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If there is any area of the law which should be crystal-clear, it is
the jurisdiction of courts.
Wolfson & Kurland'
The prescription of Professor Kurland and Mr. Wolfson notwith-
standing, the jurisdiction of the federal appellate courts2 has been any-
thing but clear.3 Much of the confusion centers on the appropriate
timing for appellate review. This confusion is particularly evident in
cases involving requests for attorney's fees.
The Supreme Court's interpretations of section 1291 of the Judicial
Code,4 the statute providing for appeals from the district courts to the
courts of appeals, have a long and tortuous history. Since the Court
stated, in an early case 5 involving the predecessor to section 1291, that a
final decision is one that "terminates the litigation between the parties
on the merits of the case, and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce
by execution what has been determined,"'6 and then proceeded to ignore
1 Certificates by State Courts of the Existence of a Federal Question, 63 HARv. L. REV. 111, 111
(1950). See generally Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 311-14 (1950) (describing im-
portance of bright line tests for distinguishing between justiciable and nonjusticiable issues);
Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (pts. 1 & 2), 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 268
(1968-1969) (evaluating American Law Institute Study of federal jurisdiction).
2 Throughout this article, I use the term "federal appellate courts" to refer only to the
United States Courts of Appeals. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is gov-
erned by provisions different from those governing the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals.
See in/ia note 38. Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252-58 (1976) (Supreme Court) with 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1291 (West Supp. 1983) (courts of appeals). For a general discussion of the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction, see R. ROBERTSON & F. KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1-456 (R. Wolfson & P. Kurland 2d ed. 1951); R. STERN &
E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 52-253 (5th ed. 1978).
3 See, e.g., Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964) (referring to
"twilight zone" of finality); Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 191 F.2d 169, 179 (2d Cir.) (Frank,
J., concurring) (final decision rule has caused more problems than it has solved), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 893 (1951); Holdsworth v. United States, 179 F.2d 933, 934 (1st Cir. 1950) ("A
glance at the annotations to this section of the code will show how difficult the application of
a superficially simple rule may become."); see also in/ta notes 57-59, 261-63, 346-53 and accom-
panying text.
4 The statute provides: "The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts of the United States, . . . except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C.A. 1291 (West Supp. 1983). Section 1291 was first enacted as
part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
Extraordinary writs provide an additional but limited device for permitting appellate
review of trial court decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976). Additionally, the federal appel-
late courts have jurisdiction for appeals of certain interlocutory orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292 (1976).
In addition to the above statutes, several others authorize jurisdiction in the courts of
appeals, but do not bear on the problem at hand. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (1982) (review of
safety standards promulgated by Consumer Product Safety Commission); 18 U.S.C. § 3731
(1976) (appeals from dismissal of indictment or information in criminal cases).
5 St. Louis, I.M. & S.R.R. v. Southern Express Co., 108 U.S. 24 (1883).
6 Id at 28-29. For some of the very early constructions of the finality requirement, see
Crick, The Final'Judgment as a Basisfor Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 548-51 (1932); Frank, Requiem
for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEx. L. REV. 292, 292 n.3 (1966).
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its own definition, 7 there has been substantial confusion over the appro-
priate point at which a disappointed party may seek appellate review.
The costs of this uncertainty are substantial. As with any area of
law, uncertainty breeds increased litigation, with attendant expenses
and unfairness, or at least perceptions of unfairness. Moreover, when
appellate jurisdiction is involved, the short "appellate statute of limita-
tions" 8 may cause a party to forfeit appellate review because of a nomi-
nal procedural lapse engendered by lack of clarity in the law.9 To a
large extent, the uncertainty in the final decision requirement histori-
cally has been resolved ad hoc by the Supreme Court (or the courts of
appeals) deciding in a specific situation whether a district court decision
is sufficiently final to permit an appeal.' 0
This article examines the issue of appellate jurisdiction in cases in
which attorney's fees are sought in addition to any other relief that may
be awarded. The "traditional American rule," requires that each party
to a lawsuit bear her own attorney's fees. 1 There are, however, several
exceptions to this general rule, some venerable and some of more recent
origin. Although rationales for these exceptions vary widely, each per-
mits a party (or her attorney)12 to recover attorney's fees from another
party, attorney,' 3 or fund established as a result of the litigation. The
currently recognized exceptions include fee shifting pursuant to contrac-
7 The suit in St. Louir R.R. was brought to compel the railroad to carry the Southern
Express Company's business. In its decree, the trial court enjoined the railroad from interfer-
ing with the business of the express company. The decree also provided that the express
company could seek an investigation of alleged discriminatory pricing and recover any
overcharges. The railroad appealed the decree. The express company applied to the trial
court for the appointment of a master to investigate and report on the alleged discriminatory
pricing, and a master was appointed. The express company then moved to dismiss the appeal
on the ground that the decree was not final. The Supreme Court held that the decree was
final and that matters pertaining to compensation for discriminatory pricing were "incidents
of the main litigation, but not necessarily a part of it." 108 U.S. at 29.
8 1 use this term in a different fashion than the common understanding of statutes of
limitations. The congruity, however, is substantial: the appellant's failure to take the requi-
site steps within a prescribed period will bar a resolution on the merits. Indeed, in one sense
the appellate statute of limitations is harsher than ordinary statutes of limitations, in that the
requirement of filing a timely notice of appeal cannot be waived because it is jurisdictional.
FED. R. App. P. 4(a); see also United States v. Isabella, 251 F.2d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 1958). But
cf Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1978) (per curiam) (court of appeals had juris-
diction where parties waived separate judgment requirement of rule 58 of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure). The statute of limitations, however, an affirmative defense, can be waived.
Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Bd., 594 F.2d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 1979).
9 Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507 (1950); Swanson v. American
Consumer Indus., 517 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1975).
10 For example, the Court recently resolved the finality of an order refusing to disqualify
counsel from further representation of a party, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449
U.S. 368 (1981), and of an order refusing to certify a class action, Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
11 E.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
12 See infra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (Supp. V 1981).
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tual agreement, 14 as a sanction for bad faith conduct, 15 for willful viola-
tion of a court order, 16 when authorized by statute 17 and the common
fund and common benefit exceptions. 18
The escalating costs of litigation' 9 and the evolution and growth of
private class actions20 and public interest litigation have contributed to
a dramatic increase in the frequency and significance of attempts to
shift attorney's fees. 21 In the public interest arena, reliance on the pri-
14 The parties to a contract may agree in advance on the allocation of attorney's fees
that may arise in litigation over performance of the contract.
15 Perhaps the most amorphous of the exceptions, the notion that a court has the inher-
ent and equitable power to punish an "obstreperous" party is unquestioned. Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975). An award of attorney's fees as a
sanction, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37, is more closely related to the bad faith theory than statutory
fee shifting. See nfra text accompanying notes 400-02.
16 See, e.g., Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923).
17 Although federal statutes have authorized fee shifting for over 90 years, see Sherman
Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982)), a sub-
stantial increase in congressional sanctioning of fee shifting has occurred since the Supreme
Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). See
infra text accompanying notes 22-26. SinceA'eska, Congress has enacted dozens of attorney's
fees statutes. See 6 FED. ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS REP. (Harcourt Brace Jovanich) No. 5, at
2-3 (Aug. 1983).
A number of states also have statutes authorizing a party to recover attorney's fees. See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.60.010, 09.60.015 (1973); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-17-101 (Supp.
1982); IOWA CODE § 625.22 (1983). When a diversity case involves a state claim for which
state law authorizes a recovery of attorney's fees, some of the same issues of finality may be
raised. See ina note 285. For a discussion of the interplay between state and federal law in a
diversity case, see Note, Attorng's Fees- Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV.
1216, 123341 (1976).
18 The common fund exception allows a plaintiff who has established a fund that will
benefit others who are similarly situated to recover attorney's fees from that fund. The com-
mon benefit exception is similar but does not require creation of a fund, only the conferral of
a benefit. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Sprague v. Ticonic
Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 777 (1939); Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntao, Clients: Attorney Fees From
Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597 (1974); see also in/ra text accompanying notes 412-512.
An offshoot of the common fund exception permits a disinterested stakeholder in an
interpleader action to recover attorney's fees from the fund deposited in court. Eg., Massa-
chusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Central Pa. Nat'l Bank, 372 F. Supp. 1027, 1044 (E.D. Pa.
1974), afd without opinion, 510 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1975).
19 Justice Powell, dissenting from the adoption of the 1980 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, stated: "Litigation costs have become intolerable, and they cast a
lengthening shadow over the basic fairness of our legal system." 85 F.R.D. 521, 523 (1980).
20 See generally Handler, The Shijt From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-
The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 6 (1971); Miller, Of Franken-
stein Monsters and Shing Knights.- Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem'" 92 HARV. L.
REV. 664 (1979).
21 Judge Tamm began a recent attorney's fee opinion by noting.
To the old adage that death and taxes share a certain inevitable charac-
ter, federal judges may be excused for adding attorneys' fees cases. The years
that have elapsed since the Supreme Court confirmed the prevalence of the
so-called "American Rule" that requires each party to bear its own counsel
fees absent a contrary statutory provision or common law exception. ., have
witnessed no abatement in the number of cases involving attempts to shift the
incidence of the costs of lawyers.
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vate attorney general exception and an expanded version of the com-
mon benefit rationale led to substantial success in recovering attorney's
fees. The Supreme Court put a temporary halt to this development in
1975 with its decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,
22
in which it held that, in the absence of congressional authorization, at-
torney's fees were not recoverable on a private attorney general theory.
23
The Court also expressed its disapproval of expansion of the common
benefit exception to justify recovery of attorney's fees. 24 Congress, how-
ever, which had included fee shifting provisions in every major piece of
civil rights legislation since 1964,25 picked up the slack and enacted the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (the Fees Awards
Act) .26
With the increasing frequency and significance of fee shifting has
come substantial confusion over when, during a given case, the issue of
attorney's fees must be decided, the appropriate procedural devices for
raising and deciding a fee request, and the extent to which resolution of
the fee issue is a predicate for appellate jurisdiction. Where an individ-
ual27 has asserted a claim for attorney's fees, this confusion has resulted
in the loss of the right 28 to appellate review of the merits of the case2 9 or
appellate review of an award of attorney's fees.30 Parties have lost the
Kennedy v. Whitehurst, 690 F.2d 951, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).
22 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
23 Id at 269. The lower federal courts have nibbled away at the restrictions placed on
recovery of attorney's fees from an adversary by A.yeska. See, e.g., Grinnell Bros., Inc. v.
Touche Ross & Co., 655 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1981).
24 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 264 n.39 (1975). The
Court was responding to Justice Marshall's dissent, which advocated reliance on a broadened
common benefit theory to affirm the award of attorney's fees. Id at 282-88 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
25 S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 5908, 5909.
26 Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(Supp. V 1981)).
For a description of the passage of the Fees Awards Act in Congress, see Malson, In
Response to Alyeska-The Civil Rights Attornq' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 21 ST. LouIs U.L.J.
430, 432-36 (1977).
27 Normally a party to the action seeks attorney's fees but this is not always the case.
Where fees are sought on the basis of the common fund exception, frequently the attorneys
are the ones seeking fees. See, e.g., In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. Pa.
1976), rev'don other grounds, 560 F.2d 1138 (3d Cir. 1977). In the statutory fee context, usually
the award is made to the client. See, e.g., Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir.
1980). Under certain circumstances, however, attorneys may intervene to assert their claim
for fees, see Lipscomb v. Wise, 643 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1981), may appeal an adverse decision,
id, or may be given the right to recover fees by the statute, see Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, § 28, 33 U.S.C. § 928 (1976). See also infra note 233.
28 All litigants in federal court have the right to one appellate review. See 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1291 (West Supp. 1983).
29 See, e.g., Crowder v. Telemedia, Inc., 659 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1981); Swanson v. Ameri-
can Consumer Indus., 517 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1975).
30 See Terket v. Lund, 623 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1980).
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opportunity to obtain attorney's fees despite the existence of a statute
permitting recovery of such fees,3 1 and cases have bounced between the
court of appeals and the district court like a yo-yo.32 The scope of the
problem is probably more extensive than the reported decisions indicate
because the courts of appeals rarely publish opinions dealing strictly
with procedural aspects of an appeal. 33 The uncertainty and confusion
has predictably led to intercircuit 34 conflict as to when a judgment is
final for purposes of appeal.
Part I of this article examines what is at stake in the determination
of when to permit an appeal. Competing considerations of judicial ad-
ministration along with efficiency and fairness to litigants create a dy-
namic tension that can never be perfectly resolved.
Part II of this article addresses an issue that has recently received a
great deal of attention: when a federal statute authorizes fee shifting,
may a decision that resolves all issues in the case other than attorney's
fees be immediately appealed? Although courts typically face attorney's
fees issues after resolution of the merits, the chronology is sometimes re-
versed when interim fees are awarded. The Supreme Court recently re-
solved one narrow aspect of this question in White v. New Hampshire
Department of Employment Security,33 a case in which attorney's fees were
sought pursuant to the Fees Awards Act. Although the Court did not
address directly the appellate jurisdiction issue, the necessary implica-
tion of its decision is to permit consideration of attorney's fees to be
delayed until after the remainder of the case is appealed. Although
White provides some certainty to the area, the analysis in Part I of this
article suggests that the case was wrongly decided. A requirement that
appeals be delayed until all issues, including attorney's fees, are decided
would better serve both efficiency and fairness. Part II also considers
many of the issues involving the intersection of statutory fees and ap-
peals unaddressed by the White Court, including interim fees, defend-
ants seeking fees, and whether fees should be treated like costs for the
purpose of appeals. Part II also examines a number of derivative proce-
31 See, e.g., White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 629 F.2d 697 (lst Cir.
1980),rev'd, 455 U.S. 445 (1982); Hirschkop v. Snead, 475 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Va. 1979),af don
other grounds, 646 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1981).
32 See, e.g., Memphis Sheraton Corp. v. Kirkley, 640 F.2d 14 i6th Cir. 1981) (district
court initially entered judgment in suit against guarantor of note, court of appeals dismissed
appeal because amount of interest was left unresolved; on remand district court awarded
interest and attorney's fees, and court of appeals modified award on appeal).
33 Johnson v. University of Bridgeport, 629 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam); see
Fulbright v. Brown Group, Inc., No. 80-1234, slip op. (8th Cir. May 20, 1980); Yellow Bird v.
Barnes, No. 79-1958, slip op. (8th Cir. May 20, 1980).
34 See in/ra text accompanying notes 91-109. Somewhat more surprising is the intracir-
cuit conflict that has developed. See infa note 97.
35 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
[Vol. 69:207
1984] A TTORNEYS FEES
dural questions intertwined with appealability. 36
Parts III through V consider appealability in the other major con-
texts in which fees are sought: bad faith, common fund, and common
benefit. Despite venerable precedent in the common fund and common
benefit contexts, the article concludes that tying attorney's fees to the
merits, with the availability of discretion in the trial courts to permit
exceptions, would better serve the courts and the parties before them.
I
THE FINALITY CALCULUS
The common law requirement of a final decision to invoke appel-
late jurisdiction 37 was incorporated in the first Judiciary Act 38 and re-
36 For example, because "judgment" is defined in terms of which orders can be appealed
and because entry of judgment places certain limitations on the district court's jurisdiction
over the case, issues concerning post-trial motions and appealability become intertwined. See
infta notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
37 See Metcalfe's Case, 11 Coke 38, 40 (1614). For a comprehensive history of the devel-
opment of the finality prerequisite for appellate review both at common law and equity in
England, see Crick, supra note 6, at 540-48.
38 The Judiciary Act of 1789 required a final decree or judgment for appeals of civil
actions in the district court to a circuit court and for appeals of cases in the circuit courts to
the Supreme Court. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84. The Act also required
a final decree or judgment for appeals of admiralty or maritime cases to the circuit court and
for appeal from the highest court of a state to the United States Supreme Court. Id §§ 21,
25, 1 Stat. 73, 83, 85-86. The restructuring of the lower federal courts, whereby the circuit
courts were transformed from courts of limited appellate jurisdiction that operated primarily
as trial courts in diversity cases into courts of mandatory appellate review is described in J.
HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE
SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 4-6 (1981); see also H. HART & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 32-45 (2d ed. 1973). When
Congress first created the courts of appeals in 1891, their appellate jurisdiction was limited to
"final decisions." Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828. The term "final
decision" is equivalent to "final judgment or decree." Ex pare Tiffany, 252 U.S. 32, 36
(1920); Harrington v. Holler, 111 U.S. 796, 797 (1884).
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of appeals from state courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 (1976), which provides: "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of
a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court."
Although the "final decision" requirement of§ 1291 has, at times, been cited as if fungi-
ble with the "final judgment or decree" requirement of § 1257, Frank, supra note 6, at 295 &
n.27, recent Supreme Court cases have not done so. Compare, e.g., O'Dell v. Espinoza, 456
U.S. 430 (1982) (per curiam) and American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274 (1980)
with Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978). Some have argued that a stricter
interpretation of § 1257 is justified on the grounds that this provision implicates federalism
concerns, as well as the efficiency notions that underlie § 1291. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 502-05 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Boskey, inalitp of State Court
jumenmts Under the FederalJudicial Code, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1002-03 (1943). In addi-
tion, the statutory exceptions to the final decision requirement contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1292
(1976) are not available for Supreme Court review of state court decisions.
In any event, the question of Supreme Court jurisdiction over a state case in which all
issues except statutory attorney's fees have been decided has not yet been addressed. The
issue is likely to arise, however, because state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a
number of federal statutory claims for which attorney's fees are authorized. Also, a number
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
mains today. Although both the courts and Congress have carved out
exceptions, it justifiably remains largely intact.39 The strongest ration-
ale underlying this allocation of jurisdiction between the federal district
and appellate courts is that it promotes efficient judicial administration.
This comprehensive rubric encompasses a variety of interests and cir-
cumstances that deserve greater explication.
One way that the final decision requirement promotes efficiency is
by minimizing the time required for the ultimate resolution of a case. If
a party could obtain appellate review of nonfinal decisions by the trial
judge at will, conclusion of the dispute could be substantially delayed.
40
This problem is exacerbated by the time required for disposition of an
appeal. 4' Less restrictive provisions for appeal would also allow conten-
tious or malicious litigants to expand the extent of the proceedings at
the expense of their opponents.
4 2
From the perspective of the courts of appeals, where concerns about
clogged dockets have been increasingly expressed, 43 the final decision
rule reduces the number of appeals for several reasons. Interlocutory
orders that would have been appealed, if permitted, become moot when
the aggrieved party is the victor. Other orders that may seem crucial at
the time of entry may later be corrected by the trial judge, fade in signif-
icance by the time the case is resolved,44 constitute harmless error,45 or
at least, be reviewed more efficiently4 6 when viewed from the perspec-
tive of a final resolution of the entire dispute. Moreover, there is sub-
of states have statutes that sanction fee shifting in cases where a federal question might arise.
See, e.g., supra note 17.
39 For a discussion of the judicial and legislative incursions on the final decision rule, see
infra notes 58, 346-49 and accompanying text. Among the commentators who have argued
for relaxation of the requirement are Crick, supra note 6, at 557-65; Redish, The Pragmatic
Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 89 (1975); Note, The Writ of
Mandamus: A Possible Answer to the Final Judgment Rule, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 1102 (1950). But
see Frank, supra note 6.
40 The problem is illustrated by the history of English equity practice where there were
no limitations placed on appeals of orders or interlocutory decrees that preceded the final
decree. Crick, supra note 6, at 545-48. The resulting disarray was one of the factors that led to
reform. See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of
Review and the National Law, 82 HARv. L. REV. 542, 549 (1969).
41 The median time for disposition of an appeal of a civil case in the courts of appeals
was 11.3 months for the 12 months ending June 30, 1980. The median ranged from a low of
6.6 months in the Second Circuit to a high of 14.6 in the Ninth Circuit. ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 234-36.
42 Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940).
43 See, e.g., Levin, Research injudicialAdinistration: The Federal Experience, 26 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 237, 239 (1981); PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIRST ANNUAL JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, 89 F.R.D. 169, 174 (1980). See generally
Carrington, supra note 40 (discussing congestion in courts of appeals and ways to deal with
problem).
44 C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 101 (3d ed. 1976).
45 See FED. R. Civ. P. 61.
46 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981).
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stantial advantage in simply consolidating all claims of error in one
appellate proceeding. For the appellate court it means only one panel of
judges need educate itself about the case. For the parties it means re-
ducing the costs of appellate review by decreasing the amount of papers
needed and limiting the amount of attorney time required to administer
procedural aspects of the case.4 7 Limitations on brief length and time
for oral argument for each appeal48 also force an appellant to assess real-
istically the validity of each potential ground for reversal asserted on
appeal.4
9
While these grounds are compelling, other rationales for the final
decision requirement have received less than unanimous support. One
such policy is that repeated "looking over the shoulder" by appellate
courts during the course of the lawsuit undermines respect for and the
independence of, the trial judge.50 The "common sense basis" that
"[o]ne [is] not really aggrieved until the final judgment" 51 is belied by
the several exceptions that have been carved out of the final decision
requirement.
52
The policies supporting the final decision requirement are not,
however, without competing considerations. The potential delay in ap-
pellate review engendered by strict application of the final decision rule
may impose a number of burdens that cause a wide spectrum of harm to
the party denied immediate review. Thus, a litigant who claims a dis-
pute is arbitrable may be required to engage in an empty but expensive
exercise if a district court's refusal to stay the case pending arbitration is
not immediately appealable.5 3 A similar burden may be suffered by a
party whose motion for summary judgment is incorrectly denied in the
trial court. More serious hardships54 resulting from the final decision
47 See generaly FED. R. App. P. 4, 10-11, 25-28, 30-34; Willcox, Karlen & Roemer,Justice
Lost-By What Appellate Papers Cost, 33 N.Y.U. L. REv. 934 (1958).
48 FED. R. App. P. 28(g), 34.
49 U.C.L.A. MOOT COURT HONORS PROGRAM, HANDBOOK OF APPELLATE ADVOCACY
26-28 (1980).
50 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978).
Given their views on the importance of appellate review, it is not surprising that Profes-
sor Wright subscribes to this argument, while Professor Carrington does not. Compare Wright,
The Doubtfil Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 779-82 (1957) (broadening
scope of appellate review impairs public confidence in trial courts) with Carrington, The Power
of District Judges and the Responsibility of Courts of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REv. 507 (1969) and Car-
rington, supra note 40, at 550-51 (appellate review prevents abuse of authority and increases
objectivity).
51 M. GREEN, BASIc CIVIL PROCEDURE 260-61 (2d ed. 1979).
52 See infra text accompanying notes 346-53.
53 For a discussion of the appealability of orders that have the effect of either granting or
denying arbitration, see Note, Interlocutog Appeal of Orders Granting or Denying Stays of Arbitration,
80 MICH. L. REV. 153, 170 n.88 (1981).
54 Professor Redish divides these hardships into "internal consequences," which include
those burdens and expenses incurred in the litigation itself, and "external consequences,"
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requirement may include losing a unique piece of property without any
opportunity to recover it after a successful appeal, 55 or suffering "irrepa-
rable injury" when injunctive relief is incorrectly denied. The final deci-
sion requirement also consumes additional judicial resources in those
cases where reversal of a nonfinal decision would have ended the
litigation.
56
These conflicting tensions have prompted Congress57 and the
courts58 to create exceptions to the final decision rule. The classic ten-
sion between the efficiency of a relatively certain rule and the fairness of
a more flexible ad hoc approach is illustrated in microcosm by the de-
bate over the final decision rule.59
Another factor that has had an impact on the development of the
doctrine is that the balance between competing policies in any specific
case may well be struck by the context in which the issue arises: a deci-
sion on whether appellate jurisdiction exists occurs only after an appeal
has been perfected, and frequently after the merits have been briefed
and presented to the appellate court., The inefficiencies in not deciding
the merits at that time, along with the natural tendency to avoid a
pointless exercise, may tend to skew the result toward permitting appeal
in close cases.cO This is particularly true when, as is often the case, all
which include those hardships incurred outside the litigation, such as revelation of a trade
secret caused by a refusal to permit interlocutory review. See Redish, supra note 39, at 98-99;
see also Frank, supra note 6, at 301-02.
55 See, e.g., Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848).
56 The hardship may also be less drastic, such as loss of interest or reduced interest on a
monetary recovery for a period of time. Cf Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446
U.S. 1 (1980) (permitting rule 54(b) direction to enter final judgment on resolution of less
than all claims because of difference in statutory prejudgment interest rate and market rate).
57 Congressional exceptions include: 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976) permitting appeals
of "[ilnterlocutory orders of the district courts... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing,
or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct
review may be had in the Supreme Court"; 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) providing for appeal
of a nonfinal order where the district court determines that the order "involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation" and the court of appeals agrees; and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976)
discussed supra note 4. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which permits the trial court to
sever for appeal final decisions of less than all claims or parties in a case, also serves as a de
facto exception. See infra notes 261-63 and accompanying text.
58 The judicial exceptions have centered around two Supreme Court decisions, Forgay
v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848) (granting appellate review of decree on merits before
final disposition where decree ordered defendant to turn overproperty to plaintiff), and Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The "collateral order" doctrine created
in Cohen has very limited applicability to the attorney's fees problem. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 484-91.
59 A number of commentators have noted that the final decision rule is an imperfect
device for distinguishing between those trial decisions that should be reviewed immediately
and those that should be deferred. See Crick, supra note 6; Redish, supra note 39.
60 See American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 289 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "[j]urisdictional prerequisites cannot be disregarded simply because
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parties take the position that appellate jurisdiction exists.61 This phe-
nomenon encourages appeal in marginally final cases, and exacerbates




APPEALABILITY WHERE ATTORNEY'S FEES ARE AWARDED
ON THE BASIS OF STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION
A. Plaintiffs Seeking Recovery of Fees at the Conclusion
of the Case
Over one hundred federal statutes63 provide for recovery of attor-
it seems more economical"); Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 488 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (arguing that Court "usfed] a dubious technique to gloss over a lack of final-
ity"); Moore & Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certiftation in Federal Appellate Procedure, 35
VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1949).
61 See, e.g., Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964); DeLong
Corp. v. Raymond Int'l, 622 F.2d 1135, 1138 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980). In Gillespie, both parties
urged the Court to decide the merits despite a question about the court of appeals' jurisdic-
tion. After citing a number of inapplicable exceptions to the final decision rule and re-
marking on the imprecision of any formula to deal -with the "twilight zone" of finality, Justice
Black engaged in an ad hoc balancing process from the perspective of an appeal already
having been taken. Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 152-53.
After Gillespie, the courts of appeals spent considerable effort attempting to divine the
precise scope of the "twilight zone" of finality. Note, Interlocuto.y Appeals in the Federal Courts
Under 28 U.S.C § 1292(b), 88 HARV. L. REv. 607, 608 n.7 (1975); see, e.g., Herbst v. Interna-
tional Tel. & Tel. Corp., 495 F.2d 1308, 1311-13 (2d Cir. 1974). Subsequently, in Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 n.30 (1978), the Court largely eviscerated Gillespie,
stating that if it were extended beyond "the unique facts of that case," which included "an
unsettled issue of national significance" and in which the "finality issue had not been
presented. . . until argument on the merits," the final decision rule "would be stripped of all
significance." Contrary to the Court's statement of the circumstances in Gillespie, however,
the respondent in that case had raised the jurisdictional issue in response to the petition for a
writ of certiorari. Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 170 n.6 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Furthermore,
it is irrelevant to the court of appeals' jurisdiction. The former assertion regarding the na-
tional significance of the underlying issue is nowhere relied on in the Gillespie Court's discus-
sion of the jurisdiction of the court of appeals.
62 Over half a century ago, Professor Sunderland made this critical assessment of the
final decision requirement:
There is one thing to be said in favor of no restrictions at all,-it will save
an immense amount of useless litigation over the question whether parties
may or may not appeal particular cases. Every restriction to ward off appeals
creates litigation over the force and effect of the restriction itself. Machinery
to save labor may become so complex as to waste more labor than it saves.
Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 TEx. L. REv. 126, 127 (1927). Professor Sun-
derland is correct that inefficiency can be generated by litigation over when an appeal may be
taken, but he is incorrect in placing the blame on the restrictive nature of the rule. It is the
uncertainty about the rule that has generated inefficiency, not its restrictive nature. Surely
there would be no more litigation over a flat prohibition on any appeal before a well-defined
conclusion to the case than there would be over an equally unrestrictive standard.
63 6 FED. ArrORNEY FEE AWARDS REP. (Harcourt Brace Jovanich) No. 5, at 2-3 (Aug.
1983); see also Public Participation in Federal Ageng Proceedings Act of 1977 Hearings on S. 270
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 95th
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ney's fees, typically, although not exclusively, by a "prevailing party. '64
Many of these statutes are of recent vintage, products of congressional
action in the civil rights and public interest areas.65 Several older stat-
utes, such as the Clayton Act, 66 the Securities Act of 1933,67 and the
Copyright Act68 authorize fee shifting as well. Given the existence of
these statutes, it is surprising that, until the mid-1970s, little attention
was paid to the interrelationship between a potential or actual claim for
attorney's fees authorized by federal statute and the existence of a final
decision that would permit appeal of the case to the courts of appeals.
69
The breaks in the dam began in 1976 with an unenlightening footnote
in Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc. 70 In Baughman, the Third Circuit, sua
sponte, raised the issue of its jurisdiction over an appeal from a judg-
ment in an antitrust case in which the trial judge had not decided the
Cong., 1st Sess. 707-19, 726-27 (1977) (reprinting COHEN, FEDERAL COURTS: AWARDS OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES (Congressional Research Service 1977) and COHEN, AWARDS OF ATrOR-
NEYS' FEES IN FEDERAL COURTS AND BY FEDERAL AGENCIES (Congressional Research Serv-
ice 1977)).
In addition to federal statutes providing for a shifting of attorney's fees in civil litigation,
a number of statutes provide for recovery of attorney's fees in administrative proceedings.
E.g., Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, § 106, 7 U.S.C. § 18() (1982).
In the criminal area, the Criminal Justice Act § 2, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1982) provides for
government payment of fees to attorneys appointed to represent indigents. Analogous ques-
tions about the relationship among the underlying criminal case, awards of attorney's fees,
and appealability have arisen. See In re Derickson, 640 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1981). Attorney's
fees awards in both the criminal and administrative context are beyond the scope of this
article.
64 Se, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(Supp. V 1981); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
65 See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(Supp. V 1981); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
66 Ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982)).
Congress first enacted the provision authorizing fee shifting in 1890 as part of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890), but later superseded it with § 4 of the
Clayton Act.
67 Ch. 38, § 11 (e), 48 Stat. 74, 83 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1982)).
As originally enacted § 11 (e) of the 1933 Act did not authorize attorney's fees. Recovery of
attorney's fees in cases involving a false registration statement under the Securities Act was
first authorized in 1934. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 206(d), 48 Stat. 881, 908 (amend-
ing Securities Act of 1933, § 11(e)).
68 Ch. 320, § 40, 34 Stat. 1075, 1084 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 505 (Supp. V
1981)).
69 E.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 221 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964); Signal Mfg. Co. v. Kilgore Mfg. Co., 198 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.
1952). But see Lunn v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 207 F.2d 174 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 928 (1954); Laufenberg, Inc. v. Goldblatt Bros., 187 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1951); Davis
Harvester Co. v. Long Mfg. Co., 283 F. Supp. 536 (E.D.N.C. 1967); Darlington v. Stude-
baker-Packard Corp., 191 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Ind. 1961); Philadelphia Brief Case Co. v. Spe-
cialty Leather Prods. Co., 160 F. Supp. 153 (D.N.J. 1958); cf. Newton v. Consolidated Gas
Co., 265 U.S. 78 (1924).
By contrast, in 1882 the Supreme Court held that an award of attorney's fees to a plain-
tiff from a common fund under the control of the court was an appealable order. Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882). See infia text accompanying notes 418-21.
70 530 F.2d 529, 531 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976).
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magnitude of the attorney's fees award.7' Since Baughman, courts have
provided various solutions to the appealability question and the related
procedural problems that arise when statutory attorney's fees awards are
at issue. 72
1. The Scope of Federal Fee Shifting Statutes
Despite the variety of language used in the many federal fee shift-
ing statutes and the glosses in interpretation superimposed by the courts,
most attorney's fees provisions fall into a limited number of categories.
Those categories are delineated by two parameters: the threshold of suc-
cess that a party must attain to be entitled to recover fees 73 and the
extent of discretion afforded to the court in deciding whether to award
fees to a party who has met the threshold. 74 The success threshold runs
in a stepped hierarchy that permits, in the least restrictive statutes, a
party who has attained some minimal success on the merits to recover
attorney's fees.75 At the other end of the spectrum, a number of statutes
sanction fee shifting only when the opposing party has litigated in bad
faith, vexatiously, or for oppressive reasons.76 Similarly, the trial court's
discretion ranges from the mandatory provision for awarding fees to a
successful plaintiff under the Clayton Act 77 to the largely unbounded
71 The court relied on the statutory characterization of an attorney's fee as part of the
costs in holding that its jurisdiction was unaffected by the undecided issue of the amount of
attorney's fees to be awarded. 1d; see infia text accompanying notes 99-100.
72 See infra text accompanying notes 96-109.
73 Or similarly, a threshold that would entitle a party to recover fees could be the mer-
itlessness of the opposing party's claims or defenses. See infia note 76.
74 In addition to the threshold and discretion parameters, the statutes may vary in other
ways that are relevant to the procedural questions addressed in this section. For example,
although some statutes characterize attorney's fees as part of the "costs" to be awarded, others
do not. See infra note 293.
75 E.g., Endangered Species Act § 11, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (1976); Clean Air Act
§ 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (Supp. V 1981); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 23, 43
U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981); see Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983).
At least one federal statute permits recovery of attorney's fees by a person who does not
prevail at all, but that statute governs agency rulemaking rather than court proceedings. See
Toxic Substances Control Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(4)(A) (1982); see also Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274, 3277 n.7 (1983).
76 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1982). The statute provides
for recovery of attorney's fees when the opponent's suit or defense is "without merit." A
number of courts have interpreted this standard to be essentially coextensive with the equita-
ble "bad faith" standard. See, e.g., Johnson v. Yerger, 612 F.2d 953, 959 (5th Cir. 1980);
Driscoll v. Oppenheimer & Co., 500 F. Supp. 174, 175 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
Between the two extremes in thresholds, there is the "prevailing party" standard con-
tained in the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V
1981), and in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976), the "finally
prevails" standard, see, e.g., Packers and Stockyard Act § 509, 7 U.S.C. § 210(0 (1982), and
the requirement that a prevailing party demonstrate "exceptional circumstances" before re-
covering fees, see, e.g., Lanham Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1982); see also Ruckelshaus v. Sierra
Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274, 3276-77 (1983).
77 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
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"whenever . . . appropriate" standard for fee awards contained in a
number of environmental statutes.
78
The analysis that follows is generally applicable to the vast major-
ity of federal fee shifting statutes, regardless of their threshold and dis-
cretion provisions. For reasons of convenience, however, the focus of this
section is on the Fees Awards Act 79 and the attorney's fees provisions of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,80 two statutes that recently
have caused considerable litigation and uncertainty. The fee award
78 See supra note 75.
In addition to the variety of standards for awarding fees, the language of one fee shifting
statute, the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. V 1981), appears specific
enough to resolve the appealability question that arises from attempts to recover fees. The
directive that "[a] party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days
of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for fees," 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1981), should be dispositive in determining when a request to recover
attorney's fees must be made and the impact of an unresolved attorney's fee issue on an
otherwise final judgment.
The relevant language in the Equal Access to Justice Act first surfaced during hearings
in the House in 1978. Previously most bills had treated an award of attorney's fees as part of
the costs of the action. See The Awarding of Attornes' Fees in Federal Courts: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the Comm. on theJudiciagy, 95th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 160-256 (1978). On April 26, 1978, the United States Department of
Justice submitted a proposed bill that contained, in § 103(a), the provision that "[a] party
seeking payment of reasonable fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final judg-
ment in the action, submit to the court an application which provides evidence of such party's
eligibility for the award and the amount sought . . . ." However, the two Department of
Justice attorneys who drafted the bill and used the term "final judgment" had no intention of
addressing or affecting the stage at which any appeal could be taken or the relationship be-
tween attorney's fees and the merits. They have described the choice of language as "pure
accident"; the provision was intended to address the more mechanical concern of the time
limits within which a party might seek fees. Telephone interview with Hon. Warren King,
Attorney-Advisor, Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, United States
Department of Justice (Nov. 23, 1982); Telephone interview with Karen Siegel, Deputy Leg-
islative Counsel, United States Department of Justice (Nov. 22, 1982). That language was
carried forward in the legislative process and ultimately ensconced in the Equal Access to
Justice Act § 204(a), 94 Stat. 2325 (1980). Nowhere in the legislative history is there any
explanation of the "within thirty days of final judgment" language.
The United States has taken the position that the reference to "final judgment" in the
Equal Access to Justice Act means the point at which the parties have exhausted all appeals,
not the final appealable decision of the district court. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND OTHER EXPENSES IN
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT 30-31 (198 1). But see
McDonald v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (government's argument that
plaintiff was foreclosed from recovering fees because of failure to file application within 30
days of district court's judgment rejected because application was filed within 30 days of
termination of appeal).
79 The statute provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C.
1681 et seq.] [sic], or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d
et seq.] [sic], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V 1981).
80 The statute provides:
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provisions in both statutes are virtually identical and have been treated
as such by the courts 81 Both contain a threshold requiring a "prevail-
ing party" as a predicate for a fee award and provide the trial court with
"discretion" in whether to award fees.8 2 A substantial number of other
federal fee shifting statutes contain comparable provisions.
8 3
Distinctions in procedural treatment of attorney's fees based on the
exception that permits their recovery are common.8 4 Nevertheless, uni-
form treatment of all requests for attorney's fees based on federal statu-
tory authority, regardless of the particular statute involved, would seem
salutary,85 at least to provide certainty to litigants and to minimize the
instances where noncompliance with procedural requirements results in
a loss of rights.
2. The Congruence ofJudgment and Final Decision
The nominal issue before the Supreme Court in White v. New Hamp-
shire Department of Employment Security8 was whether the ten-day time
limitation for making a motion to alter or amend a judgment in rule
59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure8 7 was applicable to a
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discre-
tion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Com-
mission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private
person.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
81 Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980); Obin v. District No. 9 of the Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists, 651 F.2d 574, 578 n.5 (8th Cir. 1981). But cf Derheim v. Hennepin County Bu-
reau of Social Serv., 524 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 (D. Minn. 1981) (noting that title VII entitles
prevailing parties to fee awards for efforts in exhausting administrative remedies, but that
Fees Awards Act only applies to actions in state or federal court based on violations of laws
enumerated in Fees Awards Act), a.fad, 688 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1982); Blow v. Lascaris, 523 F.
Supp. 913, 916 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (same), afdper curiam, 688 F.2d 670 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 225 (1982).
82 Both the "prevailing party" and "discretion" provisions of the Fees Awards Act and
title VII have been substantially affected by recent Supreme Court interpretation. See infia
notes 158-59, 161.
83 See Note, Awards of Attomey's Fees in the Federal Courts, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 277, 286-
87 & n.34 (1982).
This article also addresses variances among statutes that affect the considerations bearing
on the appealability determination. For example, differences in the specific threshold and the
extent of discretion may have a marginal impact on the analysis. See, e.g., infra note 163. In
addition, a unique or unusual aspect of a particular fee shifting statute may have an effect on
procedural questions. See, e.g., infla note 262.
84 Compare, e.g., Stacy v. Williams, 446 F.2d 1366, 1367 (5th Cir. 1971) (rule 59(e) appli-
cable to request for fees based on bad faith exception) with, e.g., Knighton v. Watkins, 616
F.2d 795, 798 (5th Cir. 1980) (request for fees based on Fees Awards Act is governed by
"costs" provision of rule 54(d)).
85 See infra note 163.
86 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
87 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) provides: "A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." The 10-day
period cannot be extended, even with approval of the court. FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b).
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postjudgment request for attorney's fees pursuant to the Fees Awards
Act. On its face, this appears to be a very different matter from the issue
of what constitutes a final appealable decision in the district court. De-
spite this facial dissimilarity, the two issues are closely connected be-
cause "judgment" is defined in rule 54(a) solely in terms of what may be
appealed: "'Judgment' as used in these rules includes a decree and any
order from which an appeal lies." 88 Thus, to determine whether a judg-
ment exists and whether rule 59(e) and its time limits are therefore ap-
plicable requires reference to the provisions for appellate jurisdiction.89
Most significant in this regard is the final decision requirement in sec-
tion 1291 of the Judicial Code.90 Indeed, many courts have used the
term "judgment" interchangeably with the term "final decision." 91 In
addition to appeals of final decisions, section 129292 authorizes appeals
88 FED. R. Civ. P. 54(a). The term "includes" suggests that a judgment may encompass
more than all appealable orders and decrees, but that is not the case. See In re Manufacturers
Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1952); In re Long Island Properties, 42 F. Supp. 323
(S.D.N.Y. 1941).
In Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12 (1951), Justice Jackson pointed out that every final
judgment is an appealable final decision, but that not every final decision is a final judgment.
He was referring to the collateral order doctrine, which permits an appeal despite the fact
that the merits of the case remain unresolved. See infra text accompanying notes 346-50.
89 See Banker's Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1978).
Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain other, ministerial
requirements for a judgment and its entry, most notably that the judgment be set forth in a
separate document.
90 The statute provides: "The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts of the United States, . . . except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West Supp. 1983).
91 See, e.g., In re Underwriter's at Lloyd's, 666 F.2d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1981); Young v. Ethyl
Corp., 635 F.2d 681, 683 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); see also Frank, supra note 6, at 294-95.
92 The statute provides in relevant part:
(a) [T]he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States,
granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or
refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct re-
view may be had in the Supreme Court;
(2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind
up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof,
such as directing sales or other disposals of property;
(3) Interlocutory decrees of such district courts or the judges thereof de-
termining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in
which appeals from final decrees are allowed.
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order in-
volves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,
he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may
thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order,
if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order:
Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay
proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of
Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
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from several classes of nonfinal or interlocutory orders. Rule 54(a) also
defines these appealable interlocutory orders as judgments; they have
been characterized as "interlocutory judgments," as opposed to "final
judgments," which is used to denote orders that are appealable as final
decisions pursuant to section 1291.93
Once the district court resolves all of the issues in a case necessary
for a final decision and enters final judgment, its authority to modify the
decision on those aspects of the case included or includible in the judg-
ment is circumscribed by rule 59(e) and its strict time limitations.9 4 Be-
cause of its potential impact on the judgment, a timely rule 59(e) motion
suspends the running of the time in which to take an appeal from the
final judgment until after a decision is rendered on the motion.95 Thus,
the relationship among a request for attorney's fees, a decision resolving
all other matters in a case (which, for want of a better characterization,
I will refer to as the merits), and a final decision for purposes of section
1291, must be addressed in order to resolve the issue before the Court in
White. The courts of appeals had provided a number of different ap-
proaches to this issue prior to White.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1292 (1976 & West Supp. 1983) (emphasis in original).
93 Rule 54(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes no distinction between
judgments.
Although the term "final judgment" has been used in other contexts to refer to a judg-
ment for which all available appeals have been exhausted or for which the time to appeal has
expired, see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n.5 (1965), I will use it to signify a judg-
ment that is appealable under § 1291. By contrast, I will use 'judgment" generically to apply
to all judgments regardless of the basis for appealability, and "interlocutory judgment" to
apply to all judgments that are not final judgments.
94 See, e.g., United States v. One Hundred Nineteen Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty
Dollars, 680 F.2d 106, 107 (1Ith Cir. 1982).
Among the other postjudgment devices a party may use to seek some change in the
judgment are a motion for new trial, FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a), a motion to amend or make
additional findings in a nonjury case, FED. R. Civ. P. 52(b), a motion for judgment n.o.v.,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), and a motion for relief from judgment, FED. R. Civ. P. 60. In addition,
an independent action attacking the judgment may be sustainable. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b);
cf FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Of these provisions, only rule 60(b) has any arguable relevance to a
postjudgment request for attorney's fees, and its scope is substantially limited to six specified
grounds, none of which would be applicable in a routine case involving statutory attorney's
fees. See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 202 (1950) (failure to appeal because of
prohibitive costs is not justifiable within meaning of rule 60(b)(6)).
Although a few courts before the While decision relied on rule 60(b) and its more expan-
sive time limitations to justify a postjudgment fee request, none even attempted to explain
why any of the requisite circumstances contained in 60(b) were present. See Fox v. Parker,
626 F.2d 351, 353 n.2 (4th Cir. 1980); DuBuit v. Harwell Enters., 540 F.2d 690, 692 (4th Cir.
1976); cf. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 629 F.2d 697, 704 n.9 (lst Cir.
1980) (declining to address circumstances in which rules other than 59(e) might be used to
seek postjudgment fee award), rev'd, 455 U.S. 445 (1982); Janicki v. Pizza, 501 F. Supp. 312,
313 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (intimating that rule 60(a) might sanction motion for statutory fees
made more than 10 days after entry of judgment).
95 The time for taking an appeal begins to run on entry of the order disposing of the
motion. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(4).
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3. The Variety of Solutions in the Courts of Appeals
The first approach, suggested by the Third Circuit in Baughman v.
Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 96 but later ignored and finally repudiated by that
court, 97 treats attorney's fees as "costs" of the action. 98 Because rule 58
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[e]ntry of the
judgment shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs," the effect of this
approach is to sever the merits from the issue of attorney's fees. A final
decision of the merits would constitute a valid final judgment, appeala-
ble independent of the attorney's fees. Because the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provide no time limitation for seeking costs, this ap-
proach preserves the right to seek fees despite a failure to comply with
the ten-day time limit of rule 59(e). Thus, in Knighton v. Watkins, 99 the
Fifth Circuit preserved the opportunity to obtain fees for a plaintiff who
filed a request for fees more than ten days after entry of judgment, by
holding that attorney's fees are part of the costs of the action appropri-
ately sought after entry of judgment. 100
96 530 F.2d 529, 531 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976).
97 Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc). In Baughman, the Third
Circuit held that it had jurisdiction of an appeal from a decision that left unresolved the
amount of attorney's fees to be awarded. In Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1977),
the court held that an otherwise final decision that had not addressed the plaintiff's request
for fees in his complaint was not final for purposes of appeal. Addressing the question of
appealability and resolution of attorney's fees again in DeLong Corp. v. Raymond Int'l, 622
F.2d 1135, 1138 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980), the Third Circuit attempted to distinguish Baughman from
Richerson on the ground that the right to fees in Richerson was still undecided, whereas only the
amount was left open in Baughman. However, because Baughman relied on the "costs" charac-
terization of attorney's fees, this distinction is meaningless. Both the right to have certain
expenses taxed as costs and the appropriate amount of those items are severed from the judg-
ment, and it is appealable regardless of the unresolved question of costs. See FED. R. Civ. P.
58. In Croker, the court, en banc, did not even attempt to reconcile these decisions, character-
izing them as providing "conflicting guidance." 662 F.2d at 982. The court cast its lot with
the First Circuit's ruling in White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 629 F.2d
697 (Ist Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 445 (1982), that an award of attorney's fees is part of the
relief sought and therefore integral to a judgment. Croker, 662 F.2d at 984.
The Third Circuit is not the only circuit that has failed to remain consistent in its rul-
ings. Compare White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 629 F.2d 697 (1st Cir.
1980), re'd, 455 U.S. 445 (1982) with Lovell v. Snow, 637 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1981) (refusing to
base its affirmance of district court's denial of § 1988 fees on plaintiff's failure to request fees
until several months after entry ofjudgment, and instead relying on plaintiff's pro se status to
deny recovery of attorney's fees, despite fact that request for fees, if untimely, was made to
district court that lacked jurisdiction over request); compare Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d
795 (5th Cir. 1980) with Taylor v. Sterret, 640 F.2d 663, 668 (5th Cir. 1981); compare Metcalf
v. Borba, 681 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1982) (request for fees not governed by provisions for costs)
with Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1980) (request for fees governed by costs
provisions), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1012 (1981).
98 Attorney's fees are described in the Fees Awards Act and several other federal statutes
as "costs" of the action. See inhra text accompanying note 275.
99 616 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1980).
100 Id at 797; accord Johnson v. Snyder, 639 F.2d 316, 317 (6th Cir. 1981); Bond v. Stan-
ton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1234 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1063 (1981); Williams v. Alioto,
625 F.2d 845, 848 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1012 (1981). Two district courts have
A TTORNEY'S FEES
A second approach, adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Obin v. District
No. 9 of the International Association of Machinists, (Obin I1), °10 treats attor-
ney's fees as an issue collateral to, and independent from, the merits.
Under this approach, an award of attorney's fees is properly resolved by
the district court at some point after judgment is entered, but is not
subject to any of the time limitations contained in the Judicial Code or
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 10 2 Although the collateral and
independent approach evolved from different doctrinal roots than the
"costs" approach, functionally it is quite similar: it uncouples the deter-
mination of attorney's fees from resolution of the merits. A necessary
corollary to this approach is that both the merits judgment and the
award vel non of fees are independently appealable. 03 This approach
derives from several older Supreme Court cases' 0 4 in which a party or
her attorney sought attorney's fees based on the equitable "common
fund" exception, and in turn the collateral order doctrine established by
the Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 105
The First Circuit's decision in White v. New Hampshire Department of
Employment Security, 106 represents the third approach to the procedural
reached the same conclusion. See Janicki v. Pizza, 501 F. Supp. 312, 313 (N.D. Ohio 1980);
Anderson v. Morris, 500 F. Supp. 1095, 1106 (D. Md. 1980), vacatedon othergrounds, 658 F.2d
246 (4th Cir. 1981). But cf Terket v. Lund, 623 F.2d 29, 32-33 (7th Cir. 1980) (distinguishing
attorney's fees and costs for purposes of appellate jurisdiction when appeal is taken only from
the judgment on the merits).
1o 651 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1981). Before this decision, a different Eighth Circuit panel
had denied appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal of the merits on the grounds that the
notice of appeal was untimely. Obin v. District No. 9 of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 623
F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1980) (Obin 1). Arguably, the decision in Obin II overruled the Obin I
decision. See in/a note 135.
The Eighth Circuit, as of the time of the Supreme Court's decision in White v. New
Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445 (1982), was the only circuit to have
adopted the "collateral and independent" theory.
102 The Obin II court did suggest that the district courts promulgate local rules establish-
ing time limits for submitting a fee request and suggested that the limit be 21 days. 651 F.2d
at 583.
103 Id at 584.
104 Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Central R.R. & Banking Co. v.
Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882);see infra text accom-
panying notes 413-35.
105 337 U.S. 541 (1949); see Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 482-89 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Hirschkopr v. Snead, 475 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Va. 1979), afd, 646
F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1981).
The mistaken use of the collateral order doctrine to justify separate appeals of the merits
and attorney's fees is discussed in/a text accompanying notes 484-91.
106 629 F.2d 697 (1st Cir. 1980), reoid, 455 U.S. 445 (1982). At least one other district
court ruled consistently with White. Suzuki v. Yuen, 507 F. Supp. 819, 821 n.2 (D. Hawaii
1981), rev'don other ground, 678 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1982). Before the First Circuit's holding in
White, a Virginia district court had reached a similar holding. Hirschkop v. Snead, 475 F.
Supp. 59 (E.D. Va. 1979), affdon other ground, 646 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1981). In addition, the
Second, Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits had at least implicitly rejected both the costs
approach and the collateral and independent approach as of the time of the Supreme Court's
decision in White. See Bacon v. Toia, 648 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1981), afdon other grounds sub nom.
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treatment of requests for attorney's fees pursuant to statute. The plain-
tiff challenged the defendant's handling of unemployment compensa-
tion claims and obtained a favorable judgment in the district court. 107
After the defendant appealed, the parties entered into a settlement, and
the case was remanded to the district court for entry of a consent decree.
Approximately four and one-half months later, the plaintiff moved for
an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the Fees Awards Act. The dis-
trict court, over defendant's objections, awarded plaintiff attorney's fees
in excess of $16,000. The district court later denied defendant's motion
to vacate the award, and defendant appealed.
The First Circuit held that a postjudgment request for statutory
attorney's fees is governed by rule 59(e). The ten-day time limit con-
tained in rule 59(e) is inflexible; it cannot be extended by either the
parties or the court. 08 In that sense it is "jurisdictional": the district
court has no power to rule on a motion to amend or alter the judgment
that is served more than ten days after entry of judgment. 0 9 Because
plaintiff's request for attorney's fees was untimely, the court of appeals
reversed the award.
4. The White Decision, Limited Certainty, and Preventing
Procedural Default
In a narrow opinion that was nevertheless consistent with the
Supreme Court's recent solicitude for successful civil rights plaintiffs
seeking attorney's fees, 1 0 the Court in White v. New Hampshire Department
of Employment Security11 ' reversed the First Circuit and largely adopted
the Eighth Circuit's "collateral and independent" approach from Obin
Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132 (1982); Johnson v. University of Bridgeport, 629 F.2d 828 (2d
Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (statutorily authorized attorney's fees are not "collateral"); Croker v.
Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981) (award of attorney's fees is part of relief sought and
thus integral to judgment); Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d 246, 248 (4th Cir. 1981) (judgment
that does not resolve request for attorney's fees is not final judgment); Cassidy v. Virginia
Carolina Veneer Corp., 652 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1981) (where decision on attorney's fees had
not been made, order is not final for purposes of appeal); Glass v. Pfeffer, 657 F.2d 252 (10th
Cir. 1981) (order not final until award of attorney's fees decided). But see Gary v. Spires, 634
F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1980) (indicating attorney's fees should be treated as "costs" for purposes of
rule 54(d) review).
107 Neither the judgment nor the opinion of the district court contained any indication of
an unresolved issue of attorney's fees. White, 629 F.2d at 698.
108 FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b).
109 Browder v. Director, Ill. Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257 (1978); Hirschkop v.
Snead, 475 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Va. 1979), affdon other grounds, 646 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1981); see
Lapiczak v. Zaist, 451 F.2d 79, 80 (2d Cir. 1971). But see Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384
(1964).
110 See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980);
New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980). But see Hanrahan v. Hampton,
446 U.S. 754, 757-58 (1980); Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 738
(1980).
111 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
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II as the appropriate procedural treatment of attorney's fees. The
Court noted that rule 59(e) had generally been invoked only to limit
reconsideration of those matters that might properly be included in the
merits.1 2 Reasoning that statutory fees are neither encompassed within
the decision on the merits, nor an element of traditional relief, the Court
concluded that a request for fees must be collateral and independent
from the decision on the merits and thus not subject to the time limits of
rule 59(e) or indeed any Federal Rule of Civil Procedure." 3
In response to the First Circuit's concerns for promoting judicial
efficiency by minimizing multiple appeals and preventing unfair sur-
prise to unsuccessful litigants, the Court contended that uncoupling fees
from the merits would better further those goals. First, expanding on a
point made by the Eighth Circuit in Obin II, 114 the Court adverted to
the prolonged civil rights case that involves equitable relief of a continu-
ing nature. In such a case, "many final orders may issue in the course of
the litigation,"' 15 and uncertainty as to which ones are appealable judg-
ments might result in parties making protective fee requests in response
to every order; otherwise fees to which the party was entitled would be
forfeited because not sought within the ten days permitted by rule 59(e).
Second, the Court was concerned that the stringent time limits of rule
59(e) would discourage settlement of the fees issue. 116 Third, the Court
reasoned that the discretion 17 afforded the trial court by the Fees
Awards Act in deciding whether to award fees would justify denial if the
timing of the fee request caused unfair surprise or prejudice to the de-
fendant. 118 Finally, the Supreme Court asserted that prompt resolution
of the fees request and subsequent consolidation of any fee award appeal
with the merits appeal could preclude piecemeal appeals. 119 Interest-
112 I at 451 (citing Browder v. Director, Ill. Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257 (1978)).,
113 The Court sanctioned the adoption of local rules by the district courts to govern
postjudgment requests for attorney's fees, citing the Eighth Circuit's suggestion in Obin I, 651
F.2d at 583, that the district courts adopt a local rule governing requests for attorney's fees.
White, 455 U.S. at 454 & n.16.
In a curious passage that apparently referred to the intercircuit conflict that had arisen,
the Court stated: "As different jurisdictions have established different procedures for the filing
of fee applications, there may be valid local reasons for establishing different time limits." Id
at 454 n. 16. None of the courts of appeals had relied on local factors to justify a decision
adopting an approach different from that of another circuit, and it is difficult to conceive of
factors that would justify such differences. Even the Eighth Circuit, in proposing that the
district courts adopt local rules, promoted a uniform 21-day limit. Obin If, 651 F.2d at 583.
114 651 F.2d at 581 n.8.
115 White, 455 U.S. at 453 (quoting Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 722-23 (1974)).
116 White, 455 U.S. at 453.
117 See infia note 158.
118 Whie, 455 U.S. at 454.
119 Id Presumably the Court assumed that the doctrine divesting a district court ofjuris-
diction once a notice of appeal is filed would not apply when a party seeks attorney's fees in
the district court after an appeal of the merits is taken. Courts developed this jurisdictional
dogma because of the physical limitation that a case record could only be located in one court
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ingly, the Court did not mention another point pressed by the plain-
tiffP20 and amicus:12 1 ten days is simply insufficient time in which to
expect attorneys, particularly after a lengthy case, to assemble and pre-
pare the necessary information and documentation required for a fee
request. 122
The Court did not discuss the procedural quicksand that many liti-
gants had fallen into because of the uncertainty and complexity sur-
rounding the relationship among a decision on the merits, an appealable
judgment, and a decision as to attorney's fees. The Court did not even
advert to Mr. White's plight, although he surely presented a sympa-
thetic case, having obtained a judgment based on violations of the So-
cial Security Act and the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment and a substantial award of fees from the district court, only
to lose the fees on appeal because of a technical procedural failing.1
23
at any given time. The rule has been justified as preventing two courts from addressing the
same issue simultaneously. See Terket v. Lund, 623 F.2d 29, 33 (7th Cir. 1980); Crick, supra
note 6, at 543-44. Courts have invoked the doctrine to justify dismissal of a motion for attor-
ney's fees filed after a notice of appeal. DuBuit v. Harwell Enters., 540 F.2d 690, 693 (4th Cir.
1976); see Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955, 957 (4th Cir. 1975).
Nevertheless, the rule has been riddled with exceptions. E.g., Century Laminating, Ltd.
v. Montgomery, 595 F.2d 563, 567 (10th Cir.) (district court retains jurisdiction if notice of
appeal is untimely filed or refers to nonappealable order), cert. dismissed, 444 U.S. 987 (1979).
Given the rule's rationale, it would appear inapplicable when the district court is assessing the
appropriate amount of fees while an appeal of the merits is pending. But see Taylor v. Ster-
rett, 640 F.2d 663, 667-68 (5th Cir. 1981).
120 Brief for Petitioner at 35 & n.31, White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment
Sec., 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
121 Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 14-
16, White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
122 Among the items that the courts have generally required as part of an application for
fees are affidavits of counsel detailing the amount of attorneys' time and the tasks performed,
biographical information regarding the attorneys for whom fees are sought, and information
about prevailing hourly rates in the community for comparable work. Other facts that bear
on the applicable criteria for awarding fees, see inra note 167, as well as a memorandum of
law, also may be necessary. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of
Defense, 675 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609 (1st Cir. 1977);
see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1939-41 (1983).
In Bacon v. Toia, 648 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1981), afd on other grounds sub nom. Blum v.
Bacon, 457 U.S. 132 (1982), the Second Circuit approved the district court's allowance of
three months for the plaintiffs to prepare and submit their application for attorney's fees in a
class action that had been litigated for four years. And in Codex Corp. v. Milgo Elec. Corp.,
541 F. Supp. 1198 (D. Mass 1982), it was necessary to utilize a computer program to organize
the attorney's time sheets accumulated over a period of six years by over 50 lawyers.
123 By contrast, a number of courts that had invoked procedural bars to deny a party
recovery of attorney's fees had, quite sensibly, made it reasonably clear, if implicitly, that the
barred party was not entitled to recover attorney's fees on other grounds as well.
This is perhaps best illustrated by a comparison of two cases decided by the Fourth
Circuit. In DuBuit v. Harwell Enters., 540 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1976), the defendant sought
and obtained statutory attorney's fees in a patent infringement case after a judgment on the
merits had been entered and the time for appeal expired for two of the plaintiffs. Holding
that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a request for fees at this point, the
Fourth Circuit reversed the fee award, commenting:
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Furthermore, despite defendant's contention that it thought the settle-
ment implicitly resolved the issue of attorney's fees, Mr. White's counsel
had written to defendants' attorney five days after entry of the consent
decree to discuss the unresolved issue of fees. 124 One suspects it was not
entirely coincidental that the Court's resolution of the rule 59(e) issue
may also, in addition to the express rationales contained in the opinion,
have the unspoken advantage of preventing a party otherwise entitled to
recover fees from forfeiting that right because of a delay in seeking
fees, 125 a goal to which other courts have also been sympathetic.
126
Unfortunately, the Court refused to write a broad opinion setting
definitive standards and providing guidance to parties seeking attorney's
fees in the future. In a separate concurrence, Justice Blackmun gently
chided the majority for not deciding whether the Federal Rules covering
"costs" govern fee requests pursuant to the Fees Awards Act. 127 As Jus-
tice Blackmun noted, the Court's failure to provide definitive answers
will surely result in increased procedural defaults and increased litiga-
As we have stated, the final order of the court disposed of all of the issues
between these two plaintiffs and the defendants, and since no appeals were
taken the judgment became a finality and terminated the case as to them.
Under these circumstances, the case could only be reopened or the order re-
vised under the provisions of Rule 59 or Rule 60, Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, neither of which was invoked as the basis of the court's order.
Id at 692. In dicta, the Court proceeded to apply the "exceptional case" standard of the
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976), to the facts of the case and concluded that the defendant
was not entitled to recover fees. By contrast, in Fox v. Parker, 626 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1980),
the Fourth Circuit largely affirmed an award of attorney's fees that had been sought by mo-
tion nine months after the judgment had become final. In response to the appellee's argu-
ment that the district court lacked jurisdiction to award fees, in support of which one would
assume the appellee cited DuBuit, the court stated that even though the motion for fees "was
not brought under the authority of any Rule" the district court had jurisdiction to decide the
motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See also Hairline Creations, Inc. v.
Kefalas, 664 F.2d 652, 659 (7th Cir. 1981) (in course of holding that defendant's fee request
was untimely because made after period provided by rule 59(e), court gave two substantive
reasons why fees would not have been warranted); Hirschkop v. Snead, 646 F.2d 149 (4th Cir.
1981), afl'g on other grounds, 475 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Va. 1979); Laufenberg, Inc. v. Goldblatt
Bros., 187 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1951). But see Lovell v. Snow, 637 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1981)
(eschewing procedural error as ground for denial of fees, particularly in light of fact that
plaintiff was incarcerated and proceeding pro se, and relying on merits to deny fees).
124 White, 455 U.S. at 447. Although Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980), had yet to be
decided by the Supreme Court, the First Circuit, backed by very clear legislative history, had
previously held that a plaintiff who favorably settled a case through a consent decree was
eligible to recover statutory fees as a "prevailing party." Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275,
279 (lst Cir. 1978).
125 To the extent that district courts adopt the suggestion of the Eighth Circuit in Obin II,
651 F.2d at 583, that they establish local rules limiting the time in which parties may seek
statutory attorney's fees and sanctioning noncompliance with forfeiture of any right to obtain
fees, even this advantage will disappear. See White, 455 U.S. at 454; see also in/a notes 308-13
and accompanying text.
126 See, e.g., Fox v. Parker, 626 F.2d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 1980); Knighton v. Watkins, 616
F.2d 795, 798 (5th Cir. 1980).
127 White, 455 U.S. at 455 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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tion over such defaults. 128
In addition, the Court left untouched the question of how to treat
attorney's fees sought pursuant to other federal fee shifting statutes. Al-
though the Court's citation of several appellate cases involving different
fee shifting statutes129 implicitly suggests that such statutes are to be
treated similarly, at least one court of appeals prior to White had con-
cluded otherwise, treating attorney's fees sought under the Lanham
Act' 30 as an element of relief that must be sought by rule 59(e) motion,
despite having previously treated fees sought pursuant to the Fees
Awards Act as costs. 31
Even the preservation of attorney's fees from procedural default, a
result promoted by the "collateral and independent" theory of statutory
fees first announced in Obin II and subsequently adopted by the
Supreme Court in White, has its costs. The reciprocal side of the "collat-
eral and independent" coin is a concomitant loss of the opportunity to
obtain appellate review of the merits of the case, as the facts in Obin II
illustrate. There, Obin, the appellant, lost on the merits, and the district
court assessed fees against him. He filed a notice of appeal within thirty
days of the fees award but approximately four and one-half months af-
ter the judgment entered on the merits.13 2 In Obin , 133 the Eighth Cir-
cuit denied the appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal of the merits on
the ground that the notice of appeal was untimely. The Obin I panel
held that the unresolved question of attorney's fees prevented the merits
decision from being appealable and thus concluded that the notice of
appeal was timely as to both the merits and the award of fees.' 3 4 The
Obin II determination that a decision on fees, and therefore on the mer-
its as well, is independently appealable effectively overruled the prior
decision.13 5 Because the Obin II panel's reasoning meant that the merits
128 Id
129 While, 455 U.S. at 450 n.9, 452 n.14.
130 Lanham Act § 35, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1982).
131 Compare Hairline Creations, Inc. v. Kefalas, 664 F.2d 652, 657-58 (7th Cir. 1981) (be-
cause legislative history of Lanham Act suggested fees award constituted additional remedy,
motion for attorney's fees treated as governed by rule 59(e)) with Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d
1231, 1234 (7th Cir. 1980) (construing phrase "as part of the costs" in Fees Awards Act to
require treatment of fees as costs governed by rule 54(d)). But see Black Gold, Ltd. v.
Rockwool Indus., 666 F.2d 1308 (10th Cir. 1981) (no distinction between procedural treat-
ment of fees in antitrust cases and civil rights cases).
132 Obin II, 651 F.2d at 578 n.4. The district court entered judgment on the merits on
December 21, 1979 and decided the outstanding motion for fees on April 9, 1980. The notice
of appeal was filed on May 5, 1980. Id
133 623 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
134 Id at 522.
135 The court intimated that it was not overruling the prior panel's decision, but merely
rejecting dicta in that opinion. Obin II, 651 F.2d at 584 n. 12. That explanation is belied by
the Obin II court's summary of its ruling: "[A] judgment on the merits of an action, otherwise
final, is final for purposes of appeal notwithstanding that a claim for attorney's fees may
remain to be decided." Id at 584. The court also effectively overruled two unpublished
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decision was final and appealable when entered, it necessarily follows
that the notice of appeal, filed four and one-half months later was un-
timely. As a result, Obin theoretically lost the opportunity to obtain
appellate review of the merits; the court lacked jurisdiction because of
the absence of a timely notice of appeal.13 6 Despite this lack of jurisdic-
tion, 137 the Obin II panel did review the district court's judgment on the
merits, summarily affirming.
138
Thus, although the White decision may preserve the opportunity to
obtain fees despite delayed application, it has the concomitant effect of
enhancing the possibility that a party will lose the right to appellate
review of the merits because of procedural error.
13 9
Despite this effect, the White decision is desirable for the limited
certainty it provides.140 Justice Brandeis's comment in Burnet v. Coronado
Oil & Gas Co. is apt:
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it
be settled right. . . . This is commonly true even where the error is a
decisions that held that resolution of the merits was not appealable where there was an un-
resolved issue of statutory attorney's fees. Fulbright v. Brown Group, Inc., No. 80-1234 (8th
Cir. May 20, 1980); Yellow Bird v. Barnes, No. 79-1958 (8th Cir. May 20, 1980).
136 FED. R. APP. P. 3, 4; see United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224 (1960).
137 In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981), the Supreme Court
held that the court of appeals could not make a decision that it lacked jurisdiction and apply
it prospectively; once the court concluded it lacked appellate jurisdiction, it was barred from
addressing the merits.
138 Obin II, 651 F.2d at 588. It might reasonably he asserted that the appellant had no
interest in appealing the merits until after the district court awarded over $20,000 in fees and
costs to the appellees. Thus, the failure to file a timely notice of appeal from thejudgment on
the merits may have been a conscious choice by appellant, who only later decided to appeal
the merits in an attempt to reverse the attorney's fee award. This scenario is even more
plausible given that the parties seeking fees in Obin were the defendants and therefore demon-
strated to the district court that plaintiff's claims were "frivolous, unreasonable or ground-
less," to justify the district court's award of fees. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
434 U.S. 412 (1978).
This exegesis, however, does not diminish the point. Although Mr. Obin's failure to file a
timely appeal may have been deliberate, there are a number of reported decisions (and, one
would suspect, unreported decisions, see supra note 33 and accompanying text) in which a
party forfeited appellate review of the merits because of an inadvertent failure to file a timely
notice of appeal, as determined by the court of appeals after the fact. Swanson v. American
Consumer Indus., 517 F.2d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1975);see Halderman v. Pennhurst State School
& Hosp., 673 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1982); cf. United States v. Taylor, 632 F.2d 530, 531 (5th Cir.
1980) (notice of appeal filed after unappealable order but before final judgment was insuffi-
cient to invoke court of appeals's appellate jurisdiction).
139 On the importance of appellate review, see Carrington, supra note 40, at 550-5 1. But
see generally Wright, supra note 50.
140 One respect in which the Court's decision will encourage future litigation is through
the amorphous standard it provided for rejecting a fee award on the ground that the request




matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by
legislation.'
4 1
In the long run, the loss of either fees or appellate review because of
procedural errors should be substantially reduced simply by providing
counsel with certainty as to how to proceed. For the inevitable percent-
age of attorneys, however, who, for whatever reason, will not comply
with settled procedural requirements, the White decision tends to pre-
serve the opportunity to obtain fees at the possible cost of sacrificing
appellate review of the merits.
5. Beyond Certainty." Effctuating 4Eftiency and Fairness
a. Eficieny Considerations. Accepting the benefits of certainty and
clarity in the regulation of judicial jurisdiction, it must be recognized
that other policies also bear on such decisions. Unlike the theoretical
implications of the Coase theorem 142 for tort law, it is not entirely a
matter of indifference how the courts' jurisdiction is finally resolved, as
long as it is clearly settled. No less a proponent of simplicity in jurisdic-
tional law than Professor Currie, whose statement that "j]urisdiction
should be as self-regulated as breathing; the principal job of the courts is
to decide whether the plaintiff gets his money, and litigation over
whether the case is in the right court is essentially a waste of time and
resources,"' 4 3 must rank him as one of the leaders, spent one hundred
pages critically analyzing the merits of the American Law Institute's
proposal for reform of federal jurisdiction.144
Thus, the Court's resolution of the appropriate jurisdictional treat-
ment of a case in which a party seeks statutory attorney's fees deserves
scrutiny in light of the principles and policies governing the allocation of
jurisdiction between the district courts and the courts of appeals. A
careful analysis of these policy concerns as applied to statutory fees sug-
gests that the White case was wrongly decided.
The procedural context in which White arose may provide one pos-
sible explanation for the Court's failure to recognize the remedial nature
of attorney's fees and the consequent implications for finality and ap-
pealability. The petitioner in White sought attorney's fees only after a
concededly final judgment, albeit a consent decree, thus obviating con-
141 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932). With respect to the importance of certainty in the particu-
lar context of the jurisdiction of appellate courts, see Crick, supra note 6, at 557-58. But see
Redish, supra note 39, at 104-05.
142 The Coase theorem posits that in maximizing efficiency it is irrelevant whether the
law imposes the costs of an accident on the injurer or the injured. Absent transaction costs,
the person on whom the loss is imposed will either take all cost-effective precautions, or, if
more cost effective, pay another person to take those precautions. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. LAw & EcON. 1 (1960); see Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Ecieny Norm
in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFsTRA L. REv. 487, 502-06 (1980).
143 Currie, supra note 1, at 1 (footnote omitted).
144 Currie, supra note 1.
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cerns about piecemeal appeals in that case. 145 Nevertheless, the Court
did address this concern. In passing, it offhandedly rejected the notion
that attorney's fees are simply another form of relief by noting that un-
like other forms of relief, attorney's fees are not awarded to compensate
for the injury sued upon, but arise in connection with litigation to re-
cover other relief.146 Despite that conceptual difference, the Court's de-
cision in Vaughan v. Atkinson 147 illustrates the chameleon-like quality of
attorney's fees. Vaughan involved an admiralty suit for maintenance and
cure by a seaman. The Court permitted the plaintiff to recover as dam-
ages attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting the action because defendant
failed to pay maintenance and cure. 148 As in Vaughan, a few federal fee
shifting statutes explicitly invoke the remedial aspect of attorney's fees
by permitting recovery of "damages (including reasonable attorney...
fees)."' 49
One practical consequence of the difference between attorney's fees
and traditional damages is that, unlike other forms of monetary relief,
statutory attorney's fees cannot always be finally determined at the time
of judgment; in the event of an appeal of the merits, additional fees for
the appeal may have to be awarded or a downward adjustment in the
145 A party who has agreed to the entry of a consent judgment may not attack the valid-
ity of the judgment on appeal. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 323-24 (1928).
146 White, 455 U.S. at 452; see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 695 n.24 (1978). But see id
at 707 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147 369 U.S. 527 (1962); see The Eject of Legal Fees on the Adequa of Representatior- Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Rep. of Citizen Interests of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciag, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1263 (1973) (statement of C. Dallas Sands, Professor of Law, University of Alabama).
148 The Court characterized defendant's failure to pay as "willful" and "persistent,"
Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 531. It is difficult, however, to distinguish defendant's refusal to pay
from other disputed damages cases. Although defendant's minimal investigation of plaintiff's
claim may make defendant's conduct in disputing the claim more egregious, perhaps even
justifying punitive damages, see id at 540 (Stewart, J., dissenting), it is difficult to see why this
would justify recovery of attorney's fees as an element of damages.
Both the Court and commentators have, in retrospect, characterized the Vaughan deci-
sion as involving the "bad faith" exception to the American rule. See, e.g., Summit Valley
Indus. v. Local 112, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 456 U.S. 717, 721 (1982); F.D. Rich Co. v.
United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974); Note, Bad Faith Attorneys'
Fees in Implied Private Rights of Action Under the Securities Exchange Act of 193, 13 LoY. U. CHI.
L.J. 347, 353 n.33 (1982). It is difficult to reconcile the purely compensatory focus of the
Court's opinion in Vaughan with later statements about the vindicatory and deterrent func-
tion of bad faith fees. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690-92 (1978). Indeed, as late as
1967, the Supreme Court referred to the attorney's fees awarded in Vaughan as constituting an
item of "compensatory damages." Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386
U.S. 714, 718 (1967); see also Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 682 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir.
1982) (characterizing attorney's fees as damages in action for maintenance and cure, thereby
rendering order that resolved everything but amount of attorney's fees unappealable), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 732 (1983).
149 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 208, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981); see
also Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(0 (Supp.
V 1981).
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fees already awarded may be required. °50 A remand to the district court
may be necessary to make the evidentiary findings necessary to deter-
mine the appropriate fees in connection with the appeal.' 5 ' Several
courts have attempted to justify deferral of fees until after appellate re-
view of the merits by noting that multiple appeals may result if the un-
successful party seeks review of the supplemental fee award or even
subsequent supplemental awards.152 However, this possibility will exist
as long as the district court is assigned initial responsibility for deciding
the appropriate amount of fees, regardless of the procedural treatment
of attorney's fees. 153 Significantly, the appellate court's discretion to
award fees itself serves as a check on this largely theoretical concern.
54
The proposition that attorney's fees paid by an unsuccessful litigant
150 Obviously, if the losing party succeeds on appeal, the reversal will make the award of
fees, along with all other relief, moot. The potential for reversal does not prevent determina-
tion of other types of relief from being a requisite for a final decision; it should not have a
different impact on attorney's fees. But see Memphis Sheraton Corp. v. Kirkley, 614 F.2d 131
(6th Cir. 1980); cf. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939) (resolution of merits
on appeal will put request for fees in better perspective).
15 t Most courts of appeals have allowed the district courts to conduct the proceedings
necessary for awarding fees for appellate work, reserving the option to make an award itself
under appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159,
172-73 (5th Cir. 1978); afd, 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam). The Supreme Court has re-
marked that "[t]he amount of the award for [appellate] services should, as a general rule, be
fixed in the first instance by the District Court." Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 399 U.S. 222,
223 (1970) (per curiam).
152 See Memphis Sheraton Corp. v. Kirkley, 614 F.2d 131, 133 (6th Cir. 1980); Black
Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Indus., 529 F. Supp. 272, 273 (D. Colo. 1981); cf. Sprague v. Ticonic
Nat'l Bank, 110 F.2d 174, 177 (1st Cir. 1940) (reversing district court's denial of plaintiff's
supplemental petition for fees incurred in attempting to obtain fees requested in first petition
and noting that second supplemental petition for fees incurred in litigating first supplemental
petition would be appropriate).
Parenthetically, there is no reason why the original judgment, if affirmed, should not be
treated as final, even if a remand to determine additional fees for the appeal is necessary. See
Parker v. Lewis, 670 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam). Unlike a reversal or modifica-
tion of the merits on appeal, which is likely to affect the amount of fees to be awarded in
connection with the merits, subsequent appeals limited to the appropriate amount of supple-
mental fees will have no impact on the merits or the appropriate amount of fees for the
merits.
153 See Muscare v. Quinn, 680 F.2d 42, 44 (7th Cir. 1982). A few courts have asserted a
different advantage in deferring a decision on fees until after resolution of any appeal of the
merits: promoting efficiency in those cases where the decision on the merits is sufficiently
impacted on appeal so that attorney's fees would no longer be recoverable. E.g., Memphis
Sheraton Corp. v. Kirkley, 614 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1980); Cinerama Inc. v. Sweet Music, S.A.,
482 F.2d 66, 70 n.2 (2d Cir. 1973); Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Indus., 529 F. Supp. 272,
273 (D. Colo. 1981). However, the argument for generally deferring consideration of relief
until liability has been reviewed on appeal for the sake of efficiency has long been resolved. See
infa note 175. Congress provided an escape hatch from the final decision requirement for
specific cases where an immediate appeal of an interlocutory order would substantially pro-
mote efficient resolution of the particular case. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
154 See, e.g., Morrow v. Finch, 642 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1981); Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F.2d
915 (1st Cir. 1980). In reviews of administrative decisions, the courts of appeals regularly
decide requests for statutory attorney's fees. See, e.g., Northern Plains Resource Council v.
EPA, 670 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
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to a successful party are a form of relief for purposes of an appeal can be
illustrated by considering a hypothetical contract case. Two parties
enter into a contract that provides for the recovery of attorney's fees in
the event of breach by either party. Plaintiff then sues for breach of
contract damages and for attorney's fees incurred in litigating the ac-
tion. Most courts have recognized t55 that the dollars plaintiff recovers
for fees are fungible with the dollars plaintiff recovers for breach and
that the complexion of defendant's total liability as fees or damages is
likely to be a matter of indifference. Although perhaps not as directly as
damages, attorney's fees incurred in recovering damages are a result of
defendant's breach.'56 Once the initial question of liability is resolved,
both may be recovered, although determining the amounts is likely to
require different evidentiary considerations.
t5 7
One difference between contractually stipulated fees and statutory
fees is that the prerequisite for recovery of statutory fees may not pre-
cisely coincide with the determination of liability for other relief.'58 Al-
155 Union Tank Car Co. v. Isbrandtsen, 416 F.2d 96, 97 (2d Cir. 1969) (per curiam);
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Giesow, 412 F.2d 468, 470 (2d Cir. 1969); see Cinerama, Inc. v.
Sweet Music, S.A., 482 F.2d 66, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1973); cf Cady v. Dick Loehr's, Inc., 100 Mich.
App. 543, 299 N.W.2d 69 (1980) (attorney's fees may be recovered as element of damages in
breach of warranty case). But see Memphis Sheraton Corp. v. Kirkley, 614 F.2d 131, 133 (6th
Cir. 1980); cf. IOwA CODE § 625.22 (1983) (characterizing contractual attorney's fees as "part
of the costs").
156 When a successful defendant seeks attorney's fees from the plaintiff, it is more difficult
to see how the plaintiff's "wrong" has caused the defendant to incur a loss, unless the plain-
tiff's institution of an unsuccessful suit is characterized as a wrong. See McCormick, Counsel
Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REv. 619, 639-43
(1931).
157 Recently, Justice Brennan observed that the fee shifting statutes enacted by Congress
create what amounts to remedial relief provisions for civil rights plaintiffs. Hensley v. Eck-
erhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1951 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
158 A related difference that has occasionally been cited as a justification for different
treatment is that many federal statutes provide for judicial discretion in whether to award
fees. E.g., Obin v. District No. 9 of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 651 F.2d 574, 581 (8th Cir.
1981) ("[A]n award of fees generally represents a discretionary rather than a legal judgment
by the court."). Both the Fees Awards Act and title VII provide: "[T]he court, in its discre-
tion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the. . . United States, a reasonable attor-
ney's fee as part of the costs." This discretion has been substantially circumscribed by
Supreme Court decisions and by the legislative history of the Fees Awards Act to the effect
that a prevailing plaintiff "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circum-
stances would render such an award unjust." Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400,
402 (1968) (per curiam) (Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964); accord Albermarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (title VII); S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908, 5912 (Fees Awards Act); see Note,Judicial Discretion
and the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act: What Special Circumstances Render an Award
Unjust?, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 320 (1982); Comment, Calculation of a Reasonable Award of Attor-
ney's Fees Under the Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 13J. MAR. L. REV. 331,336 n.18 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Reasonable Awards]; see also Comment, Attorney's Fees in Damage
Actions Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Ac of 1976, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 332 (1980).
Also, a court must explain its determination that special circumstances exist justifying
denial of fees. Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980); Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 647 (1st Cir. 1978). The courts
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though a contract could provide otherwise, one would expect attorney's
fees to be recoverable in connection with any breach-thereby entitling
plaintiff to fees once the defendant's liability had been determined,
much like other forms of relief. The threshold for recovery of statutory
fees, however, may not be precisely congruent with liability; the plaintiff
must qualify as a "prevailing party"' 59 under the Fees Awards Act
before recovering fees. The While Court, in justifying its conclusion that
the fees issue was collateral and independent, appeared, somewhat ob-
scurely, to make this point by stating that the fees question is "an in-
quiry that cannot even commence until one party has 'prevailed.' "160
But it is difficult to understand why the existence of a statutory precon-
dition to recovery of fees-a precondition that in the vast run of Fees
Awards Act cases will be virtually coextensive with whether defendant is
liable to plaintiff1 6 '-makes resolution of the fees question a "collateral
of appeals have been less than deferential in reviewing those determinations. See Interna-
tional Oceanic Enters. v. Menton, 614 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1980); Perez v. University of P.R.,
600 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979); cf. Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 794 (10th Cir. 1980) (vacating
as unreasonably low hourly rates set by district court although within discretion of lower
court).
Thus, the "discretion" in awarding fees to a prevailing plaintiff boils down to a very
narrow set of circumstances where a plaintiff who is otherwise entitled to relief may not re-
cover fees. See Ramos v. Lamm, 539 F. Supp. 730, 734 n.8 (D. Colo. 1982); E. LARSON,
FEDERAL COURT AWARDS OF ATrORNEY'S FEES 51 (1981).
To the extent that other federal statutes contain a less objective threshold for recovery of
fees, see supra text accompanying notes 73-76, the discretion exercised by the district court in
awarding attorney's fees vel non will be greater but far from unbridled. See, e.g., Plastic
Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics, 607 F.2d 885, 905-06 (10th Cir. 1979) (reversing
award of attorney's fees to defendant in patent infringement case requiring "exceptional cir-
cumstances"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980). See generaly Note, supra note 83, at 323-35.
159 Although the precise contours of "prevailing party" are not yet established, it is at
least clear that a plaintiff who is successful on the merits of some aspects of a claim qualifies.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (1983); Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754,
757-58 (1980). A settlement by which a plaintiff obtains relief for her claim is also sufficient.
Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980); S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5912. However, it may be necessary to obtain
something more than trivial relief. See Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d
192, 197 (6th Cir. 1978) (although plaintiff established defendant's discrimination, plaintiff
was not prevailing party because she was not entitled to any relief), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932
(1979); see also infia note 173. A substantial volume of scholarly comment has addressed the
question in a variety of contexts. Note, supra note 83, at 286-301 & n.35 (citing articles).
160 455 U.S. at 451-52.
161 In Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980), the Supreme Court held that plain-
tiffs who obtained a reversal of the trial court's dismissal of their case on appeal were not
"prevailing parties" for purposes of obtaining an interim fee award. After reviewing the legis-
lative history of the Fees Awards Act, the Court described the threshold for recovery of fees:
It seems apparent from these passages that Congress intended to permit the
interim award of counsel fees only when a party has prevailed on the merits of
at least some ofhis claims. For only in that event has there been a determina-
tion of the "substantial rights of the parties," which Congress determined was
a necessary foundation for departing from the usual rule in this country that
each party is to bear the expense of his own attorney.
d at 757-58 (footnote omitted); see Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550, 556-58 (8th Cir. 1977)
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and independent" matter. The comments of Judge Seymour in review-
ing an appeal of the merits and an award of attorney's fees to the plain-
tiff pursuant to the Fees Awards Act belie any notion of independence
between the two matters:
To determine whether plaintiffs prevailed on the merits, it was neces-
sary for us to review the entire record with the same scrutiny as our
review to determine the outcome on the merits. Thus, the propriety
of the fee award and the correctness of the decision on the merits are
inextricably bound.'
62
This conclusion would follow even for more restrictive fee shifting stat-
utes in which the threshold for recovery of fees is not coextensive with
liability.
163
Another difference between statutory fees and traditional monetary
damages is that Congress has given the trial judge fact-finding responsi-
(reversing district court's finding for defendant and remanding to determine appropriate
monetary and equitable relief along with attorney's fees); James v. Stockham Valves & Fit-
tings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1977) (directing district court to award attorney's
fees to plaintiffs who had established defendant's liability), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978);
Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973, 976-77 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (attorney's fees appropriate once plain-
tiff has established discrimination in title VII suit); Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp., 445 F.
Supp. 559 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (awarding attorney's fees after finding that defendant discrimi-
nated on basis, of sex, but before any relief had been awarded); see also supra note 158.
162 Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 788 (10th Cir. 1980).
163 The argument that statutes such as the Lanham Act § 35, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1982),
which require a more stringent standard as a prerequisite for recovery of attorney's fees,
should be treated differently than statutes containing the "prevailing party" standard, would
largely be based on the fact that the relationship between the merits and the heightened
threshold would be less direct than that which exists when a prevailing plaintiff seeks attor-
ney's fees. The force of such an argument is substantially muted because, although the
threshold may be marginally more or less related, once it has been met the standards for
awarding fees are the same. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable", 126
U. PA. L. REv. 281, 315-26 (1977). Apparently unaware of the latter point, the Seventh
Circuit nevertheless got it backwards when it held that fees sought under the Lanham Act
were "relief" governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and distinguished its earlier
decisions that fees sought under the Fees Awards Act are deemed "costs" for purposes of
appeal. Hairline Creations, Inc. v. Kefalas, 664 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1981). The court's sugges-
tion that the equitable underpinnings of the Fees Awards Act require different treatment, id
at 660, fails to recognize that the process of awarding prevailing party fees is more closely
connected to the merits. Such reasoning ultimately exalts theoretical conceptualism over
functional impact. Interestingly, only two months earlier another panel of the Seventh Cir-
cuit had rejected such distinctions: "We see no reason why fees should be characterized as
incidental or non-incidental to a judgment on the merits based on the nature of the suit."
Crowder v. Telemedia, Inc., 659 F.2d 787, 788 (7th Cir. 1981).
More importantly, the Hairline court mistakenly adopted different procedural treatment
of attorney's fees based on the specific federal statute involved. Although one could make
arguments for different treatment, see Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Indus., 529 F. Supp. 272,
273 (D. Colo. 1981), the need for uniformity and certainty outweighs the shadings of degree,
right or wrong, attempted by the Hairline court. I do not envy the tasks of attorneys in future
Seventh Circuit cases involving other fee shifting statutes, in attempting to preserve their
clients' statutory rights to fees and to appellate review of the merits. At the very least, distinc-
tions such as the Hairline court made will engender a substantial amount of unnecessary pro-
tective lawyering.
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bility for determining the appropriate amount of fees.1'r This is, how-
ever, of little consequence in evaluating the role attorney's fees play in
determining appealability. Whenever a party seeks both legal and equi-
table relief, the possibility exists for split fact-finding between judge and
jury. 65 Courts have never viewed such a division of duties as affecting
the requirement that all relief be awarded before an appeal can be
pursued. 166
In addition to the interrelationship of the merits and the threshold
for fees, the court's determination of the appropriate amount of attor-
ney's fees is also more closely tied to the merits than the White Court
recognized. Although the standards for awarding statutory attorney's
fees continue to evolve, 167 a number of the factors commonly relied on
164 Most federal statutes explicitly state that determination of the fee award is left to the
court. E.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V
1981); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(B) (1976). Courts have inter-
preted statutes lacking such explicit statements as delegating the responsibility to the court.
See, e.g., Cape Cod Food Prods. v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 119 F. Supp. 900, 911 (D. Mass.
1954) (amount of fees awarded pursuant to Clayton Act is within court's province).
Excluding the jury from the attorney's fee decision is not a universal practice. Texas, for
example, leaves to the jury the valuation of an attorney's services in contract cases where a
statute permits recovery of attorney's fees. Graves v. Sommerfeld, 618 S.W.2d 952, 954-55
(Tex. Civ. App. 1981); see also A.G. Becker-Kipnes & Co. v. Letterman Commodities, Inc.,
553 F. Supp. 118, 122-24 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (no seventh amendment right to have jury decide
claim for contractual attorney's fees); Maday v. Elview-Stewart Syss. Co., 324 N.W.2d 467
(Iowa 1982).
165 E.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
166 See, e.g., Harris v. Goldblatt Bros., 659 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1981).
167 A considerable body of case law governing the determination of a reasonable attor-
ney's fee has developed. See, e.g., FED. ATTORNEYS FEE AWARDS REP. (Harcourt Brace
Jovanich); E. LARSoN, supra note 158, at 115-240; Berger, supra note 163, at 283-94; Com-
ment, Reasonable Awards, supra note 158, at 341-76. Although at the margin there is considera-
ble controversy, compare, e.g., Swicker v. William Armstrong & Sons, 484 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) (reducing fee award by one-third because of small recovery) with, e.g., Furtado v.
Bishop, 635 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1980) (amount of recovery may not be used as arbitrary meas-
ure to reduce fee award), the core approaches are somewhat similar and appear to be becom-
ing more homogeneous.
The basic strands derive from two decisions: Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488
F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) and Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lindy I).
InJohnson, the Fifth Circuit listed 12 factors, largely drawn from DR 2-106(b) of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, that were to be considered in setting an appropri-
ate fee in a title VII case. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19. These included: (1) the time and labor
required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the
legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to the
acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7)
time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the
result obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesir-
ability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
and (12) awards in similar cases. In Lindy , a class action antitrust case, the court set out a
two-step process for determining an appropriate fee. First, a "lodestar," which consists of the
number of compensable hours of work multiplied by an appropriate hourly rate for those
hours, must be calculated. Once the lodestar is calculated, the second step permits an adjust-
ment of the lodestar based on the quality of the attorney's work, and a risk factor representing
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require scrutiny of the merits. In determining the number of compensa-
ble attorney hours, a court must first eliminate any unnecessary or exces-
sive work. This determination requires reference to the issues involved
in the merits of the case.16 Where a plaintiff is not successful on every
aspect of the case, the fee determination may also require an analysis of
the extent to which the attorney's efforts are attributable to the success-
ful claims and the relation of those claims to the unsuccessful ones.
169
The "novelty and difficulty of the questions" involved 170 calls for a di-
rect examination of the merits of the case. Similarly, assessment of the
probability of success,' 17 another potential element of the fee shifting
the probability that the attorney will lose the case and recover no fees. 487 F.2d at 167-69.
Subsequently, in an appeal from the remand in Lindy , Lindy Bros. Builders v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 117-18 (3d Cir. 1976), the Third Circuit
elaborated on the appropriate factors to be considered under the risk rubric. These included:
the legal and factual complexity of the case, the probability of proving defendant's liability,
the difficulty of establishing damages, and a number of other factors less related to the merits.
Id at 117. The court also admonished that the hourly rates set for calculating the lodestar
normally reflect the quality of an attorney's work; only exceptional services would justify an
adjustment. The primary factor cited in adjusting the lodestar was the benefit obtained. Id
at 117-18. Although the award of fees in Lindy I was based on the common fund rationale,
courts have applied its two-step process to statutory fee awards with only slight modifications.
Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015,
1020 (3d Cir. 1977). Other circuits have largely followed Lindy I orJohnson or some combina-
tion thereof. The trend is toward the analytical formula provided in Lindy I, largely because
the Johnson approach provides no guidance in how to weigh and apply its 12 factors. See
Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 890-91 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc); Copper Liquor, Inc.
v. Adolph Coors Co., 624 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1980). For a detailed description of the standards
applied in awarding attorney's fees in each of the circuits, see A. MILLER, ATrORNEY's FEES
IN CLAss AcTiONs 74-184 (1980).
Recently, the Supreme Court touched on the calculation of a reasonable fee in Hensly v.
Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983). In Hensg, the Court citedJohnson approvingly, 103 S. Ct.
at 1937-38, but then proceeded to endorse an analytical framework similar to the one in Lindy
Z Id at 1939-41. Before Hensl, the Court had never squarely addressed the question. See
Leubsdorf, The Contingenq, Factor in Attorng Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473, 473 n.2 (1981).
Courts have made some minor adjustments to the appropriate factors depending on the
statute that authorizes fees, e.g., Copeland, 641 F.2d at 892 n.22 (authorizing recovery of attor-
ney's fees in Fair Housing Act cases only when plaintiff is financially unable to pay them), but
for the most part courts apply the same nominal standard in calculating statutory fees, see
Henson v. Columbus Bank & Trust, 651 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1981). Three statutes contain
general guidelines on computing fees, two ofwhich use language similar to the lodestar analy-
sis in Lindy I Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 94-284,
§ 10(a), 90 Stat. 503, 506-07 (1976), repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1210, 95 Stat. 357, 721 (1981); Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act § 17, 49
U.S.C. § 1686(e) (1976); see also Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act § 20, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1619(d)(2) (1976).
168 See Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1979), a'don other grounds, 448 U.S. 122
(1980); King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1027 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916
(1978).
169 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983); see also infra note 173.
170 Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974);see also Lindy
Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 117 (3d Cir.
1976) (complexity of case bears on contingency factor).
171 Professor Leubsdorf has recently undertaken a thorough and critical analysis of the
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calculus, 72 requires a close evaluation of the merits.1 73
The case for requiring that fees be decided as part of the merits
judgment is enhanced by the overlap between the two issues, but is not
entirely dependent on it. Damages are recoverable only after a court
has determined that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff. In many
cases the liability and damages inquiries will be unrelated in the sense
that proof of each will require completely different evidence. Separate
trials on the two questions are occasionally held,' 74 yet no "final deci-
sion" and therefore no judgment exists until the court has resolved the
issues of liability and damages (or other elements of relief).' 75 Even
more compelling in this regard is the case in which the plaintiff asserts
two completely unrelated claims against the defendant, a practice per-
mitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 76 Although each claim
is entirely distinct from the other, final resolution of one is not an ap-
current doctrine adjusting an award based on the probability of success of the particular case.
Leubsdorf, supra note 167.
172 The majority and concurring opinions in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933
(1983), raise doubts as to the legitimacy of adjusting an award to reflect the probability of
success. The majority referred only to the achievement of "exceptional success" as grounds
for an "enhanced award." Id at 1940. Justice Brennan wrote separately, apparently unable
to attract a majority, to point out the importance of the likelihood of success in determining
an appropriate fee award. Id at 1948 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
173 Although not detracting from the point, the dichotomy suggested between fees vel
non and the amount thereof is not as clear-cut as may appear. When a plaintff is not success-
ful on all asserted claims, or is unsuccessful on various procedural skirmishes, the question of
the extent to which the plaintiff is a "prevailing party," or conversely whether the amount of
fees awarded should, in some fashion, be adjusted to reflect those aspects of the case is raised.
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983).
When a plaintiff is unsuccessful on claims unrelated to those on which the plaintiff prevailed,
attorney efforts in connection with the unsuccessful claim are not compensable. Id at 1940.
When a plaintiff obtains less than all of the relief that was initially sought, the extent of the
relief obtained must be factored into the fee determination. Id at 1941.
174 S e FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
175 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); United States v. Dember Con-
str. Corp., 600 F.2d 11 (4th Cir. 1979).
The proposition that a precondition to a final appealable order is resolution of all claims
for monetary relief appears to have been first accepted by the Supreme Court in The Pal-
myra, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 502 (1825). In that case, the Court dismissed an appeal of a libel
action where restitution of the vessel had been ordered but the amount of damages due the
claimants remained undetermined. ChiefJustice Marshall stated:
The damages remained undisposed of, and an appeal may still lie upon that
part of the decree awarding damages. The whole cause is not, therefore,
finally determined in the Circuit Court; and we are of opinion that the cause
cannot be divided, so as to bring up successively distinct parts of it.
Id at 503-04. The Court has unflaggingly adhered to this requirement for a final judgment.
See Guarantee Co. v. Mechanics' Say. Bank & Trust Co., 173 U.S. 582 (1899); Dainese v.
Kendall, 119 U.S. 53 (1886); Railroad Co. v. Swasey, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 405 (1874); Brown v.
Swann, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 1 (1835); Canter v. American Ins. Co., 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 307 (1830);
Chace v. Vasquez, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 429 (1826).
176 FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
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pealable final decision, absent a certification pursuant to rule 54(b).17 7
Unless there are specific reasons justifying severance of the claims-rule
54(b) requires the district court to find that "there is no just reason for
delay"I 7 -procedural efficiency is enhanced by delaying the appellate
process until the entire case is concluded, 179 ensuring that only one ap-
pellate proceeding is necessary.18 0
The White Court concluded its three paragraph explanation of why
statutory attorney's fees are not an element of relief by quoting the Fifth
177 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direc-
tion for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which ad-
judicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all
the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties,
and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties.
Despite the While Court's intimation to the contrary, 455 U.S. at 451-52 n.13, a request
for statutory attorney's fees is not a separate "claim for relief" that can be severed from the
merits by a rule 54(b) certification. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976);
infta note 262. But see David v. Travisono, 621 F.2d 464, 467 n.2 (1st Cir. 1980).
178 A court exercising its discretion under rule 54(b) may consider factors unrelated to
appellate efficiency, including the time value of money. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General
Elec. Co., 446.U.S. 1 (1980); infra note 259.
179 See Campbell v. Westmoreland Farm, Inc., 403 F.2d 939, 942 (2d Cir. 1968) (prefer-
ence against rule 54(b) certification unless there is danger of hardship or injustice through
delay). But see Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1980) (suggesting
appellate efficiency concerns may be satisfied when two claims are distinct, and appellate
court would not be required to decide same issue in both appeals).
180 Responding to these efficiency concerns, the Court in White suggested that prompt
submission and resolution of attorney's fee requests would ordinarily permit any appeals of
the fee award to be consolidated with a preexisting appeal of the merits. 455 U.S. at 454.
History will ultimately determine whether the Court's assessment is realistic, but the matter is
far more problematical than the Court's optimistic prediction suggests. See, e.g., Nottleson v.
Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F.2d 445, 455 n.14 (7th Cir. 1981) (trial court's
award of attorney's fees five months after final judgment unavailable at time of appellate
briefing). At least one circuit, the third, has no internal procedure for sua sponte consolida-
tion. Telephone conversation with Betty Ferguson, Chief Deputy Clerk for the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (july 16, 1982). At some point in the appellate pro-
cess, around the time briefs are filed or the case is submitted to the court, consolidation be-
comes infeasible. Id; Telephone conversation with Robert St. Vran, Clerk of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (July 15, 1982). For the year ending June 30,
1981, the median time from filing of the notice of appeal to filing of the last brief was 4.4
months, with a range of 2.9 months in the Eighth Circuit to 6.1 months in the District of
Columbia Circuit. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1981 AN-
NUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, table B4. Even if local rules limiting the time in which to
submit an application for fees are adopted, whether district court judges will be willing or
able to resolve those motions within the time remaining to permit consolidation is uncertain.
This will be particularly true in fee proceedings where a factual dispute requires a hearing,
discovery, or both.
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Circuit's opinion in Kn'ghton v. Watkins: 8' "[A] motion for attorney's
fees is unlike a motion to alter or amend a judgment. It does not imply
a change in the judgment, but merely seeks what is due because of the
judgment."' 8 2 The court of appeals in White was surely correct when it
observed that this statement merely begs the question. 83 Because a
judgment is not a prerequisite for statutory fees, 18 4 whether fees must be
determined as part of the final decision required for a judgment, or in-
stead are an independent matter, is, unquestionably, the issue at hand.
The Court neglected to mention two prior cases that suggested that
statutory fees were relief for purposes of determining whether a final
decision had been reached. In Libero Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, 185
plaintiffs obtained partial summary judgment establishing defendant's
liability for violations of title VII. The district court made the rule
54(b) determination required for entry of judgment, and the court of
appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded that the court of ap-
peals lacked jurisdiction and vacated its judgment, stating:
[R]espondents, although having received a favorable ruling on the is-
sue of petitoner's liability to them, received none of the relief which
they expressly prayed for in the portion of their complaint set forth
above. They requested an injunction, but did not get one; they re-
quested damages, but were not awarded any; they requested attorneys'
fees, but received none.
• ..[T]he District Court's order. . . finally disposed of none of
respondents' prayers for relief.
186
The Court's opinion in Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert 18 7 suggests that the
reference in Wetzel to undecided attorney's fees was not purely gratui-
tous. Van Gemert presented a troublesome procedural hybrid of the com-
mon fund and statutory fee situations. There, the plaintiff class had
obtained a judgment for a sum certain on behalf of the class. The judg-
ment also provided that attorney's fees, in an amount not yet deter-
mined, were to be awarded from the entire fund established by the
judgment. Although the class attorneys sought fees on the authority of
the common fund exception, the defendant, unlike the typical common
fund defendant, claimed an interest in the allocation of those fees be-
cause it asserted a claim to any residual portion of the fund that went
unclaimed by class members. It appeared that as much as fifty percent
181 616 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1980).
182 455 U.S. at 452 (quoting Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 797 (5th Cir. 1980)).
183 White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 629 F.2d 697, 702 n.8 (1st Cir.
1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
184 See Deerfield Medical Center v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1981);
Ruiz v. Estelle, 609 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1980).
185 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
186 Id at 742 (emphasis added).
187 444 U.S. 472 (1980).
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of the fund might remain unclaimed. 88  Because the district court had
not yet determined the amount of fees, the defendant appealed only that
portion of the district court's judgment that provided that fees would be
paid from the entire fund, which would have had the effect of reducing
any unclaimed portion by its proportionate share of attorney's fees.
The Supreme Court held that the judgment was a final decision
and was properly appealed. The Court emphasized that the "judgment
terminated the litigation between Boeing and the class concerning the
extent of Boeing's liability," 89 and distinguished Wetzel as a case
"where a prayer for attorney's fees against an opposing party remains
unanswered."' 190 The Court concluded that final resolution of the de-
fendant's liability to the class constituted a judgment sufficient for ap-
pellate jurisdiction, yet recognized the defendant's inchoate claim to any
unclaimed portion of the judgment, thus permitting the defendant to
challenge the allocation of attorney's fees across the fund.19 1 Regardless
of whether the Court was correct in sanctioning an appeal of the alloca-
tion of fees before those fees were awarded, 192 it is difficult to understand
how the White Court could ignore in its discussion of the relationship
between statutory fees and a final decision both Wetzel, which stated
that an award of statutory fees was an element of relief required for a
final judgment, and Van Gemert, which suggested the Court meant what
it said in Wetzel. 193
b. Fairness Considerations. Although Wetzel and Van Gemeri de-
served attention by the White Court, those cases do not establish that
tying statutory fees to the merits as a prerequisite for a final decision is
wise policy. In addition to the efficiency concerns already addressed, the
Court in White also overlooked the uncertainty and consequent unfair-
ness a losing party faces when she must decide whether to appeal with-
out complete knowledge of the scope of liability. 194 As the White Court
188 Id at 477 n.4.
189 Id at 480 n.5.
190 Id
191 Recognition of these conflicting notions was crucial to the propriety of the appeal.
Otherwise, either the district court's purported judgment was not appealable, id at 479-80
n.5, or the defendant lacked standing to appeal, id at 488 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
192 See injfa text accompanying notes 493-94.
193 Justice Rehnquist, who authored the Weirl opinion and wrote a dissent in Van Gemert
that carefully explicated the confusion surrounding the relationship between attorney's fees
(both common fund and statutory) and appealable orders, was curiously silent in While. His
advocacy for a coupling of the merits and fees in the common fund context for appeal pur-
poses, Van Gemer, 444 U.S. at 483-84, would a fortiori suggest coupling when the fees involved
are statutory, see infia text accompanying notes 436-94.
194 In response to the court of appeals's concern about unfair postjudgment surprise,
While, 629 F.2d at 704, revld, 455 U.S. 445 (1981), the Supreme Court noted that the "discre-
tion" afforded the district court in awarding attorney's fees pursuant to the Fees Awards Act
would justify denial of fees where the motion "unfairly surprises or prejudices" the opposing
party. Whie, 455 U.S. at 454. However, given the prominence and notoriety of the major
federal fee shifting statutes, it is often the size of the award-a sum that may have no connec-
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recognized, "a fee award could affect substantially the total liability of
the parties."' 95 The decision to appeal will, obviously, include a pano-
ply of factors, including the likelihood of success, the costs involved, the
benefits of further delay, and the extent of liability (or the onerousness
of an equitable decree). The amount of attorney's fees the unsuccessful
party would otherwise be required to pay would also inform such a deci-
sion. In evaluating the benefits of a reversal, 196 the unsuccessful party is
likely to be indifferent as to whether she is required to pay X dollars as
money damages or as attorney's fees. 197 As a matter of fairness, a liti-
gant should know the full extent of the adverse consequences before a
decision whether to appeal is required.198 Yet, if attorney's fees are sev-
ered from the merits, it is unlikely that the trial judge will have fixed the
liability for fees before the expiration of the thirty-day period1 99 in
which to appeal the judgment.20 0 Although a losing party will appeal
tion with the relief already granted-that causes surprise or prejudice, rather than the request
for fees itself. See, e.g., Skoda v. Fontani, 646 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (plaintiff
who won jury verdict of one dollar in civil rights action entitled to attorney's fees, absent
finding of special circumstances making award unjust); Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d
46 (1st Cir. 1979) (award well in excess of $250,000). The "discretion" to deny an untimely
fee request has no utility in avoiding this problem.
Moreover, the losing party's ability to estimate the ultimate fee award is complicated by
a number of factors. Normally the losing party will not know the amount of the opposing
attorney's time with any precision. The vagaries in applying the standards for awarding fees
substantially aggravate uncertainty about the size of the ultimate award. See supra notes 167,
172-73. This is particularly so because of the use of the multiplier in stage two of the Lindy
analysis; an award may be increased by as much as 400% of the lodestar under this rubric.
See Leubsdorf, supra note 167.
195 455 U.S. at 449.
196 Because, at a minimum, attorney's fees pursuant to the Fees Awards Act and title VII
are only awarded to a prevailing party, reversal of the judgment on appeal would normally
have the same effect on the award of attorney's fees as it would have on other relief awarded.
197 Some governmental entities may find it more politically palatable to pay attorney's
fees rather than money damages, particularly in a civil rights case involving an unsympa-
thetic plaintiff.
198 Gary v. Spires, 634 F.2d 772, 773 (4th Cir. 1980); see Glass v. Pfeffer, 657 F.2d 252,
254 (10th Cir. 1981); Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1980); cf Comment, Taxation
of Costs In Federal Courts-A Proposal, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 877, 879 (1976) (advocating pretrial
determination of which costs may be taxed where party anticipates incurring taxable costs in
excess of $500).
199 FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1). The time for appeal is measured from the date of entry of
judgment. Id When the United States or any officer or agent of the United States is a party,
the time for appeal is extended to 60 days. Id
200 E.g., Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 981 (3d Cir. 1981); Crowder v. Telemedia,
Inc., 659 F.2d 787, 788 (7th Cir. 1981); Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 797 (5th Cir.
1980). Although a number of federal district courts have adopted local rules imposing a time
limit on submission of bills for costs, see infra note 309, and a number of others may follow the
suggestion of the White and Obin II courts regarding the promulgation of local rules setting
time limits for submission of statutory fee applications, White, 455 U.S. at 454 & n. 16; Obin II,
651 F.2d at 583, these time limits on applying for attorney's fees would not ensure that the
amount of fees would be determined by the trial court before the period in which to perfect
an appeal had expired.
The Obin II court suggested a 21-day period for submission of fee applications, leaving
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some cases regardless of liability for, or the extent of, fees, 20 1 in other
cases an informed decision will require full information about fees2 2-
information that may be unavailable if attorney's fees are uncoupled
from the merits.
A particularly egregious example of this unfairness occurred in
Johnson v. Snyder,203 in which judgment on a claim under the federal Fair
Housing Act 204 was entered on a jury verdict in the amount of one dol-
lar. Neither party appealed in the thirty days subsequent to entry of
judgment. The trial court then entertained a motion for attorney's fees
pursuant to the Fees Awards Act and awarded plaintiff $8,600 in fees.
Because the court of appeals adopted a view that uncoupled the merits
from fees,205 defendant's opportunity to challenge the merits on appeal
was lost. Although there are procedures that a clever attorney might
invoke to ameliorate this unfairness, all are cumbersome to some extent
and none is entirely satisfactory.
20 6
6. The Consequences of Recoupling Fees to the Merits
If the foregoing discussion is correct in suggesting that statutory at-
torney's fees should be treated as simply another form of relief, then it
follows that fees should be requested in the plaintiff's complaint.20 7 It
the district court with nine days to decide the request before the time for appeal would expire.
The court may actually have less than nine days if the party from whom fees are sought is
given additional time to respond to the fee application. A number of factors suggest that a
district court would be unable to render a decision within this brief period. The process of
determining fees may require an evidentiary hearing, or at least consideration of substantial
factual information about hours, services, and the like contained in affidavits, supra note 122.
The courts of appeals have also imposed significant obligations on the district courts to ex-
plain and justify the basis for a fee award. See O'Neil v. City of Lake Oswego, 642 F.2d 367
(9th Cir. 1981); Northcross v. School Bd., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 447 U.S.
911 (1980); n re First Colonial Corp. of Am., 544 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
904 (1977).
201 E.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
202 See, e.g., supra note 138. Similarly, in White, the defendant moved to vacate the con-
sent decree only after the district court awarded plaintiff over $16,000 in attorney's fees, be-
cause of the impact of those fees on its total liability. 455 U.S. at 448.
203 639 F.2d 316 (6th Cir. 1981).
204 Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 801, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.).
205 The court adopted the fees as costs approach of Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795
(5th Cir. 1980).
206 One method would be to take a protective appeal of the merits judgment and then
move for dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 if, after
the amount of fees is set, prosecuting an appeal of the merits is no longer desired. Another
possibility might be to request a 30-day extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal
from the district court. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5). This option would only be useful where there
was some assurance that the district court would make a decision on the fee request before the
extended period for appeal expired. Finally, the district court might be persuaded to with-
hold rendering judgment on the merits until the issue of fees is resolved, thereby effectively
recoupling the fees to the merits.
207 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) provides: "A pleading which sets forth a claim
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appears that, before the White decision, most plaintiffs seeking statutory
attorney's fees were proceeding in this fashion. 20 8 The plaintiff in White
did not request attorney's fees in his complaint, as the Supreme Court
explicitly noted,20 9 probably because the complaint was filed before the
Fees Awards Act was enacted. 2 10 Thus, even if fees were deemed relief,
entry of the consent decree in White, which on its face resolved all the
outstanding issues between the parties, was a final, appealable decision,
and the plaintiff's only avenue for obtaining fees after judgment would
be by way of a rule 59(e) motion. That would not, of course, be the case
where the plaintiff made a proper request for attorney's fees before judg-
ment.2 11 Even if the trial court had resolved all other issues in connec-
tion with the merits, a final judgment would not be proper until the
court had also decided the issue of fees. Although entry of a judgment
2 12
that did not resolve an outstanding plea for fees would satisfy one of the
requisites for a final judgment-the apparent intention of the judge that
the decision be final-there nevertheless would be lacking another nec-
essary condition for a final judgment-resolution of all matters of re-
lief.2 13 Thus, the judgment would be invalid, and an appeal ineffective,
for relief. . . shall contain . . .(3) a demand for judgment for the relief to which [the claim-
ant] deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be
demanded."
208 Eg., Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d 246, 248 (4th Cir. 1981); Gurule v. Wilson, 635
F.2d 782, 786 (10th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. University of Bridgeport, 629 F.2d 828 (2d Cir.
1980).
209 White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 448 (1982). It is
somewhat curious that the Court made it a point to mention this fact. Given the Court's
rejection of attorney's fees as a form of relief, it would be irrelevant that the plaintiff sought
them in the complaint or in some other fashion before judgment.
210 White was filed in the district court in March 1976. The Fees Awards Act was en-
acted and became effective on October 19, 1976. Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641, 2641
(1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V 1981)). Its provisions have been
applied to all cases pending on the date of enactment. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 694 n.23
(1978).
211 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(3) requires the plaintiff to state the relief to
which he deems himself entitled. Although some plaintiffs have made their initial prejudg-
ment request for fees by motion, rather than in their complaint, the correct procedure would
probably require a motion to amend the complaint adding recovery of attorney's fees to the
relief requested. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
Although making a request for a specific form of relief is not required for recovery, and
rule 54(c) states that a party shall receive all the relief to which that party is entitled, the
pleadings do define the scope of the case, and an unresolved request for relief would impact
on the existence of a final decision. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
212 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, governing the form ofjudgment, was amended in
1963 to require that judgments be set forth in separate documents. The purpose was to pro-
vide a clear benchmark to the parties signifying when entry of judgment had occurred,
thereby preventing procedural defaults in making post-trial motions or filing notices of ap-
peal because of uncertainty as to the date of entry ofjudgment. ProposedAmendments to Rules of
Civil Procedurefor the United States District Courts, 31 F.R.D. 625, 649 (1962) (advisory committee
note to rule 58).
213 The necessary elements for a final judgment are (1) resolution of all issues in the case,
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); (2) the intention of the trial judge that the
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because the court of appeals would lack jurisdiction. Significantly, the
district court would retain jurisdiction over the entire case to resolve the
outstanding issue of fees214 after one of the parties (or the court of ap-
peals) 215 raised the invalidity of the judgment.
In determining whether all issues have been resolved by the judg-
ment, a knotty question of interpretation may arise where the judgment
awards or denies relief generally but does not specifically address an is-
sue such as attorney's fees. A general award of monetary relief could
mean that the judge intended to deny recovery of attorney's fees, or
simply that the judge failed to decide the question. Another possiblility,
although less likely, is that the judge intended the general award to in-
clude an amount for attorney's fees. 216 Depending on the extent of dis-
resolution be final and not subject to later amendment or modification in the trial court,
United States v. F & M Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 232 (1958); and (3) entry of
judgment in accord with the formalities of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 58 and 79(a).
Unless all three of these elements are present, the judgment is insufficient to support
appellate jurisdiction, and the district court would retain jurisdiction over the entire case. See
Lee v. Washington County Bd. of Educ., 682 F.2d 894 (1 1th Cir. 1982); Harris v. Goldblatt
Bros., 659 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1981). A number of courts have failed to recognize this. In
Hairline Creations v. Kefalas, 664 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1981), the court held that attorney's fees
sought pursuant to the Lanham Act were relief and therefore a motion for attorney's fees 28
days after entry of "judgment" was untimely. However, both the plaintiff and defendant
(who asserted counterclaims) sought attorney's fees as part of the relief in each of their plead-
ings. Id at 654. Thus, the "judgment" entered by the district court did not resolve all re-
quests for relief in the case and should not have been given effect by the court of appeals. See
also Davis Harvester Co. v. Long Mfg. Co., 283 F. Supp. 536 (E.D.N.C. 1967) (district court
failed to decide defendant's prejudgment request for attorney's fees, nevertheless court of ap-
peals affirmed decision on merits without recognizing absence of appellate jurisdiction); cf.
White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 629 F.2d 697, 704-05 (1st Cir. 1980)
(dicta stating that judgment that did not resolve attorney's fees would, even if nonappealable,
"otherwise be effective"), rev'd, 455 U.S. 445 (1982); Dubuit v. Harwell Enters., 540 F.2d 690,
693 (4th Cir. 1976) (district court had no jurisdiction to consider postjudgment request for
fees once notice of appeal was filed where district court failed to either mention request in its
order or reserve jurisdiction).
214 Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 983-84 (3d Cir. 1981); Anderson v. Morris, 658
F.2d 246, 248 (4th Cir. 1981); Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 787-88 (10th Cir. 1980).
215 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) permits correction of "errors [in judgments]
arising from oversight or omission" at any time either on motion or by the court, sua sponte.
Presumably this would include the power to withdraw a judgment that is invalid. Cf Ciner-
ama, Inc. v. Sweet Music, S.A., 482 F.2d 66, 68 (2d Cir. 1973) (rule 60(b) motion used to
vacate improper judgment). Alternatively, upon recognizing the absence of a final decision,
the court of appeals could dismiss the appeal and remand to the district court to resolve the
remaining issues. E.g., Lee v. Washington County Bd. of Educ., 682 F.2d 894 (1I1th Cir.
1982); Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Indus., 666 F.2d 1308 (10th Cir. 1981); see Cassidy v.
Virginia Carolina Veneer Corp., 652 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1981).
216 In this regard, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 is inadequate when statutory attor-
ney's fees are sought in addition to monetary damages. Unlike damages, which are typically
decided by a jury, statutory attorney's fees are decided by the court. See supra note 164 and
accompanying text. If a jury renders a general verdict, rule 58 authorizes the clerk, in the
absence of contrary direction by the court, to enter judgment. If attorney's fees remain to be
awarded, the onus is on the court to order the judgment delayed, and if it neglects to do so,
judgment may be entered erroneously. See Harris v. Goldblatt Bros., 659 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.
1981). Indeed, this problem can arise any time there are issues that will not be resolved by a
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cretion in the trial court to deny fees, 21 7 interpretation of the judgment
may be more or less difficult. 21 8 The solution to this interpretation con-
cern is tractable: in any case in which the successful party has made a
prejudgment request for recovery of attorney's fees, the judgment should
specifically address that claim. 2 19 This practice should not impose any
significant additional burden, given the existing requirements for expli-
cation by the trial judge of rulings on requests for statutory attorney's
fees.2
20
One reason asserted by the Obin II court,22 1 and echoed by the
jury's general verdict. See Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 642 F.2d 614 (D.C. Cir.
1980). If attorney's fees were relief, it would be preferable to amend rule 58 so that when
attorney's fees have been requested (or more generally, whenever additional matters exist in a
case that a jury verdict will not resolve), the authority to enter judgment on a general jury
verdict would not be vested in the court clerk as a ministerial act.
217 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
218 However, even where the district court has discretion to deny attorney's fees to a
successful plaintiff, that discretion is considerably circumscribed, and when exercised the
court must articulate the reason fees were denied. See supra note 158.
219 See North East Indep. School Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 898 (Tex. 1966); cf.
United States v. F & M Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 251 (1958) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that district court judges should indicate intention regarding finality of decision).
Judge Warriner, who first held that a postjudgment request for attorney's fees under the
Fees Awards Act was subject to rule 59(e) in Hirschkop v. Snead, 475 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Va.
1979), aj'don other grounds, 646 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1981), recently observed that "[i]n virtually
every case, in both Complaint and Answer . . . counsel fees and other forms of relief are
requested; the requests are then disregarded by everyone unless appropriately pressed during
the litigation." El-Amin v. Williams, 92 F.R.D. 454, 455 (E.D. Va. 1981).
The first point is probably correct, as well as troublesome, if fees are treated as relief.
Boilerplate requests for fees are commonly added to the concluding paragraph of both com-
plaint and answer, regardless of whether there is any basis for such recovery. Thus, before a
judge could confidently direct entry of judgment in almost any case, a review of the com-
plaint, and perhaps, the answer, see inra note 386, would be required.
Thus, although Judge Warriner's second point may also be accurate historical descrip-
tion, some adaptation by district court judges would probably be necessary. The certification
procedure contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) certainly required similar ad-
justments, as did the amendments in 1963 to rule 58, which required a judgment to be set
forth in a separate document. See supra note 212.
Moreover, numerous methods exist for eliminating an unwarranted request for attor-
ney's fees before judgment. A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) or (f) to
dismiss or strike the request for fees could be made by the opposing party. The pretrial
conference and order may also be appropriate vehicles for summary disposition of an attor-
ney's fee request. Judge Warriner's concern that if fees are treated as an element of relief,
"[blefore making a dispositive decision, the Court would need to conduct a scavenger hunt
through all of the pleadings, searching for any requests for relief mentioned, however briefly
or cursorily," E-Amin, 92 F.R.D. at 455, appears substantially exaggerated. Furthermore,
even if the district courts do not conduct a review of the record before directing entry of
judgment, the courts of appeals frequently do, with the result that an unnecessary and im-
proper appeal is dismissed. See, e.g., Chacon v. Babcock, 640 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1981).
220 See Davis v. City of Abbeville, 633 F.2d 1161, 1163 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing cases in
which Fifth Circuit has vacated fee awards and remanded to district court to articulate how it
applied applicable standards for awarding fees to particular case); supra note 158.
221 651 F.2d at 582.
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Supreme Court in Whie, 222 for severing the merits decision from consid-
eration of an award of attorney's fees is the need for adequate time after
resolution of the merits for the parties to discuss and possibly settle the
question of attorney's fees. Both courts expressed their concern that the
ten-day limitation of rule 59(e) would prevent out-of-court settlement of
fees in a number of cases.2 23 In addition to the very plausible response
that the parties are free to settle the matter even after the motion is
made,2 24 adoption of local rules governing the time in which to move for
fees, as suggested by both courts,225 would similarly constrain the settle-
ment process. 226 On the other hand, this problem is solved if an un-
resolved request for fees deprives a merits decision of finality.
Treating statutory fees as integral to a final judgment would not
exacerbate the ethical dilemma faced by counsel in negotiating settle-
ment of a case involving statutory fees. The problem arises because a
defendant will generally prefer to settle both the merits and attorney's
fees simultaneously so that its total liability is determined. The defend-
ant may thus make an offer of settlement contingent upon a waiver of
attorney's fees, offer a lump sum settlement to encompass both merits
relief and attorney's fees, or offer a substantial sum as attorney's fees to
induce a cheap settlement of the merits. 227 To some degree, all of these
alternatives put the plaintiffs counsel in conflict with her client.
To avoid this ethical quandary, the petitioner in Whie sought a
prophylactic rule barring (or strongly discouraging) simultaneous nego-
tiation of the merits and attorney's fees; ajudgment on the merits would
be required before attorney's fees could be discussed.2 28 This solution
222 455 U.S. at 453.
223 Id; Oin ii, 651 F.2d at 583.
224 Most judges would be more than willing to defer consideration of a motion for fees if
the parties state that they are engaged in settlement negotiations. Cf Bacon v. Toia, 648 F.2d
801, 810 (2d Cir. 198 1) (permitting prevailing party three months in which to submit request
for attorney's fees), aj'd on other grounds sub noma. Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132 (1982);
O'Connor v. Keller, 90 F.R.D. 599 (D. Md. 1981) (after plaintiff served motion for fees within
time limits set by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), defendant's request for extension of
time in which to respond was granted).
225 White, 455 U.S. at 454; Chin I, 651 F.2d at 583.
226 To the extent the local rules provide a longer time in which to seek fees than the 10
days provided for in rule 59(e), there may be some improvement in facilitating settlements.
The Obin II court suggested a 21-day time limit. 651 F.2d at 583. However, attorneys are
notorious for not seriously addressing settlement until required by a deadline, such as the
impending call of a case for trial.
227 See Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 912 (1981); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1020-21 (3d Cir. 1977); Note,
Attornys' Fees-Confcts Created by the Simultaneous Negotiation and Settlement of Damages and Statu-
tonly Authorized Attomeys' Fees in a Title VII Class Action, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 799 (1978); cf. Delta
Airlines v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 364 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (recognizing potential
conflict of interest when defendant makes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 offer ofjudg-
ment that does not provide for attorney's fees).
228 White, 455 U.S. at 454 n.15.
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would deprive the defendant of any assurance of the extent of its liabil-
ity if it settled the merits, which explains why the Supreme Court re-
fused to adopt petitioner's suggestion. 229 Even if such a rule were
deemed desirable and. implemented,2 30 however, a trial court has ample
flexibility to give formal credence to a settlement of the merits, short of
entry of judgment.
231
Aside from devices to separate negotiations on fees and the merits, a
major premise of petitioner's argument is highly questionable. Al-
though there is scattered authority to the contrary,2 32 it is reasonably
well-settled that the party, and not counsel, is entitled to an award of
statutory attorney's fees. 233 Thus, the attorney's interest in the alloca-
tion of any recovery between damages and attorney's fees is presumably
because the attorney-client contract makes the attorney's remuneration
a function of the amount recovered as statutory attorney's fees.2 34 Mod-
ifying this arrangement 235 so that the contractually specified fee is in-
229 The conflicting interests are often exacerbated in the class action context. See Note,
Timeliness of Post-Judgment Motions for Attorney's Fees Under the Civil Rights Attorne's Fees Awards
Act, 16 VAL. U.L. REv. 355, 394 (1982).
230 But see Note, supra note 227, at 812-13 (concluding that mandatory rule barring simul-
taneous negotiation of merits and fees is unworkable and undesirable).
231 See, e.g., Lisa F. v. Snider, 561 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ind. 1983).
232 See, e.g., Regalado v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447, 451 (E.D. Ill. 1978); f Greenspan v.
Automobile Club, 536 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (civil rights organization that ad-
vanced costs of suit to plaintiff may recover them from defendant pursuant to title VII).
Where the client does not have an obligation to pay attorney's fees, a number of courts have
made awards directly to counsel; typically this occurs when a legal services organization rep-
resents a prevailing party. E.g., Miller v. Apartments & Homes, Inc., 646 F.2d 101 (3d Cir.
1981); Harris v. Tower Loan, Inc., 609 F.2d 120, 124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826
(1980); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1244-46 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913
(1978); Miller v. Amusement Enters., 426 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1970); see Comment, Court
Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 685-89 (1974).
233 Fee shifting statutes almost universally provide for an award of attorney's fees to the
party rather than to the attorney. Berger, supra note 163, at 303-04; Dawson, supra note 18, at
1600; see, e.g., Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F.2d 445, 455 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1046 (1981); Richards v. Reed, 611 F.2d 545, 546 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980);
Hirschkop v. Snead, 475 F. Supp. 59, 64 (E.D. Va. 1979), afd, 646 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1981);
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V 1981); Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
A few federal statutes are couched in terms of fee awards to the attorney. These, how-
ever, are not fee shifting statutes, but instead regulate fees as between attorney and client and
are thus inapplicable to this discussion. E.g., Military Personnel and Civilian Employees'
Claims Act of 1964, § 8, 31 U.S.C. § 243 (1976); War Hazards Compensation Act § 204, 42
U.S.C. § 1714 (1976).
234 See Hamilton v. Ford Motor Co., 636 F.2d 745, 746-47 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Hughes v.
Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 485 (3d Cir. 1978); Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Foster Mfg. Co.,
421 F.2d 61, 86-89 (1st Cir. 1969); Rogers v. Fansteel, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 100, 101 (E.D. Mich.
1981).
235 Even where the attorney and her client have not done so, the court has power to
review and modify the fees provided for in the attorney-client contract. International Travel
Arrangers v. Western Airlines, 623 F.2d 1255, 1277 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063
(1980); Russo v. New York, 515 F. Supp. 470, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 672
F.2d 1014 (2d Cir. 1982).
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dependent of the statutory fees recovered, at least in the case of a
settlement, would largely obviate the problem.
23 6
The While Court also justified severing fees from the merits by rely-
ing on the premise, derived from Bradley v. School Board, 23 7 that "many
final orders may issue in the course of the litigation. '238 Adding the
corollary that determining whether a particular order is a final judg-
ment often engenders substantial uncertainty, the Court concluded that
if fee requests were governed by rule 59(e) counsel would frequently file
protective motions for attorney's fees after every ruling relating to the
merits to avoid losing the opportunity to claim fees. Not only is the
premise misleading, the syllogism is myopic. Needless to say, the conclu-
sion is wanting.
The Supreme Court in Bradley was faced with two interrelated
problems. The plaintiffs sought recovery of attorney's fees in connection
with efforts to desegregate the Richmond school system. Approximately
one and one-half months after entering a decree requiring implementa-
tion of a desegregation plan, the district court awarded plaintiffs attor-
ney's fees based on nonstatutory grounds.23 9 While an appeal of the fee
award was pending, Congress enacted section 718 of the Education
Amendments of 1972,2 40 which authorized a prevailing party in a school
desegregation case to recover reasonable attorney's fees "[u]pon the en-
try of a final order. '241 When the case reached the Supreme Court,
236 The most obvious solution is to provide for a contingent fee arrangement in the event
of settlement. This may be the only alternative for a plaintiff who could not otherwise afford
an attorney. The contingent fee arrangement itself has been subject to criticism for the ethi-
cal problems it poses. Seegeneraly F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES
159-67, 195-206 (1964); Symposium, Contingent Fee: Champerty or Champion?, CLEV. ST. L.
REv., May 1972, at 15. The utility of this alternative is to a great extent limited to nonclass
action cases where monetary damages are the primary relief sought. Where equitable relief is
dominant, a contingent fee arrangement is not a viable alternative. In the class action con-
text, the class representative's fee arrangement with counsel does not bind the remaining
members of the class. Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 120 (3d Cir. 1976).
237 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
238 White, 455 U.S. at 453 (quoting Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 723 (1974)).
239 In a lengthy and rambling opinion, the court based its award on the "bad faith" and
"private attorney general" exceptions to the American rule. Bradley v. School Bd., 53 F.R.D.
28 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972), revd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 696
(1974).
240 Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 718, 86 Stat. 235, 369 (codi-
fied as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 3205 (Supp. V 1981)), repealedby Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 587(a)(1), 95 Stat. 357, 480.
241 The entire statute provided:
Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the United States against a
local educational agency, a State (or any agency thereof), or the United States
(or any agency thereof), for failure to comply with any provision of this sub-
chapter or for discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in
violation of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.),
or the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States as they
pertain to elementary and secondary education, the court, in its discretion,
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both the existence of a final order upon which to predicate the district
court's award of fees and the retroactivity of section 718 to services per-
formed before its effective date were disputed. The Court resolved the
issue of retroactivity by concluding that the statute should be applied to
all cases pending on appeal242 at the time section 718 became
effective.
2 43
The Court then faced what amounted to diametrically opposed ar-
guments proffered by the defendants on the proper interpretation of the
clause permitting an award of attorney's fees "[u]pon the entry of a final
order." In a confusing passage that addressed both arguments simulta-
neously, the Court rejected defendants' contention that the district
court's award of fees was too late because it was not entered until one
and one-half months after the desegregation decree. Recognizing that
resolution of the fee request could, because of its complexity and factual
nature, take some time, the Court rejected an interpretation that would
require a fee award to be made simultaneously with the final order.244
Unabashed, the defendants antithetically contended that because re-
quests for further relief were pending in the district court at the time of
the fee award, the desegregation decree was not a final order sufficient
under section 718 as a predicate for attorney's fees.245 Recognizing that
desegregation cases typically require long periods for final resolution-
the Bradley case, instituted in 1961, was still being litigated twelve years
later24 6 -the Court sensibly declined to read the section 718 "final or-
der" requirement literally. Instead, the Court suggested that "any order
that determines substantial rights of the parties" may justify an award
of counsel fees. 247 Quite obviously, many such "final orders" might oc-
cur in the course of a desegregation lawsuit.248 Congress implicitly ap-
upon a finding that the proceedings were necessary to bring about compli-
ance, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reason-
able attorney's fee as part of the costs.
20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976), amended by 20 U.S.C. § 3205 (Supp. V 1981), repealed by Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 587(a)(1), 95 Stat. 357, 480.
242 Bradl/, 416 U.S. at 715-16.
243 The Court followed this holding in connection with the applicability of the Fees
Awards Act to cases pending when that act became effective. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,
694 n.23 (1978).
244 Bradl,, 416 U.S. at 722-23.
245 A motion to consolidate the Richmond school district with .two contiguous county
districts was still pending in the district court when the fee award was made. Bradley v.
School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 331 (4th Cir. 1972), rev'don other grounds, 416 U.S. 696 (1974). The
district court ultimately ordered consolidation, Bradley v. School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D.
Va. 1972), but was reversed on appeal by the Fourth Circuit, Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d
1058 (4th Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided Court. School Bd.
v. State Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 92 (1973) (per curiam).
246 See Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 699 (1974). Eight of the 10 oldest cases in the
federal system are desegregation cases. Stewart, Endless Litigation, AM. LAW., July 1982, at 46.
247 Bradley, 416 U.S. at 723 n.28.
248 Unfortunately, the Court did not clarify the meaning of "final order." This confusion
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proved the Court's authorization for interim fees when it enacted the
Fees Awards Act and, significantly, omitted the final order predicate.
2 49
Thus, the Court's statement in White that many final orders may
occur is irrelevant in determining the latest point at which fees may be
sought unless the Court was suggesting that a final order is synonymous
with a final decision-the prerequisite for an appeal under section
129 1.250 A broad reading of final order is desirable because of the flex-
ibility that it provides in authorizing interim fee awards; there is no
analogous justification for a similarly broad reading of final decision
and consequently no reason to treat the two terms as synonymous. To
make the point in more concrete terms, a finding of liability on the part
of defendant, without a finding as to damages, may be sufficient to jus-
tify an interim award of attorney's fees, but it is not appealable as a final
decision under section 1291. Affording flexibilty in awarding interim
fees should not straight-jacket the courts and parties into being required
to address attorney's fees every time a plaintiff is successful in obtaining
led to the White Court's misplaced reliance on the premise that "many final orders may is-
sue." 455 U.S. at 453. Although making clear that attorney's fees could be awardedpendent
lite, the Court in Bradly cited Johnson v. Combs, 471 F.2d 84, 87 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
413 U.S. 922 (1973), to suggest that the term "final order" in § 718 was coextensive with
"final decision" in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). Bradly, 416 U.S. at 722 n.28. The Court then
cited several of its opinions to suggest that there is substantial flexibility in the requirement of
a "final decision," and that it is not necessarily the last order in a case. Id Eschewing any
definitive resolution, the court proceeded to retreat from its analysis equating a final order
with a final decision: "[W]e venture to say only that the entry of any order that determines
substantial rights of the parties may be an appropriate occasion upon which to consider the
propriety of an award of counsel fees in school desegregation cases." Id at 723 n.28. The
conclusion is desirable; the manipulation of§ 1291's "final decision" requirement necessitated
by the implication that "final order" is its equivalent is not. No subsequent decision of the
court has addressed the relationship between "final order" and "final decision," and no court
other than the Fifth Circuit inJohnson v. Combs has squarely held them to be synonymous. But
cf Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 618, 622-23 (4th Cir. 1978) (interpreting
Bradley to mean that phases of desegregation case are so distinct that each may be conceived
as mini-case, with final decision at conclusion of each); Tasby v. Estes, 498 F. Supp. 1130,
1132-33 (N.D. Tex. 1980), vacatedon otherground, 651 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1981); McPherson v.
School Dist. # 186, 465 F. Supp. 749, 751-52 (S.D. Ill. 1978) (alternative holding that final
order is equivalent to final decision).
In school desegregation cases, § 1291 appeals would not play a major role. Most of the
trial judge's orders providing interim relief would be appealable as injunctions pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976). Only when the court provided what it intended to be the final
plan for relief would a final decision exist.
249 S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5908; H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976) ("IT]he word 'prevailing' is
not intended to require the entry of ajinzal order before fees may be recovered.") (emphasis in
original). See Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 756-58 (1980). See general' Note, Interim
Awards of Atloms' Fees Under the Civil Rights Attorne's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 21 ARIz. L.
REV. 893, 906-16 (1979).
In light of the Court's holding that the Fees Awards Act is applicable to all violations of
federal law, Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980), a prevailing plaintiff need not rely on
the Court's opinion in Bradl to justify interim fees; the Fees Awards Act would provide an
alternative basis for recovery. See Davis v. Reed, 72 F.R.D. 644 (N.D. Miss. 1976).
250 See supra note 248.
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an interlocutory order determining "substantial rights," as the White
Court implied would be the result if attorney's fees were tied to the mer-
its as relief.
25 1
The Court also may have overestimated the difficulty of determin-
ing which orders constitute final decisions where equitable relief is
sought in a case like Bradley. Interim decrees might constitute judg-
ments, but would be appealable only as injunctions pursuant to section
1292(a)(1), not as final decisions. On the other hand, to the extent that
the Court's judgment was intended as the final word on equitable relief,
with no other issues remaining in the case, the judgment would consti-
tute a final decision, even though the Court retained jurisdiction to con-
sider later modification. 252 Although the line between the two might in
some cases be uncertain, it is probably not as pervasive a problem as the
Court suggested.
Uncertainty as to which orders constitute final decisions in this area
is a serious concern, regardless of the impact on attorney's fees.253 One
would expect this uncertainty to generate unnecessary protective ap-
peals to preserve the opportunity for appellate review.254 Furthermore,
failure to recognize a final judgment and to perfect a timely appeal will
cause some parties to forfeit appellate review. These effects may be
ameliorated somewhat if courts shift their view of what constitutes a
final decision when the consequence is to uphold appellate jurisdiction
rather than to deny appellate review because the final decision had al-
ready been entered and not appealed. 255 In any case, the solution re-
quires clarification of the term "final decision," not severing attorney's
fees from the merits.
Finally, the Court's concern regarding unnecessary fee applications
and related litigation could be avoided if fees were recognized as relief,
thereby requiring the resolution of prejudgment requests for fees before
a final judgment could occur. Thus, the uncertainty that might sur-
round the appealability of a given order would not engender protective
251 Thus, in Morgan v. McDonough, 511 F. Supp. 408 (D. Mass. 1981), the court found
the plaintiff-intervenor entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to the Education Amendments of
1972. The court reached its decision after considering the Bradly interpretation of "final
order" and concluding that "[slince many such orders have been entered in this case, [plain-
tiff-intervenor's] application for fees is not premature." 5-11 F. Supp.. at 413.
252 See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 312 F. Supp. 1150, 1164 (W.D. Tenn. 1970), re-
manded, 444 F.2d 1179 (6th Cir. 1971).
253 See supra text accompanying notes 37-62.
254 See supra text accompanying notes 27-34. Thus, in Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott &
Co., 682 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 732 (1983), the appellant raised the
issue of the appellate court's jurisdiction because the district court's judgment had not re-
solved the issue of attorney's fees. Uncertain whether the 'judgment" was proper, the appel-
lant took a protective appeal only to have the appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and
returned to the district court after a delay of more than one year. Id at 1144, 1148.
255 See supra note 84.
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fee applications, because the order would not be a final judgment until
related questions of attorney's fees had been resolved.
Although there was no mention of it in While, the Bradley case sug-
gests one possible objection to tying attorney's fees to the merits: linking
the two may delay entry of judgment. Thus, in Bradley, after comment-
ing on the complexity of proceedings to determine appropriate attor-
ney's fees, the Court concluded: "It would therefore be undesirable to
delay the implementation of a desegregation plan in order to resolve the
question of fees simultaneously." 256 The district court, however, can
readily avoid this potential delay. To generalize the situation in Bradley,
whenever the district court determines that equitable relief is appropri-
ate and must be effected with dispatch, an injunction may be granted
and appealed despite the existence of other, unresolved prayers for re-
lief.257 Appeals of injunctions are authorized by section 1292(a)(1) in
the absence of a final decision under section 1291 and therefore consti-
tute "judgments" under rule 54(a). Although severing injunctive relief
from attorney's fees may result in multiple appeals, the importance of
affording prompt appellate review of a coercive decree requires sacrific-
ing the efficiency derived from delaying and consolidating appellate re-
view of a case until its conclusion. 258 In addition, if the relief obtained
256 Bradg, 416 U.S. at 723. The Court in this passage was responding to the appellee's
argument that fees must be awarded simultaneously with the final order because of the "upon
the entry of a final order" language. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text. Never-
theless, it is valid to question whether resolution of a request for fees would delay entry of an
otherwise effective order on the merits. The court of appeals in White addressed this concern,
albeit incorrectly. The court suggested that where speed was important, the district court
could enter a judgment reserving the question of fees. White, 629 F.2d at 704. Although
recognizing that such a judgment would be of dubious appealability under § 1291,see Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976), the First Circuit nevertheless asserted that "even
if [the judgment were] non-appealable because still interlocutory the judgment would other-
wise be effective." White, 629 F.2d at 705. If unappealable, the order would not be a judg-
ment. Cinerama, Inc. v. Sweet Music, S.A., 482 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1973); see supra note 88 and
accompanying text. The court's statement that rule 54(b) would authorize certification,
thereby making appealable a judgment that did not decide fees, White, 629 F.2d at 705, is
also incorrect. See in/a text accompanying notes 261-63.
257 Thus, in Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1981), af'g, 500 F. Supp. 1095
(D. Md. 1980), John Anderson obtained an injunction requiring that his name be placed on
the ballot for the 1980 Presidential election in Maryland. Because attorney's fees had been
requested in plaintiff's complaint, the injunction was not appealable as a final decision, but
rather pursuant to § 1292(a)(1). While the appeal of the injunction was under consideration,
the trial court awarded attorney's fees. This award constituted the final decision in the case.
Id at 248. Accord Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1982);
Bacon v. Toia, 648 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1981), aj'don other grounds sub nom. Blum v. Bacon, 457
U.S. 132 (1982); see also Note, supra note 229, at 389 n.172.
258 Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628, 635-56 (3d Cir. 1982);
see Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955); Frank, supra note 6, at 293;
Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L. REv. 351, 364 (1961).
One commentator has suggested that the Court's decision in Switzerland Cheese Ass'n v.
E. Horne's Market, 385 U.S. 23 (1966), limits the applicability of§ 1292(a)(1) to preliminary
injunctions. Redish, supra note 39, at 89 n.2. The Court, however, qualified its decision by
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by the plaintiff is not injunctive and therefore not immediately appeala-
ble, delay in the entry of judgment until the trial court decides attor-
ney's fees would not be a serious problem.259 To some extent, a plaintiff
who has obtained a favorable ruling on the merits can minimize the
delay in entry of judgment by promptly filing an application for fees
with the requisite documentation.
260
noting that some permanent injunctions may fall within the language of the statute and that
the challenged order, denying a motion for summary judgment that included a permanent
injunction, in no way decided the merits of the request for an injunction, but only decided
that there were issues of fact to be resolved. Switzerland Cheese, 385 U.S. at 25. Subsequent
cases in the lower courts have not read Switzerland Cheese as limiting § 1292(a)(1) to prelimi-
nary injunctions. E.g., Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 446-47 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3508 (1982); Shirely v. Bensalem Township, 663 F.2d 472, 476-78
(3d Cir. 1981).
259 Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (delaying entry of judgment in case involving multiple
claims or parties despite. monetary recovery on one of those claims unless district court deter-
mines that "there is no just reason for delay"). But see Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57, 64 (2d
Cir. 1978).
The substantial gap in recent years between the legal and market rate of interest pro-
vided another parameter that made prompt disposition of money damage cases even more
important. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1 (1980). However,
whether delaying entry of judgment until fees are decided will actually exacerbate the legal-
market interest rate gap is problematical. Among the considerations are:
(1) Whether prejudgment interest is available. See General Motors Corp. v. Devex
Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2058 (1983) (prejudgment interest may be awarded in patent infringement
case); Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 414 (1962) (prejudgment interest may be awarded in
response to equitable considerations but is not required as element of compensation); Note,
Interest onJudgments Against the Federal Government: The Need for Full Compensation, 91 YALE L.J.
297, 302 (1981) (describing breakdown of rule limiting prejudgment interest to liquidated
damages). Compare Crawford v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 914, 925 (W.D. La.
1980) (awarding prejudgment interest in title VII case) with Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith
Clark, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 404,409 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (prejudgment interest in copyright infringe-
ment case denied).
(2) Any difference in the legal rate for pre- and post-judgment interest. See West v.
Harris, 573 F.2d 873, 884 (5th Cir. 1978) (prejudgment interest rate based on forum state's
provision); Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1199, 1211 (E.D. Tex. 1981)
(asserting discretion to award prejudgment interest at rate higher than legal postjudgment
rate), rev'don other grounds, 692 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1982).
(3) Whether interest is available on awards of attorney's fees. Compare Gates v. Collier,
616 F.2d 1268, 1272-79 (5th Cir. 1980) (interest available for fees awarded pursuant to Fees
Awards Act) with Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 567 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1978) (interest
may not be recovered on fees awarded pursuant to the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)).
(4) Whether tying fees to the merits as compared with severing fees speeds or delays the
point of final resolution of the case including appeals.
(5) Whether tying fees to the merits results in their being resolved more quickly than if
they are severed.
Congress recently attempted to ameliorate the interest rate gap by providing that
postjudgment interest be calculated based on treasury bill interest rates rather than the state
law rate. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 302, 96 Stat. 55
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976)).
260 Of course, the court could deny relief to the plaintiff for failure to prosecute in the
event of substantial delay in seeking fees. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). The court also would
have the option of setting a deadline for submission of an application for fees after a decision
resolving all other matters.
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Before the Supreme Court's decision in White, a number of courts
had suggested that a court could avoid delay in the entry of a judgment
by certifying for appeal a decision on the merits pursuant to rule 54(b),
even though attorney's fees remained undecided. 261 This solution would
give the district court discretion to make the requisite determination
and thereby permit appeal of the merits while the fee question remained
in the district court. Because the decision in White automatically severs
the merits from fees, the need for a discretionary device becomes largely
academic. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether rule 54(b), which is lim-
ited to cases involving multiple "claims for relief" or multiple parties,
authorizes an appeal of the merits while statutory attorney's fees remain
unresolved. Even if fees were recognized as relief, they are only an addi-
tional element of relief that arises from the single "claim" asserted by
the plaintiff.2 62 Because rule 54(b) is not applicable in single "claim"
261 Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1982); de
Mouy v. Ingvoldstad, 664 F.2d 21, 22 (3d Cir. 1981); White v. New Hampshire Dep't of
Employment Sec., 629 F.2d 697, 705 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
For a more extensive discussion of rule 54(b), see infra text accompanying notes 462-68,
477-83.
262 The Supreme Court has declined to formulate precisely the scope of "claim for relief"
in rule 54(b). See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 n.4 (1976); Sears Roe-
buck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956); infra note 512. Despite the lack of a definitive
standard, Wetze, in holding improper a rule 54(b) certification of a decision in a title VII case
that adjudged defendant liable but did not address any of the elements of relief sought, makes
clear that an attempt to appeal the merits while fees remain outstanding would be improper.
See also Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1978); cf Union Tank Car Co. v. Isbrandt-
sen, 416 F.2d 96, 97 (2d Cir. 1969) (rule 54(b) cannot be used to sanction appeal of merits
where unresolved issue of attorney's fees is "dependent on a contract under construction by
the court").
In a footnote, the White Court tantalizingly hinted that statutory fees may be sufficiently
distinct from the merits of a case that a separate action, divorced from the initial suit, could
be brought to recover fees. Whie, 455 U.S. at 451 n. 13. After rejecting the defendant's con-
tention that Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939), controlled the outcome,
Justice Powell wrote:
Nonetheless, we agree with petitioner to this extent: Sprague at least estab-
lishes that fee questions are not inherently or necessarily subsumed by a deci-
sion on the merits. See also New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54,
66 (1980) (a claimed entitlement to attorney's fees is sufficiently independent
of the merits action under Title VII to support a federal suit "solely to obtain
an award of attorney's fees for legal work done in state and local
proceedings').
Id The citation to and parenthetical description of New York Gaslight implies that a statutory
claim for fees is a separate cause of action that may be independently sued on and that such a
suit would not be precluded by the res judicata doctrine of merger. Efficiency concerns sug-
gest that such a reading would be unfortunate. See supra text accompanying notes 37-47. The
language used by Congress in authorizing statutory attorney fees also belies any such conclu-
sion. See Derheim v. Hennepin County Bureau of Social Servs., 524 F. Supp. 1321, 1325 (D.
Minn. 1981), afd, 688 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1982); Blow v. Lascaris, 523 F. Supp. 913, 917
(N.D.N.Y. 1981), afdper curiam, 688 F.2d 670 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 225 (1982).
Finally, the citation to New York Gaslight is misleading. Because title VII uniquely re-
quires an employment discrimination claimant initially to assert her claim in available state
proceedings, as the plaintiff in Gasight had done, the primary issue was whether those state
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cases, its availability would be limited to those cases in which a plaintiff
was asserting multiple legal rights to recovery. Even in that instance,
current rule 54(b) doctrine would require final resolution of all aspects
of relief pertaining to at least one claim, including fees, before a rule
54(b) judgment could be entered.
2 63
Articulating a related concern about delay, the Obin II court as-
serted that tying the merits and fees together in one judgment "may
force an appeal of the entire case when the sole issue of concern to appel-
lant may be the propriety or size of the attorney's fees award. ' 264 Sever-
ing the merits and fees, on the other hand, "would allow for the
judgment on the merits to be in effect and any remedy operative while
the appellate court reviews the award of fees."' 265 This contention ig-
nores the fact that appeals may be taken of a portion of a judgment,
26 6
and that, in any case, stays of judgment are not automatic; no reason
would exist to stay equitable relief when only attorney's fees are
proceedings constituted an "action or proceeding under this title," the language used in
§ 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that authorizes recovery of attorney's fees in title VII
cases. After concluding that the language did encompass the state proceedings required by
title VII the Court added:
Since it is clear that Congress intended to authorize fee awards for work done
in administrative proceedings, we must conclude that § 706()(1)'s authoriza-
tion of a civil suit in federal court encompasses a suit solely to obtain an
award of attorney's fees for legal work done in state and local proceedings.
New York Gaslight, 447 U.S. at 66. This necessity rationale would not apply to statutory
claims that do not contain a requirement of resort to state proceedings. Derheim, 524 F. Supp.
at 1324; Blow, 523 F. Supp. at 915-16.
263 The rule 54(b) issue might arise in two different multiple claim contexts. In the first,
at least one claim for which statutory fees are available has been resolved, except for the
matter of fees, but one or more claims remains, none of which would provide a basis for
awarding fees. In the second, one or more of the unresolved claims would also provide for
recovery of attorney's fees, thereby leaving the potential for further proceedings regarding
fees. Presumably the unresolved claims in each case would not be merely alternative theories
for the resolved claims, and thereby mooted by resolution of the latter.
Allowing the trial judge discretion to sever the merits of the resolved claim in the second
situation would appear desirable: future proceedings on fees may be required if plaintiff is
successful on the remaining claims. Particularly where the judgment loser seeks or does not
oppose a rule 54(b) certification, thus obviating concerns about the sufficiency of information
to make the decision to appeal, providing flexibility should not engender much controversy.
On the other hand, where the remaining claims do not provide the potential for further
attorney's fee proceedings, permitting use of the rule 54(b) certification procedure would have
the effect of giving the trial judge discretion to sever the merits and fees.
There is at least one significant argument to be made on behalf of providing that flex-
ibility, indeed even extending it to the single claim, multiple relief case. Given the resjudicata
requirement of a "final judgment," a court may proceed with a complex case for a lengthy
period, making partial, yet substantial, decisions toward final resolution, only to have all
those efforts negated by a later controlling decision. See Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57, 64 n.8
(2d Cir. 1978). This would require, however, a fundamental change in the current interpreta-
tion of rule 54(b).
264 Obin I, 651 F.2d at 581 n.8.
265 Id
266 Spound v. Mohasco Indus., 534 F.2d 404, 410 (1st Cir. 1976),cert. denied, 429 U.S. 886
(1976); see Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 479 & n.5 (1980).
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challenged. 267
In summary, severing statutory attorney's fees from the merits
raises serious concern about efficient judicial administration in the
chronological allocation of jurisdiction between the district courts and
the courts of appeals. Moreover, uncoupling may also force unsuccessful
parties to decide whether to appeal before they know the full extent of
their liability. Although some of these effects may be ameliorated by
adoption of local rules, that alternative is a second-best solution to the
competing concerns reflected in the limitations on appellate jurisdiction
and related policies in the determination of an appropriate statutory fee
award.
B. An Afterword: Fees As Costs
In a number of respects, the "fees as costs" approach adopted by a
number of courts before While, and left unaffected by that decision, pro-
duces results identical to those reached by the collateral and independ-
ent approach of White. 268 Treating fees as costs allows a decision on the
merits to become final for purposes of appeal despite an outstanding
request for attorney's fees.269 This result follows from the requirement
of rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that entry ofjudgment
should not be delayed for taxation of costs. 270 Furthermore, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure impose no explicit time limit on submission of
a bill of costs. 27t Thus, although the "costs" approach is conceptually
quite different from the collateral and independent approach-indeed
the Obin _I court flatly rejected fees as costs 272 -the two can peacefully
coexist, as the Supreme Court recognized in White. 273 The primary
functional difference between these two approaches is whether a local
267 See Edelman v. Jordan, 414 U.S. 1301 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, 1973); FED. R.
Civ. P. 62; FED. R. App. P. 8; cf. Parker v. Lewis, 670 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam)
(summarily affirming portion of judgment that was not contested on appeal); Barnes v.
United States, 678 F.2d 10 (3d Cir. 1982) (same as Parker). But cf. Kean v. National City
Bank, 294 F. 214, 227 (6th Cir. 1923) ("There cannot be a final judgment granting or denying
a part of the damages claimed under one count, and at the same time contemplating further
proceedings in the suit to determine the liability as to the remainder of the damages
claimed."), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 629 (1924).
268 E.g., Crowder v. Telemedia, 659 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1981).
269 See, e.g., Terket v. Lund, 623 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1980); Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett,
Inc., 530 F.2d 529, 531 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976).
270 This was the case even before adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Fowler v. Hamill, 139 U.S. 549 (1891); Prescott &A. Cent. Ry. v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 84
F. 213 (2d Cir. 1897) (per curiam).
271 American Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., 41 F.R.D. 161 (D. Minn. 1966).
When the request for costs is delayed unreasonably, courts have denied recovery on equi-
table grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Pinto, 44 F.R.D. 357 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
A substantial number of federal district courts have promulgated local rules that place
an outside time limit on seeking costs. See infra note 309.
272 Obin 1, 651 F.2d at 580.
273 See White, 455 U.S. at 454 & n.17.
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district court rule prescribing time limits for submission of a bill of costs
also governs fee requests.
2 74
Thus, one could view the arguments and case law in favor of treat-
ing statutory fees as part of the costs of the action as giving succor to the
While decision, at least on a functional level. Given this similarity and
the unresolved nature of the issue, some further analysis is appropriate.
This section initially presents arguments in favor of assessing fees in the
same fashion as costs. After consideration of the differences between
costs and attorney's fees as well as the functional disadvantages of un-
coupling fees from the merits, however, this article concludes that rule
58 is inappropriate for the fee assessing process.
In support of treating attorney's fees as taxable costs, proponents
have aptly noted that the language of several federal statutes authoriz-
ing an award of attorney's fees, including the Fees Awards Act, provides
that a prevailing party may be awarded "a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the CoStS." '2 7 5 Attorney's fees, like costs, primarily are incurred as
a consequence of the litigation in which plaintiff seeks relief; unlike
money damages, they are not awarded as compensation for the wrong
upon which suit is brought.276 As a result, both attorney's fees and costs
normally are awarded at the conclusion of the case.2 77 Finally, treating
fees as costs avoids denying a deserving party attorney's fees because of a
procedural default.
2 78
There is also historical precedent for awarding attorney's fees with
other taxable costs. In England, which has a long history of awarding
costs to the prevailing party in actions at law and equity,2 79 taxable
274 Watkins v. Mobile Housing Bd., 632 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1980); Knighton v. Watkins,
616 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1980).
There is precedent for treating statutory attorney's fees as costs that precedes much of
Congress's recent activity in the fee shifting arena. See Danzig v. Virgin Isle Hotel, 278 F.2d
580 (3d Cir. 1960). But see infra note 285.
275 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V 1981).
276 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 695 n.24 (1978). But see id at 707 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
277 Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 797 (5th Cir. 1980). But see infra text accompany-
ing notes 331-38.
278 See Comment, Procedural Characterization of Post-Judgment Requests for Attorney's Fees in
Civil Rights Cases-Eliminating Artiftcial Barrers to Awards, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 827, 839
(1981); supra text accompanying note 125. The Fifth Circuit, which adopted the fees as costs
approach in Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1980), was motivated in part by a
desire to avoid denying fees simply because of a procedural error. The Third Circuit, in
Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 530 F.2d 529, 531 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825
(1976), relied on the costs characterization to conclude that an antitrust case was properly
appealed despite the unresolved question of attorney's fees authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1982). That statute permits a prevailing plaintiff "threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
279 Since at least 1275, when the Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw., ch. 1, was enacted, pre-
vailing plaintiffs have recovered costs in common law actions. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J.
849, 852 (1929); Comment, Distribution of Legal Expense Among Litigants, 49 YALE L.J. 699, 700
(1940). It was not until the enactment of the Statute of Westminster, 4 Jac., ch. 3, in 1607
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costs include a substantial portion of the fees paid for legal counsel. 280
Although the English practice of awarding attorney's fees was for the
most part not adopted in colonial times,281 and was largely rejected in
America at least until the federal fee shifting statutes of the last several
decades, proposals for reform often recall the English practice and
procedure.
282
On closer examination, however, treating statutory attorney's fees
as costs in determining whether a resolution of the merits is appealable
cannot be justified. Reliance on statutory language describing attor-
ney's fees as an element of costs is dubious. Coupling fees with the mer-
its does0no violence to the plain meaning of those statutes that suggest
attorney's fees are an element of costs. 283 First, no fee shifting statute
explicitly states that the procedures of rule 54(d) and 58, which sever
that a successful defendant's right to costs was established in all common law cases. Good-
hart, supra, at 853. In the interim period, the Chancellor awarded costs in equity cases, albeit
with more discretion than in the common law courts. Id at 854.
280 Goodhart, supra note 279, at 856-58. For a description of the procedure by which
costs are taxed in England, see Goldberger, The Cost ofjustice: An American Problem, An English
Solution, 9 VIL. L. REV. 400, 402-04 (1964); Goodhart, supra note 279, at 854-55; Comment,
supra note 232, at 638 n.7.
281 The most plausible explanation for the refusal to permit fee shifting in the late eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries in America was a prevailing distrust of lawyers among the
largely rural populace. Goodhart,supra note 279, at 873; Comment,supra note 279, at 701. A
number of jurisdictions had statutes that provided for recovery of fixed sums as counsel fees,
but these sums were so small as to be de minimus. Id at 701 nn.20, 22; see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1923(a) (1982).
Others have interpreted history differently, ascribing more significance to the statutory
provisions for fixed recovery, see C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 235 (1935); Note, Use of Taxable
Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 78, 80 (1953), and concluding that
they were the alternative that permitted rejection of the English rule but ultimately became
inadequate because of their maximum, Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great
Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792, 798-99 (1966). Professor Falcon has suggested that some com-
bination of these factors, plus historical accident, explains the American rule. Falcon, Award
of Attorn's Fees in Civil Rights and Constitutional Litigation, 33 MD. L. REv. 379, 381-82 n.5
(1973). Professor Leubsdorf has recently suggested that the American rule evolved as a com-
promise in which the bar accepted the statutes regulating the amount of fees that the victor
could recover in exchange for freedom to contract with their clients for payment of fees.
Leubsdorf, Toward the Histoy of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovey (forthcoming in LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS.).
282 Goodhart, supra note 279, at 849-72; Comment, supra note 279, at 700-02; see
Stoebuck, CounselFees Includedin Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. CoLo. L. REV. 202, 204-07
(1966); Note, Attorney's Fees and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 319, 320
(1977); Comment, Theories of Recovering Attorneys' Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule, 47
UMKC L. REV. 566, 592 (1979).
283 A basic canon of statutory interpretation requires the court to determine if the issue at
hand can be resolved by resort to the clear meaning of the language of an applicable statute.
See, e.g., United States v. Missouri P.R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929). The plain meaning rule,
particularly in its strictest formulation, has not been without its critics. See generally Kelso &
Kelso, Appeals in Federal Courts by Prosecuting Entities other than the United States: The Plain Meaning
Rule Revisited, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 187 (1981); Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain Mean-
ing Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modem" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299
(1975).
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costs from the merits, should be adopted for attorney's fees. 28 4 Second,
the term "costs" is generic and, when contained in fee shifting statutes,
need not be read as referring to the statutorily authorized costs that are
taxed pursuant to rule 54(d).
28 5
Finally, the oft-cited explanation for characterizing fees as costs in
the Fees Awards Act is that Congress chose this method to avoid the
eleventh amendment barrier to monetary awards against the states.
28 6
Although the legislative history provides some support for this argu-
ment, 28 7 there are indications that Congress selected the language to
make the Fees Awards Act consistent with fee provisions in earlier civil
rights statutes. No sovereign immunity problems could arise under
these statutes because the states enjoyed an express exemption from cov-
erage.288 There is also evidence that the drafters of the Fees Awards Act
284 Indeed, it would be impossible to adopt these procedures, because Congress has pro-
vided that the court, rather than the clerk of the court, should initially assess the amount of
fees, see supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text, thereby rejecting at least one aspect of the
rule 54(d) procedure. See infra note 300 and accompanying text. In a related vein, rule 58
specifies that the judgment should not be delayed for the "taxing" of costs; the term "taxing"
is commonly used to refer to the process engaged in by the clerk of the court rather than the
judge. Eg., FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d) ("Costs may be taxed by the clerk on one day's notice.").
285 See People of Sioux County, Neb. v. National Sur. Co., 276 U.S. 238, 244 (1928)
(holding that state statute that authorized plaintiff to recover attorney's fee "to be taxed as
part of the costs," which was applicable in diversity case, did not govern procedural fashion in
which fees should be awarded; fees should be treated as part of the judgment, not taxed as
costs); accord Oxford Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Duckworth, 689 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1982); Alcan
Pac. Co. v. Mauk Seattle Lumber Co., 302 F. Supp. 606 (D. Alaska 1966), afd 414 F.2d 832
(9th Cir. 1969); Reynolds v. Wade, 140 F. Supp. 713 (D. Alaska 1956), rev'don other grounds,
249 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1957). Contra Henlopen Hotel Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 38 F.R.D. 155
(D. Del. 1965).
Similarly, where a state statute authorizes recovery of attorney's fees, the amount of the
fees may be considered as part of the amount in controversy for purposes of establishing
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, despite the exclusion of costs in the statutory
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 290 U.S. 199
(1933); Batts Restaurant v. Commercial Ins. Co., 406 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1969); Mutual Bene-
fit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Bowman, 96 F.2d 7 (8th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 304 U.S.
549 (1938); cf. Graham v. Henegar, 640 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1981) (amount of attorney's fees
requested by plaintiff included in calculating amount of claim for purposes of jurisdiction
under Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976)).
286 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 696 (1978); Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268, 1276 (5th
Cir. 1980); Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284, 1299 n.18 (5th Cir. 1978).
For a discussion of the eleventh amendment and its impact on attorney's fees awards
prior to Hutto v. Fimey, see Note, Attorney's Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARV. L. REv.
1875 (1975).
287 See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 n.6, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5908, 5913 n.6. The report cited Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S.
70 (1927), in connection with its statement that attorney's fees, like costs, could be collected
from the state official or state entity involved. In Fairmont Creamery, the court upheld its power
to tax costs against a state in a criminal appeal. For an argument that Fairmont Creamery dealt
only with common law sovereign immunity, see Note, supra note 286, at 1890-91.
288 See S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 49-50 (1975); 122 CONG. REc. 35,122 (1976)
(remarks of Rep. Drinan).
The earlier civil rights acts referred to in the text were Titles II and VII of the Civil
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read Fitz er 289 as permitting Congress to authorize awards of
monetary relief against states in exercising its power under section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment,2 90 thus rendering the "costs" characteriza-
tion unnecessary in order to except fees from the barrier of the eleventh
amendment. In any case, the eleventh amendment was not the impetus
for authorizing an antitrust plaintiff to recover "the costs of suit, includ-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee" 291 in 1890 when Congress passed the
Sherman Act. Indeed, at that time, the statute governing awards of
costs required that costs be included as part of the judgment.
292
Because Congress has employed a myriad of verbal formulations in
fee shifting statutes, including many that do not characterize attorney's
fees as costs, 293 it is difficult to ascribe any significance to such language
for purposes of determining the appropriate procedural context in
which to treat statutory attorney's fees.294 There simply is no indication
that the language used in these statutes was, in any sense, meant to ad-
dress this question. 2
95
More importantly, the differences between routine costs awarded to
the prevailing party and attorney's fees-their quantum, the standards
applicable to determine their amount, the procedure by which they are
determined, and their significance in relation to the underlying merits in
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5(b) (1976) and the Emergency School
Aid Act of 1972, 29 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976) (repealed 1982). Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, state governments were initially exempted from coverage and therefore
no eleventh amendment issue could have motivated the "fees are costs" characterization. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1) (1964). In 1972, Congress amended title VII to include state govern-
ments within its scope. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §
2(1), 86 Stat. 103, 103. But see Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268, 1276 (5th Cir. 1980).
289 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
290 H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 n. 14 (1976); see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.
678, 693-94 (1978).
291 Sherman Act § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982));
see Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1980).
292 e infra notes 315-17 and accompanying text.
293 Eg., Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, § 706, 15 U.S.C.
§ 169 le(d) (1982) ("costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee"); Truth in
Lending Act § 130, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1982) (same); Equal Access to Justice Act § 204, 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1981) ("fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs");
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, § 208, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(2)
(Supp. V 1981) ("damages including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees').
294 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
295 Cf. 122 CONG. REC. 35,116 (1976) (statement of Rep. Drinan characterizing wording
of Fees Awards Act as "routine, boilerplate, legal language"). The characterization of fees as
costs in many of the federal statutes probably can be traced to a number of related factors:
the English practice of awarding some measure of attorney's fees as part of the costs, Good-
hart, supra note 279, at 856; the adoption of that view by a few of the states in the early
nineteenth century in their statutes providing for a minimal sum to be recovered as fees,
Comment, supra note 279, at 701; the continuation of that characterization by a number of
states that permitted a substantial attorney's fee to be recovered in certain cases, see supra note
17; and the superficial similarity that attorney's fees have with taxable costs incurred in litiga-
tion, see supra note 276 and accompanying text.
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the case-counsel against adoption of the fees as costs approach for sev-
eral reasons.
First, the taxable "costs" normally awarded a prevailing party in
the district court296 are defined by statute297 and generally are neither
significant in amount 298 nor representative of the total expenses in-
curred by a party in litigation.299 In the vast run of cases, costs are
taxed by the clerk of the court3 0 based on a bill of costs submitted by
the prevailing party for a reasonably well-defined class of costs.30 ' Typi-
cally these costs include docket, filing, service and witness fees, and the
cost of obtaining a transcript of trial and printing briefs. Thus, al-
though there are exceptions, the costs taxed in the district court pursu-
ant to rule 54(d) are generally not significant sums and do not comprise
a significant percentage of the amount otherwise at stake in the case.
30 2
296 FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
297 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Other statutes concerning costs in other
federal courts and fees charged to litigants are contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1911-1930 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981). The court retains discretion to award other expenses incurred by a party as
costs. See Peck, Taxation ofCosts in United States District Courts, 37 F.R.D. 481, 485-95 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Peck, District Courts]; Peck, Taxation of Costs-New Developments, 43 F.R.D.
55 (1967). The court also has discretion to deny items of expense as taxable costs, Farmer v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227 (1964), or to deny costs in toto, FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
298 See Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964); Comment, supra note
279, at 700-0 1. But see infra note 328. The relative unimportance of costs may explain the
observation that the few cases that deal with taxable costs are not written with "a 'fastidious
precision'" of language. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Jacobson, 37 F.R.D. 427, 430 (W.D. Mo.
1965) (quoting Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283, 287 (1945)).
299 Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964); see Peck, District Courts,
supra note 297, at 485-95. See generally Goodhart, supra note 279.
300 Costs are taxed after submission of a verified bill of costs, except in instances where
the trial court exercises its discretion. Opposing parties may file written objections or appear
and object orally at the time set for taxation by the clerk. Peck, District Courts, supra note 297,
at 482-84.
The differing processes by which costs and statutory attorney's fees are determined is best
illustrated by the treatment of each in the federal courts of appeals. The clerk of the appel-
late court taxes costs on appeal after submission of a bill of costs by a party that deems itself
entitled to costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Because a party authorized by
statute to recover attorney's fees may recover for attorney efforts in connection with an ap-
peal, Love v. Mayor of Cheyenne, 620 F.2d 235, 237 (10th Cir. 1980), the courts of appeals
have been faced with the question of who should make the factual and evaluative determina-
tions necessary to fix the amount of attorney's fees. The courts of appeals have, for the most
part, left this determination to the district courts, which have superior and more flexible fact-
finding capabilities. See supra note 151.
301 See Peck, District Courts, supra note 297, at 485-94.
302 Those who advocate limiting the amount of costs recoverable by the victor point to
the same egalitarian notions cited in support of the American rule requiring that each party
bear its own attorney's fees to justify such limitations. Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379
U.S. 227, 234-45 (1964). These same concerns recently prompted Judge Weinfeld to disallow
over $160,000 that had been taxed against the plaintiff as costs by the clerk. The judge
reached this determination despite his earlier assessment that "the factual underpinnings for
plaintiff's Sherman and Clayton Act claims are somewhat shallow." Brager & Co v. Leumi
Sec. Corp., 530 F. Supp. 1361, 1363 (S.D.N.Y.), a fd without opinion, 697 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.
1982).
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By contrast, the attorney's fees that courts award pursuant to fee shifting
statutes are frequently substantial amounts, in most cases comprising a
significant proportion of the total monetary relief recovered.
303
Second, because the fees as costs approach is functionally similar to
the collateral and independent characterization adopted in White, one
can level many of the same criticisms of the latter at the former as well.
The minimal impact of costs may justify severing them from the judg-
ment to speed its entry, but a losing party required to pay attorney's fees
should know the amount at stake before deciding whether to appeal the
merits.3 4 Similarly, addressing fees and the merits in close temporal
proximity in the trial court and, if necessary, reviewing them in the
same appellate proceeding fosters judicial efficiency in both the trial and
appellate courts. Unlike attorney's fees, the clerk's largely ministerial
assessment of costs 30 5 rarely requires assessment of the merits,306 and fre-
quently is concluded in a matter of days. The relative unimportance of
keeping costs closely connected with the merits is demonstrated by cases
in which taxation of costs is deferred until after the conclusion of an
appeal.30
7
Third, treating attorney's fees in the same fashion as costs is also an
imperfect vehicle for minimizing procedural defaults.30 8 Currently
more than one-third of the district courts have local rules prescribing
time limits for submitting a bill of costs. 30 9 These time limits vary from
303 This generalization, without empirical support, may seem suspect, even with copious
citation to individual cases that appear to provide support. Nevertheless, as any contempo-
rary observer of the attorney's fee litigation explosion can attest, "[t]he impact of [federal fee-
shifting] statutes, and particularly of the awards under them, has been enormous." E. LAR-
SON, supra note 158, at 1 (1981); see, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 483 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 629 F.2d
697, 702-04 (1st Cir. 1980), re'd on other grounds, 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
304 See supra notes 194-206 and accompanying text.
305 Compare Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967)
("The time, expense and difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question of what consti-
tutes reasonable attorney's fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial administration.")
with Peck, District Courts, supra note 297, at 482-84 (mechanics of taxing costs are simple).
306 See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text. But see, e.g., Farmer v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227 (1964); Brager & Co. v. Leumi See. Corp., 530 F. Supp. 1361, 1363
(S.D.N.Y.), afd without opinion, 697 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1982).
307 American Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., 41 F.R.D. 161 (D. Minn. 1966);
Fleischer v. A.A.P. Inc., 36 F.R.D. 31" (S.D.N.Y. 1964); see Boice v. Boice, 56 F. Supp. 339
(D.N.J. 1944).
308 See Metcalf v. Borba, 681 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1982).
309 These districts include: Middle and Southern Districts of Alabama; District of
Alaska; District of Arizona; Central, Eastern, Northern, and Southern Districts of California;
District of Colorado; Middle and Northern Districts of Florida; Northern and Southern Dis-
tricts of Georgia; District of Idaho; Northern District of Illinois; Northern and Southern Dis-
tricts of Iowa; Western District of Louisiana; District of Maryland; Northern District of
Mississippi; Eastern District of Missouri; District of Montana; District of Nebraska; District of
Nevada; District of New Jersey; District of New Mexico; Southern District of New York;
District of North Dakota; Eastern, Northern, and Western Districts of Oklahoma; District of
Oregon; Middle District of Pennsylvania; District of Puerto Rico; District of Rhode Island;
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district to district310 and in some the deadline is as short as five days
after notice of entry of judgment, 3 1 a limitation even more restrictive
than the ten days from entry of judgment provided in rule 59(e). In
districts with local rules, the worst effects of placing tight time con-
straints on applications for fees combine3 1 2 with the disadvantages of
severing fees from the merits,3 13 if the rules applicable to costs also gov-
ern statutory attorney's fees.
Finally, the haphazard historical developments that led to the pro-
vision in rule 58 severing costs from the judgment suggest that the rea-
sons for divorcing costs from the judgment do not apply to attorney's
fees.
The first comprehensive statute3 14 governing the award of costs in
the federal courts was the Fee Bill Act of 1853.3 15 In applying the Act,
courts treated a final disposition of the merits that did not provide for
costs as a final judgment, 3 16 even though the statute required that
"[costs]. . .shall be taxed. . . and. . . included in and form a portion
of a judgment or decree against the losing party. ,3 17 In some instances,
subsequently taxed costs would be inserted in the judgment nunc pro
Middle and Western Districts of Tennessee; Southern District of Texas; District of Utah;
Eastern and Western Districts of Washington; Eastern District of Wisconsin. See [Fed. Local
Ct. Rules] FED. R. SERv. 2D (Callaghan).
One significant difference between a post judgment time limit on submission of a request
for attorney's fees imposed by local rules governing costs, and the time constraints of rule
59(e), is that the latter limitation is jurisdictional and cannot be extended, see supra text ac-
companying notes 108-09, while the former can be enlarged, FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b).
310 From five days after entry of judgment in the Western District of Washington, W.D.
WASH. R. 54, [Fed. Local Ct. Rules] FED. R. SERV. 2D (Callaghan), to 40 days after entry of
judgment or 10 days after the issuance of the mandate of the appellate court, whichever is
later, in the Eastern District of Missouri, E.D. Mo. R. 24, [Fed. Local Ct. Rules] FED. R.
SERV. 2D (Callaghan).
311 W.D. LA. R. 5(c), [Fed. Local Ct. Rules] FED. R. SERV. 2D (Callaghan). The Western
District of Washington is even more restrictive, imposing a five-day deadline from enl9 of
judgment. W.D. WASH. R. 54, [Fed. Local Ct. Rules] FED. R. SERv. 2D (Callaghan).
312 See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
313 See supra text accompanying notes 145-206.
314 For a historical discussion of federal statutes bearing on costs, see S. LAW, THE JURIS-
DICTION AND POWERS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 255-82 (1852); Payne, Costs in Com-
mon Law Actions in the Federal Court, 21 VA. L. REV. 397, 401-03 (1935); see also Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-51 (1975) (discussing congressional
treatment of attorney's fees before 1853).
315 Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161.
316 Fowler v. Hamill, 139 U.S. 549, 550 (1891); United States v. Nordbye, 75 F.2d 744,
746 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 572 (1935); Prescott & A. Cent. Ry. v. Atchison T. &
S.F.R.R., 84 F. 213, 214 (2d Cir. 1897).
317 Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, § 3, 10 Stat. 161, 168.
One might assert that the language of the statute only requires that the judgment in-
clude a discretionary decision on whether to tax costs and not a determination of the amount
thereof. The mandatory nature of the statute along with the language providing that costs
shall comprise a "portion of a judgment," although not conclusive, suggest otherwise.
The current federal statute authorizing taxation of costs, 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1976 & Supp.
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tunc; 31 s in others, a separate order would subsequently be entered assess-
ing CoStS. 3 19 Either way, as is the case today, the taxing of costs affected
neither the judgment nor the beginning of the period in which a disap-
pointed party might take an appeal.
The virtual unappealability of an award of costs partially explains
the development of this practice. Both in equity,3 20 where the courts
exercised great discretion in awarding costs, and-to a lesser extent-at
law,32 1 appellate review of costs was quite limited.322 Thus, uncoupling
the costs from the merits presented few problems in terms of piecemeal
appeals or procedural inefficiencies, and had the advantage of permit-
ting earlier entry of judgment.323 Even in 1946, when rule 58 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended to overrule explicitly the
practice in several New York federal district courts of delaying entry of
judgment until the assessment of costs, 324 the volume and availability of
appeals of costs were minimal.
325
V 1981), is also inconsistent with rule 58. It provides in relevant part: "A bill of costs shall be
filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the judgment or decree." Id
The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976), provides that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure supersede inconsistent federal law. See generally Clinton, Rule 9 of the Federal
Habeas Corpus Rules: A Case Study on the Need for Reform of the Rules Enabling Acts, 63 IOWA L.
REV. 15, 53-54 (1977).
318 Eg., Stallo v. Wagner, 245 F. 636, 640 (2d Cir. 1917); Allis-Chalmers Co. v. United
States, 162 F. 679, 680 (7th Cir. 1908).
319 Eg., Fowler v. Hamill, 139 U.S. 549, 550 (1891); United States v. Nordbye, 75 F.2d
744, 745 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 572 (1935); Prescott & A. Cent. Ry. v. Atchison, T. &
S.F.R.R., 84 F. 213, 213 (2d Cir. 1897).
320 Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 265 U.S. 78, 82-84 (1924); Trustees v. Greenough,
105 U.S. 527, 527-28 (1881); Canter v. American Ins. Co., 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 307, 319 (1830);
Stallo v. Wagner, 245 F. 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1917); Payne, supra note 314, at 400.
321 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Jacobson, 37 F.R.D. 427, 430 n.5 (W.D. Mo. 1965).
322 One commentator, writing in 1929, contrasted the significance of costs in Great Brit-
ain and America, stating: "In America, on the other hand, the subject of costs seems to be a
minor one." Goodhart, supra note 279, at 851; see Payne, supra note 314, at 430.
323 The parties who lost the opportunity for appellate review of the merits because they
erroneously thought that a judgment that included taxable costs was a prerequisite to begin
the time within which to appeal might disagree. See, e.g., Fowler v. Hamill, 139 U.S. 549
(1891); Allis-Chalmers Co. v. United States, 162 F. 679, 681 (7th Cir. 1908).
324 Local Rule 22 for the Southern District of New York provided: "The judgment in
any case may be signed, leaving a blank space for the insertion of costs by the clerk as and
when they have been taxed. But the judgment shall not be entered until costs have been
taxed or waived." United States District Court Rules for the Southern District of New York
36-37 (Sept. 16, 1938);see Harris v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 139 F.2d 571, 572 (2d
Cir. 1943); Kehaya v. Axton, 32 F. Supp. 273, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); FED. R. Civ. P. 58 advi-
sory committee note, 5 F.R.D. 433, 475-76 (1946).
The practice apparently developed because state practice required costs to be deter-
mined and included as part of the judgment. See J. CLEVENGER, ANNUAL PRACTICE OF NEW
YORK § 1532 (1946); D. SIEGEL, HANDBOOK ON N.Y. PRAcTIcE 552-53 (1978); 8 J. WEIN-
STEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 8402.01 (1982).
The Southern District annulled rule 22 on October 1, 1945, because it was inconsistent
with amended Federal Rule 58. FED. R. Civ. P. 58 advisory committee note, 5 F.R.D. 433,
475-76 (1946).
325 Harris v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 139 F.2d 571, 572 n.1 (2d Cir. 1943).
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By contrast, there is virtually no limitation on appellate review of
attorney's fee awards other than the standard deference to a trial judge
with regard to factual matters that he or she may be in a better position
to determine. The courts of appeals require trial judges to articulate the
basis of their fee awards for the purpose of facilitating appellate re-
view.326 To the extent that the minimal amounts awarded as costs were
a factor in discouraging appeals, 327 the substantial amounts courts
award as attorney's fees belie any similarity. In short, apart from a lit-
eral minded reliance on "attorney's fees as costs," there is little reason to
employ the procedures for taxing costs328 in the assessment of attorney's
fees.
3 2 9
C. Interim Awards of Attorney's Fees
1. General Considerations
The authorization for interim attorney's fees announced in Bradley
v. School Board, 330 and subsequently adopted by Congress in numerous
326 Davis v. City of Abbeville, 633 F.2d 1161, 1163 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing cases); Van
Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488, 497 (5th Cir. 1980), aJ'd in part, vacated and remanded in part,
654 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982); Northcross v. Board of
Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980).
327 See Comment, supra note 198, at 883-85.
328 The increasing willingness of appellate courts to review awards of costs, see, e.g.,
Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227 (1964), and, in a small number of cases, the
increasing significance of cost awards, Peck, District Courts, supra note 297, at 482, suggest that
the rule 58 uncoupling of costs from the judgment may be outdated.
To some extent, this problem has been alleviated by local rules mandating a time limit
within which a request for costs must be made. See supra note 309. Although these rules still
do not require that costs be awarded before a judgment may validly be entered, a require-
ment that would violate rule 58, they do ensure that a party contemplating appeal will at
least know the costs being sought before deciding to appeal. These rules also increase the
probability, given the lag time in the courts of appeals, that an appellate court will consoli-
date an appeal of costs with any appeal of the judgment in the case. See, e.g., Schneider v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 994 (1982); cf
supra note 180.
329 Interestingly, some of the early cases awarding statutory attorney's fees authorized by
the Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982), which permits a successful plaintiff to recover
"the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee," treated attorney's fees and other
taxable costs quite differently, without any explicit recognition of the issue. Thus, in Twenti-
eth Century Fox Film Corp v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880
(1964), the trial court included $100,000 as attorney's fees in the judgment and taxed
$66,507.31 separately as costs. Although the court of appeals reviewed and affirmed the at-
torney's fee award without commenting on its appealability, it reviewed the lower court's
taxation of costs only after addressing the appealability of cost awards. Id at 221-23. See also
Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 42 (1904) (including attorney's fees but not costs in
judgment); Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 166 F. Supp.
163, 168-73 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (same), afd, 273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959), rev'd on othergrounds, 365
U.S. 127 (1961); Sf Clapper v. Original Tractor Cab Co., 270 F.2d 616, 627 (7th Cir. 1959)
("We cannot agree that attorneys' fees are meant to be thus included as an item of the usual
'costs' taxed against the unsuccessful litigant."), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 967 (1960).
330 416 U.S. 696 (1974); see supra notes 237-49 and accompanying text.
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fee shifting statutes331 raises another issue concerning the relationship
between statutory fees and appeals: 332 when a district court grants at-
torney's fees before judgment on the merits, can a party appeal the
award immediately or must the party defer appeal until the case is con-
cluded? An intuitive analysis based on While might proceed as follows:
because attorney's fees are collateral and independent and therefore sep-
arately appealable when awarded after judgment, they are also appeala-
ble before a final determination of the merits. That intuitive conclusion
is at least superficially buttressed by the Supreme Court's decision in
Trustees v. Greenough. 33 In that case, an appeal of an award of attorney's
fees was permitted before judgment on the merits because the fee issue
was "a collateral one, having a distinct and independent character.
'334
An analysis of the situation, however, reveals that such a conclusion is
incorrect and further demonstrates that reliance on the collateral and
independent theory of White to sever fees from the merits is less than
desirable. 3
35
As the lower federal courts have recognized, 336 there is even less
reason to sever prejudgment fees from the merits than postjudgment
fees. One reason for this is that consolidation of appeals of prejudgment
331 Congress enacted the Fees Awards Act two years after Bradly, and authorized recov-
ery of interim fees. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
332 This issue has only surfaced recently and infrequently, probably because interim fee
awards are relatively uncommon. Note, supra note 249, at 915; see Note, ftomoting the Vindica-
tion of Civil Rights Through the Attorg's Fees Awards Act, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 346, 357-59
(1980).
333 105 U.S. 527 (1881); see infra text accompanying notes 412-2 1.
334 Greenough, 105 U.S. at 531.
335 The conclusion that interim fee awards should not generally be appealable also dem-
onstrates the inapplicability of the collateral order doctrine to sanction separate appeals of
fees and the merits. See in/ta text accompanying notes 484-91.
336 See Hastings v. Maine-Endwell Cent. School Dist., 676 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1982); Brad-
ford Exch. v. Trein's Exch., 644 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1981); Wheeler v. Anchor Continental,
Inc., 622 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1980); Ruiz v. Estelle, 609 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1980); cf. In re Under-
writers at Lloyds, 666 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1981) (appeal of attorney's fees awarded as sanctions
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 may not be taken until final judgment). Contra
Ohio v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978).
In Ruiz and Bradford Exchange, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits held they did not have
jurisdiction over an appeal of a prejudgment fee award, even though both circuits had previ-
ously sanctioned uncoupling postjudgment fees from the merits by subscribing to the fees as
costs theory. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. In Bradford Exchange, the Seventh
Circuit justified its holding by citing two cases that involved "similar situations," where the
courts rejected bifurcated appeals. 644 F.2d at 683. Both of those cases, Richerson v. Jones,
551 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1977), and Union Tank Car Co. v. Isbrandtsen, 416 F.2d 96, 97 (2d Cir.
1969), had held that a decision on the mers was not appealable until attorney's fees had been
determined, a position the Seventh Circuit had previously rejected when it accepted the fees
as costs doctrine. See Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1063 (1981); Terket v. Lund, 623 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1980). Well after Bradford Exchange, the
Seventh Circuit held that attorney's fees awarded in a trademark infringement case were
different than civil rights fees and had to be resolved before the merits could be appealed.
Hairline Creations, Inc. v. Kefalas, 664 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1981).
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fees and the merits is substantially less likely to occur than when fees are
awarded after the merits. 33 7 As with postjudgment fees, when various
forms of relief are awarded seriatim, delay of appellate review until the
trial court has resolved all aspects of relief generally promotes both effi-
ciency in judicial administration and fairness to the parties.3 38 Further-
more, an interim fee award is unlikely to be the final word on the
amount of attorney's fees awarded during the district court's initial con-
sideration of the case.
The Supreme Court in While did not purport to address the ques-
tion of interim fees. The Court formulated the issue before it as whether
a "postjudgment request" for fees pursuant to the Fees Awards Act "is a
'motion to alter or amend the judgment,' subject to the 10-day timeli-
ness standard of Rule 59(e)," 339 and the opinion gives little guidance for
resolving the question of interim fees. Given the Court's concern for
avoiding the filing of protective fee requests and the resulting non-
productive litigation over them, it is ironic that the White decision is
likely to spawn protective appeals of interim fee awards by attorneys
concerned that a failure to appeal the award may preclude appellate
review of it later with the merits appeal.
34°
The one situation in which deferring appellate review of an interim
fee award becomes problematic is where the party paying the award341
337 This is so because the time span between an award of interim fees and final resolution
of the merits frequently will be substantially longer than the gap between the merits and
postjudgment fees. See supra notes 180, 200.
338 See supra text accompanying notes 37-62.
339 White, 455 U.S. at 446-47.
340 See, e.g., Bradford Exch. v. Trein's Exch., 644 F.2d 682, 683 (7th Cir. 1981).
341 In order to effectuate its purpose, see supra text accompanying notes 246-49, an in-
terim fee award must be effective immediately. Ironically, the conclusion that the order
awarding fees is unappealable may, in the event of a recalcitrant defendant, make execution
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) unavailable; execution is only available for
judgments. See Wilson v. Daniel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 401 (1798); International Controls Corp. v.
Vesco, 535 F.2d 742, 744-45 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Redding & Co.
v. Russwine Constr. Co., 417 F.2d 721, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Biggins v. Oltmer Iron Works,
154 F.2d 214, 215-16 (7th Cir. 1946). The unappealable interim fee award is not a judgment.
In re Long Island Properties, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 323, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); FED. R. Civ. P.
54(a). Under such circumstances, the inadequacy of legal remedies would seem to justify an
equitable order requiring payment. The order would be enforceable by contempt or other
equitable sanctions such as attachment and sequestration. Cf., e.g., Spain v. Mountanos, 690
F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1982) (equitable authority used by court to effectuate payment of attor-
ney's fees by recalcitrant state); In re International Syss. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 94
F.R.D. 640 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (attorney's fee awarded as discovery sanction to be paid within
30 days on penalty of contempt). But see Governor Clinton Co. v. Knott, 120 F.2d 149, 153
(2d Cir.), appeal dismissed, 314 U.S. 701 (1941). There is precedent authorizing immediate
execution on a civil contempt citation. New York Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers of
Am., AFL-CIO, 445 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1971).
The appealability of such an equitable order under § 1292(a)(1), because of its injunctive
nature, probably depends on whether the attorney's fees are incidental to the other relief
sought in the case, as suggested by White, or whether they are relief. In the former case, the
notion that injunctive orders incidental to the relief sought are not within the scope of
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is concerned about recoupment. If the party later obtains reversal or
reduction of the award on appeal,342 delayed review may be a futile
exercise.343 However, the simple device of requiring the party recover-
ing interim fees to post a bond guaranteeing repayment in the event of
reversal 344 ameliorates much of this problem.3 45 Should the posting of a
bond be infeasible, an immediate appeal should be available.
Two judicially created exceptions to the final decision requirement
of section 1291 would probably sanction such an appeal. In Cohen v.
Benefial Industrial Loan Corp.,346 the Court announced the "collateral
order" exception 347 to the final decision requirement. Although the
§ 1292(a)(1) would preclude immediate appeal. Hastings v. Maine-Endwell Cent. School
Dist., 676 F.2d 893, 896 (2d Cir. 1982); Weight Watchers, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc.,
455 F.2d 770, 774 (2d Cir. 1972);see Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d
645, 645-46 (3d Cir. 1982) (Seitz, J., concurring); cf. Andre, The Final Judgment Rule and Parly
Appeals of Contempt Orders: Tne For a Change, 55 N.Y.U. L. REy. 1041, 1093-97 (1980) (hard-
ship caused by imposition of fines for contempt that may be executed on immediately point
to need for immediate appeal).
342 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 609 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1980); Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp.,
445 F. Supp. 559, 560 (N.D. Ohio 1977). In Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962 (6th
Cir. 1976), the court of appeals permitted immediate appellate review of a contempt citation
imposing a $10,000 per diem fine on the defendant, payable to the plaintiff. The court noted
that the defendant had been "ordered to pay an amount far in excess of any proven dam-
ages--not into court, but to the plaintiff-and no bond was required." Id at 966. Professor
Andre has quite reasonably suggested that this statement reveals the court's concern regard-
ing the ineffectiveness of delayed appellate review. Andre, supra note 341, at 1094 n.276.
343 In other areas, most notably civil contempt, the traditional view has been that imme-
diate appellate review is unavailable even though delayed review may be ineffective. Doyle v.
London Guar. & Accident Co., 204 U.S. 599 (1907). The refusal to permit immediate review
of a civil contempt order has been criticized by commentators, Andre, supra note 341, at 109 1;
Redish, supra note 39, at 123-24, and is subject to a number of exceptions, e.g., New York Tel.
Co. v. Communication Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 445 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1971) (collateral
order doctrine); Vincent v. Local 294, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 424 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1970)
(civil contempt order after conclusion of principal action immediately appealable). The doc-
trine may be undergoing evisceration, at least where the underlying order affects a significant
interest of the contemnor or the contempt sanction imposes a substantial hardship. Halder-
man v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Attorney
Gen., 596 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903 (1979); New York Tel. Co. v.
Communication Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 445 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1971); Andre, supra note
341, at 1063 n.138, 1084-1108.
344 Alternatively, the attorney may be required to post a bond, especially in a case where,
because of the contractual arrangement with the client, the attorney effectively has the eco-
nomic interest in the recovery of fees.
345 See Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp., 445 F. Supp. 559, 560 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Patterson
v. American Tobacco Co., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 586 (E.D. Va. 1975).
346 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
347 The collateral order doctrine has been described as both an exception to the final
decision requirement of § 1291 and an interpretation of it. R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE
IN THE UNITED STATES 69-70 (1981).
This characterization is of little practical importance except that it may affect the ques-
tion of whether a failure to appeal immediately from a collateral order would preclude later
appellate review at the conclusion of the entire case. If viewed as an exception, later review
might be permitted. This situation is analogous to review of injunctive relief on appeal from
a final decision, which is permitted despite the exception permitting immediate review con-
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merits of the case were in an early stage at the time of appeal, the Court
sanctioned appellate review of an order refusing to require the plaintiff
in a shareholders' derivative action to post security for costs. The Court
referred to a number of attributes of the challenged order: the trial
court's decision on the matter was concluded; the order was neither en-
meshed in nor affected by the resolution of the merits; refusing immedi-
ate review might well deny defendant any effective review thereby
resulting in "irreparable harm"; the rights asserted were too important
to be denied review; and the issue involved a serious and unsettled ques-
tion.3 48 Although the precise contours of Cohen are amorphous,349 the
combination of two factors-a significant right (ownership of the
amount of interim fees awarded is analogous to the right in Cohen to be
assured of recovery of costs), and the inability to review effectively the
order on appeal (which is posited)-should be sufficient to permit
appeal.
350
In addition to the collateral order doctrine, Forgay v. Conrad 35 1 in
which the court created one of the first exceptions to the final decision
rule, would appear applicable to an interim fee award where recoup-
ment is in doubt. In Forgay, the Court permitted an appeal of a nonfinal
tained in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976). If viewed as an interpretation, once the time for
appeal of the collateral order expired, no review would be available.
348 Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546-47.
349 Compare, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978) (relying in part on
efficacy of appellate review after final judgment in preserving appellant's rights as grounds for
refusing to permit appeal under collateral order doctrine of order denying certification of
class action) with Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (authorizing appeal of
order permitting published notice rather than individual notice for substantial portion of rule
23(b)(3) class and allocating 90% of notice costs to defendant without reference to irreparable
injury). See also Redish, supra note 39, at 111-13; Note, supra note 258, at 364-66; Comment,
The Collateral Order Doctrine After Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord: The Appealability of
Orders Denying Motionsfor Appointment of Counsel, 62 B.U.L. REv. 845, 854-55 (1982); Comment,
Collateral Orders and Extraordina.7 Writs as Exceptions to the Finality Rule, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 746,
749-51 (1957).
350 There is language in Hastings v. Maine-Endwell Cent. School Dist., 676 F.2d 893, 896
(2d Cir. 1982), that suggests an interim award of fees could never be appealed under the
Cohen rationale because the amount is not final and may be adjusted in the final award,
presumably upward, to reflect additional services by the attorney. But the right to fees and
the amount awarded to that point had been fixed and were not likely to be adjusted. The
district court's power to reconsider the order does not prevent it from being appealable as a
collateral order. Otherwise, no order entered before final judgment and therefore theoreti-
cally subject to reconsideration could ever fall within the Cohen doctrine.
Also, given the decision in White, the requirement that the order be completely separate
from the merits would appear satisfied. To the extent one concludes that the court was wrong
in White, or that the "collateral and independent" characterization by the White Court is not
identical to the Cohen requirement that the challenged order be collateral to the merits, but see
Note, supra note 258, at 365 n. 123, appeal would still be permitted either under Forgay .
Conrad, see infra text accompanying notes 351-54, or under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(l) because the
fees would be an element of the ultimate relief. See supra notes 257-58 and accompanying
text.
351 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848).
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order directing the defendants to deliver real property and slaves to the
complainant assignee of a bankrupt for distribution to the bankrupt's
creditors. The Court reasoned that the property and slaves would be
unrecoverable if a belated appeal resulted in a reversal. Although per-
haps somewhat overbroad, the Forgay Court's statement of its holding
permitting an immediate appeal, "if, by an interlocutory order or de-
cree, the party seeking an appeal is required to deliver up property
which he claims, or to pay money which he denies to be due, "13 5 2 together with
the impotence of a delayed appeal, support interlocutory review.
3 53
2. Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction for Interim Fees
Courts have not yet squarely addressed the availability of pendent
appellate jurisdiction to review an award of attorney's fees when an in-
terlocutory appeal of some other aspect of the case is sanctioned by one
of the exceptions to section 1291.34 When faced with the more general
issue of requests to review an aspect of the case unrelated to the interloc-
utory matter that conferred appellate jurisdiction, the courts have
reached conflicting conclusions without any reconciliation.3 55
The essential tension involves two conflicting concerns. Efficiency
is often promoted by reviewing an otherwise unappealable order that
may have a substantial impact on the case in the same appellate pro-
ceeding with another order of the trial court that is appealable as of
right.3 56 Yet permitting such review may encourage a party to take an
appeal that would not otherwise be taken, in order to obtain pendent
review of an unappealable order. Thus, in Abne v. United States, 357 the
Supreme Court, although permitting interlocutory review of a denial of
defendant's double jeopardy claim, refused to permit pendent review of
other orders because "[a]ny other rule would encourage criminal de-
352 Id at 205 (emphasis added).
353 But see Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 126 (1945) (construing
Forgay as involving two independent and separable disputes, one involving rights to property
and one involving an accounting).
354 Such exceptions would include 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), (b) (1976); the All Writs Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976); and the collateral order doctrine.
355 Compare Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (sanctioning appeal of challenge
to indictment on double jeopardy grounds, but refusing to permit review of other claims that
indictment should have been dismissed) with Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107 (1922)
(permitting review of nonfinal civil contempt finding because contempt was also partly crimi-
nal, which is final decision and was appealed) and United States v. Spectro Foods Corp., 544
F.2d 1175, 1179 (3d Cir. 1976) (reviewing civil contempt order because preliminary injunc-
tion, reviewable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976), was appealed).
356 Once an interlocutory appeal is permitted, the trial proceedings are disrupted, the
expense of prosecuting an appeal is incurred, and an appellate court's study of the case be-
comes necessary. The marginal additional cost of injecting another issue for review may well
be overcome by avoiding otherwise wasted efforts in the trial court or the need for subsequent
appellate review of the same issue in a later appeal.
357 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
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fendants to seek review of, or assert, frivolous double jeopardy claims in
order to bring more serious, but otherwise nonappealable questions to
the attention of the courts of appeals prior to conviction and
sentence."
358
On the other hand, in Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp.,35 9 the
Court approved the court of appeals' review of a denial of a motion to
dismiss, which was unappealable, in connection with the appeal of a
preliminary injunction. After acknowledging the jurisdiction of the
court of appeals to review the grant of the preliminary injunction, the
Court stated: "However, this power is not limited to mere consideration
of, and action upon, the order appealed from. 'If insuperable objection
to maintaining the bill clearly appears, it may be dismissed and the liti-
gation terminated.' -360 At least one court has viewed the pendent ap-
peal issue, probably correctly, as a matter of discretion rather than
jurisdictional authority.
3 61
In the specific context of attorney's fees, pendent review of the
amount of fees already awarded generally would not be desirable be-
cause the remaining proceedings would require an additional fees
award.3 62 However, review of whether fees should be awarded vel non
might be desirable, 363 particularly because this determination will often
be closely related to review of the appealable interlocutory order, as
would be the case, for example, with a preliminary injunction. A rever-
sal on appeal of whether fees should be awarded vel non would save
substantial time in assessing fees for future proceedings in the district
court. 364
358 Id at 663.
359 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
360 Id at 287 (quoting Mecanno, Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, N.Y., 253 U.S. 136, 141
(1920)).
361 Gaulter v. Capdeboscq, 594 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1979). The courts of appeals are
authorized after ruling on a "judgment, decree, or order" that is "lawfully brought before it
for review" to remand the cause and, in addition to directing the entry of an appropriate
order, to "require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circum-
stances." 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1976). Implicit within this power may be the discretion to ex-
amine aspects of the case other than those directly bearing on the order or judgment
appealed.
362 Gaulter v. Capdeboscq, 594 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1979). But see supra text accompa-
nying notes 341-45.
363 But see Paeco, Inc. v. Applied Moldings, Inc., 562 F.2d 870, 878-80 (3d Cir. 1977).
364 This is precisely what the Supreme Court did in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375 (1970). A § 1292(b) interlocutory appeal on the issue of liability was permitted and
subsequently reviewed in the Supreme Court. The Court went on to decide the plaintiff's
entitlement to an award of attorney's fees stating: "We believe that the question of reim-
bursement for these expenses has a sufficiently close relationship to the determination of what
constitutes a cause of action under § 14(a) [of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] that it is
appropriate for decision at this time." Id at 390 n.13. Because the Court's jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254 depends on the jurisdiction of the court of appeals, the Court's
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D. Defendants Seeking Statutory Fees
Some federal statutes limit fee awards to a successful plaintiff;
3 65
others, however, do not distinguish between plaintiffs and defendants in
sanctioning fee shifting. For example, both the Fees Awards Act and
title VII speak generically of the "prevailing party. '3 66 Such statutes
necessitate consideration of the appropriate relationship between ap-
pealability and an award of statutory attorney's fees to a defendant.
36 7
Where there is statutory authorization for recovery of fees by a de-
fendant, courts have not distinguished between the procedure for con-
sideration of defendants' fees and plaintiffs' fees. Most have treated
defendants the same as plaintiffs without discussion.3 68 Even those cases
that have discussed the difference have concluded that similar treatment
is appropriate. 369 Although the party seeking fees in White was the
plaintiff, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the Eighth Circuit's opin-
ion in Obin L, where the defendants sought fees. In prescribing the rela-
tionship between statutory fees and the merits, neither court addressed
the parameter of which party was seeking fees. A fair reading of White
indicates that defendants' fees are also collateral and independent from
the merits decision.3 70 As to the unanswered question of whether the
statement necessarily implies that the court of appeals would also have jurisdiction to decide
the fees question in the § 1292 appeal of liability.
In Mills there was no concern that the § 1292 appeal was merely a pretext to obtain
review of attorney's fees: the issue was not raised until after the Supreme Court granted certi-
orari, and then by the United States in an amicus brief. Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 19-24, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375 (1970). Although the Court's "suffi-
ciently close relationship" rationale might be criticized as dissembling in light of Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881), Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939), and the
Court's obvious desire to reach out and authorize attorney's fees in shareholder derivative
suits, the decision makes good procedural sense. Had the Court declined to address the issue
on interlocutory appeal, another independent proceeding in the Supreme Court, with all its
attendant expense and delay, would have been required before final resolution of the matter.
The same considerations might justify a court of appeals reviewing an attorney's fee issue in
conjunction with an interlocutory appeal.
365 E.g., Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982); Fair Labor Standards Act § 16, 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. V 1981).
366 Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V
1981); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976); see also, e.g., Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 9, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1982); Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976); Clean Air Act § 304,42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (Supp. V
1981).
367 Of course, even where there is no statutory authority a defendant may still seek an
award of attorney's fees based on the equitable "bad faith" exception. See Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,258-59 (1975); Robinson v. Ritchie, 646 F.2d 147,
148 (4th Cir. 1981).
368 See Obin v. District No. 9 of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 651 F.2d 574 (8th Cir.
1981); Jones v. Dealers Tractor & Equip. Co., 634 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981); DuBuit v. Har-
well Enters. Inc., 540 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1976).
369 See Crowder v. Telemedia, 659 F.2d 787, 788-89 (7th Cir. 1981); Glass v. Pfeffer, 657
F.2d 252, 255 (10th Cir. 1981).
370 This is as much a consequence of what the Court failed to say as it is a consequence of
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costs provisions of the federal rules should govern fees,37 1 rule 54(d) does
not distinguish between plaintiffs and defendants in prescribing the pro-
cedure for recovering costs.
Severing defendants' fees from the merits produces many of the dis-
advantages previously discussed in the context of plaintiffs seeking fees.
These include enlarging the number of piecemeal appeals;3 72 requiring
the parties to decide whether to appeal the merits without full knowl-
edge of the scope of financial liability;373 and creating an even greater
danger of unfair surprise.3 74 The same effect of reducing procedural
barriers to recovery of fees at the cost of foreclosing appellate review of
the merits would also exist.3 75 Treating attorney's fees sought by de-
fendants as relief would obviate these problems, but there are differences
between plaintiffs and defendants that merit examination before one
reaches such a conclusion.
Even though the language of title VII and the Fees Awards Act
does not distinguish between prevailing plaintiffs and defendants for
purposes of awarding fees, the threshold for an award is quite different.
The district court has discretion in deciding whether to award fees, but
prevailing plaintiffs "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless
special circumstances would render such an award unjust. 3 76 In Chris-
tiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC 377 however, the Supreme Court limited
defendants' recovery of fees in title VII cases to those situations where
what the Court did say. The failure to mention that the defendants were seeking fees in Obin
1, while embracing its holding, suggests that the Court found no significance in the differ-
ence. The Court also cited Glass v. Pfeffer, 657 F.2d 252 (10th Cir. 1981), without mention-
ing that the issue in that case involved defendants seeking fees. White, 455 U.S. at 450 n.9.
371 See supra text accompanying notes 268-73.
372 See supra text accompanying notes 145-93.
373 Seesupra text accompanying notes 194-206. To the extent that the plaintiff is success-
ful in obtaining appellate review of the trial court's determination that her case was suffi-
ciently meritless to justify imposing attorney's fees on her, this concern is substantially
ameliorated.
374 See supra note 194. This risk is considerably more substantial when a defendant is
seeking attorney's fees. Because of the more restrictive threshold, see izn/a text accompanying
notes 376-80, a plaintiff would be less likely to anticipate defendant's request for fees, al-
though in some cases a defendant may have used the possibility of seeking fees as a strategic
device during the litigation process. Although the White Court noted that fees might be prop-
erly denied where the request results in unfair surprise or prejudice, 455 U.S. at 454, imposing
such a draconian sanction, particularly given the lack of any clear guidance on appropriate
time limitations, appears less than desirable. But see Gary v. Spires, 634 F.2d 772, 773 (4th
Cir. 1980).
3 75 See Terket v. Lund, 623 F.2d 29, 32-33 (7th Cir. 1980); supra text accompanying notes
133-39.
376 Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (decided under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 204, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976)); accord Albermarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (decided under Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k) (1976); S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5912 (Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, § 2, 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V 1981)); see supra note 158.
377 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
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the plaintiff had proceeded with a "frivolous, unreasonable, or ground-
less" claim.3 78 Carefully explaining that this standard was not as strin-
gent as the equitable bad faith standard, the Court nevertheless
cautioned against Monday-morning quarterbacking in assessing the lack
of foundation in the plaintiff's claim and required that the district
courts assess the validity of the plaintiff's case as of the time of filing.
3 79
Subsequently, in Hughes v. Rowe,3 80 the Court adopted the Christiansburg
standard to govern fee awards to prevailing defendants under the Fees
Awards Act.
The generally higher threshold for recovery of fees by a defendant
suggests that different procedural treatment may be appropriate. The
overlap between the merits and the inquiry into whether the defendant
may recover fees is more attenuated than when a successful plaintiff
seeks fees.381 It might also be contended that it is difficult to conceptual-
ize attorney's fees as relief when awarded to a defendant,38 2 because the
defendant is asserting no claim other than one based on the plaintiff's
pursuit of a frivolous claim. Finally, even if the functional similarity
between attorney's fees and other monetary relief outweighs these differ-
ences,383 in the case of a defendant asserting no claim other than one for
attorney's fees there is no explicit corollary to the requirement of rule
8(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that a claim for relief
contain "a demand for judgment for the relief to which [the party]
deems himself entitled."
Despite these differences, the case for tying defendants' fees to the
merits is strong. The connection between the inquiry on fees and the
merits may be attenuated, but there is still considerable overlap. The
defendant, of course, must prevail on the merits. Although the inquiry
into whether the plaintiff's claim was sufficiently meritless to justify the
defendant's fee request may require consideration beyond that necessary
to decide the merits, the court still must parse the plaintiff's claim to
some extent. Frequently the inquiry necessary to resolve the merits will
be sufficient to decide whether defendant has satisfied the threshold for
recovery of fees.3 84 In addition, the standards for setting the amount of
fees do not vary based on which party obtains the award.3 85 Despite the
378 Id at 422.
379 Id at 421-22.
380 449 U.S. 5 (1980).
381 See supra note 163.
382 This problem did not phase the Seventh Circuit in Hairline Creations, Inc. v. Kefalas,
664 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1981). In Kefalas, the court relied on the remedial nature of attorney's
fees awarded to a plaintiff who has established a trademark violation pursuant to the Lanham
Act in holding that fee requests pursuant to that statute be made by rule 59(e) motion, even
though it was the defendant who was seeking fees.
383 See supra text accompanying notes 145-63.
384 See, e.g., Glass v. Pfeffer, 657 F.2d 252, 256-57 (10th Cir. 1981).
385 See, e.g., Jones v. Dealers Tractor & Equip. Co., 634 F.2d 180, 182 (5th Cir. 1981);
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lack of an explicit device by which a defendant may assert a prejudg-
ment claim for fees, either a flexible reading of the Federal Rules, 386 or
the adoption of a local rule, could be used to require that a defendant
make a prejudgment request for statutory attorney's fees or seek fees
after judgment by way of rule 59(e).
III
BAD FAITH FEES
The bad faith exception to the American rule traces its genesis to
the power of the Chancellor to tax costs in equity cases. Although there
is some dispute whether this power was conferred by statute38 7 or de-
rived from the inherent power of the court,388 federal jurisprudence has
accepted the doctrine as another arrow in the court's quiver to manage
litigation in an efficient and just manner.
389
The accepted standard for awarding bad faith attorney's fees re-
Whiten v. Ryder Truck Lines, 520 F. Supp. 1174, 1177 (M.D. La. 1981). In Durrett v. Jen-
kins Brickyard, Inc., 678 F.2d 911, 917 (11th Cir. 1982), the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that
the standards for awarding fees to defendants are the same as for plaintiffs, although a court
could also consider additional factors, such as the plaintiff's limited financial resources. See
also Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Co., 607 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1979) (reducing district court's
award in light of plaintiff's impoverished circumstances); Sek v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 463
F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (reducing lodestar based on plaintiff's ability to pay).
386 Several possibilities, none completely satisfactory, exist. First, a defendant seeking
fees might be viewed as asserting a counterclaim, which would then be subject to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(3). Cf Varnes v. Local 91, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 674 F.2d
1365 (11th Cir. 1982) (amendment of complaint to seek attorney's fees on equitable theory
constituted a new "claim for relief" for purposes of rule 5). But see Durrett v. Jenkins Brick-
yard, Inc., 678 F.2d 911, 914 n.3 (11th Cir. 1982). Second, although rule 8(a)(3) does not
explicitly apply to a defendant's answer, its applicability might be implied, thus permitting a
defendant to raise and preserve a statutory fee claim in her answer. See, e.g., Glass v. Pfeffer,
657 F.2d 252 (10th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 651 F.2d 718 (10th Cir.
1981). Finally, a defendant might assert such a claim in a prejudgment motion.
387 Stallo v. Wagner, 245 F. 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1917) (citing 17 Rich. 2, ch. 6 (1393), as
authorizing recovery of attorney's fees from persons who brought groundless suits in
Chancery).
388 Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939).
389 The first clear expression of the bad faith exception by the Supreme Court was in
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.4 (1968), where the Court stated: "[I]t
has long been held that a federal court may award counsel fees to a successful plaintiff where
a defense has been maintained 'in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive rea-
sons.'" (citations omitted). Some authorities cite even earlier Supreme Court cases as sanc-
tioning bad faith fees. See Comment, Theories of Recovering Attorney's Fees.- Exceptions to the
American Rule, 47 UMKC L. REv. 566, 569-70 (1979) (citing Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank,
307 U.S. 161 (1939) and Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 427 (1962)); see also Pennywit v.
Eaton, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 382 (1872) (awarding 10% damages for taking an appeal for delay
purposes). Decisions subsequent to Newman have reaffirmed this power, including the power
to require an attorney to pay counsel fees. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752
(1980); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,
421 U.S. 240 (1975). For a survey of cases in which courts have applied the bad faith excep-
tion, see Note, Attorney's Fees and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 319 (1977);
Note, supra note 148, at 351-54; Comment, supra, at 569-73.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
quires that the party or attorney39 0 against whom fees are imposed acted
in "bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons,"391 or
with that classic onomatopoeic redundancy, "obdurate obstinacy. '3
92
This standard is not dissimilar to the Christiansburg standard for award-
ing fees to a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff's claim is "frivolous,
unreasonable or groundless."393 Both require something more than that
the party against whom fees are assessed was ultimately unsuccessful.
3 94
There are, however, some differences between statutory fees and
bad faith fees that are relevant to an analysis of the appropriate proce-
dural treatment of the latter. The bad faith standard includes a scienter
requirement not present in Christiansburg,395 and probably requires a
demonstration of somewhat more egregious circumstances as well.
396
Thus, bad faith fees require yet a more stringent threshold finding than
statutorily authorized defendants' fees.
More significantly, the circumstances justifying such fees vary con-
siderably from those underlying the award of statutory fees. Bad faith
fees are applicable in a wide variety of situations and may be recover-
able by either party based on conduct that occurs before litigation be-
gins, or for conduct wholly unrelated to the merits that does not begin
until well after litigation is underway. 397 Indeed, bad faith fees may be
awarded against afprevailing party who asserted a separate claim or de-
fense that had sufficient indications of harassment or oppression for a
court to find willful abuse of the judicial process.3 98 The bad faith ex-
ception is ultimately a collection of several different rationales and justi-
fications for shifting fees from one party to another, all of which have in
common circumstances sufficiently egregious to impose attorney's fees
on the wrongdoer.3 99 Thus, unlike the case with statutory fees, when the
390 See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
391 F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974).
392 Bradley v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 310, 321 (4th Cir. 1965).
393 Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).
394 See id at 421-22; Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 182-84 (1976).
395 Compare Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421 (district court may award attorney's fees to
prevailing defendant in title VII case even though plaintiff's action not brought in subjective
bad faith) with Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766-67 (1980) (bad faith excep-
tion applies where party or attorney willfully abuses the judicial process).
396 See Durrett v. Jenkins Brickyard, Inc., 678 F.2d 911 (11th Cir. 1982).
397 See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973); Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955, 958 (4th Cir.
1975).
398 McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109, 1112 (lst Cir. 1971) (fees awarded against
prevailing party), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972).
399 See supra note 389. Compare Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691-92 (1978) (comparing
bad faith award to fine for contempt of court designed to "vindicate the District Court's
authority over a recalcitrant litigant") with Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962) (attor-
ney's fees awarded to compensate seaman who brought suit to collect maintenance and cure




propriety of a bad faith fee award is at issue, the inquiry will focus pri-
marily on the conduct and motive of a party,400 rather than on the va-
lidity of the case.401 In this regard, awards of attorney's fees for discovery
abuse are much more analogous to bad faith fees than statutory fees,
although fees for discovery abuse are explicitly authorized by the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.
4°2
The argument for tying bad faith fees to the merits is thus less com-
pelling than that for statutory fees. To some extent the threshold deter-
mination of whether bad faith fees are recoverable will be independent
of the merits. This leads to two conclusions: first, requiring simultane-
ous consideration in the trial and appellate courts will not greatly ad-
vance judicial efficiency; second, fee issues will not affect the decision
whether to appeal the merits, because a reversal of the merits will have
no impact on fees. Furthermore, the basis of a claim for bad faith fees
may not arise until well into the case. Thus, unlike statutory fees, it may
be impracticable for parties to request bad faith fees in their pleadings,
although the liberal provisions for amending pleadings in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure largely ameliorate this problem. 40 3
Current judicial treatment of appealability where bad faith fees are
involved is largely unsatisfactory. Contrary to the implications of the
above analysis, the Fifth Circuit, for example, ties bad faith fees to the
merits by requiring a petitioner to utilize rule 59(e), yet uncouples statu-
tory fees from the merits by treating them as costs. The Fifth Circuit's
explanation in Ki'hton v. Watkins, 404 that bad faith fees are not part of
the costs "but should be sought as part of the litigation itself, '40 5 is as
conclusory as it is unenlightening. In the vast majority of cases, the stat-
400 Alternatively, the attorney's conduct may justify an award of bad faith fees. Because
of the multiple party provision in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the trial judge could
probably sever the remainder of the case from the fee claim against the attorney. Seegeneral/f
infao text accompanying notes 462-68. But see, e.g., Reygo Pac. Corp. v. Johnston Pump Co.,
680 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1982) (permitting appeal by attorney of fee award for discovery abuse);
David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1977) (permitting immediate appeal by non-
party of attorney's fees award against him for discovery abuse).
The rationale of Rygo and Hooker that denying immediate appeal would result in no
review because a nonparty may not appeal from the final decision in a case is suspect in light
of the cases permitting attorneys to intervene and appeal to protect their interest in a fee
award. See, e.g., Lipscomb v. Wise, 643 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1981).
401 Due process concerns will require a hearing more frequently when bad faith fees are
at issue than when statutory fees are sought. Compare Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447
U.S. 752, 766-67 & n.14 (1980) (bad faith fees imposed as sanction should not be assessed
without affording opportunity for hearing) with National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v.
Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (hearing necessary on statutory fee
request only where "material issues of fact that may substantially affect the size of the award
remain in well-founded dispute").
402 FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
403 FED. R. Civ. P. 15(d).
404 616 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1980).
405 Knighton, 616 F.2d at 797.
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utory fee seeker can anticipate at the genesis of legal proceedings that
she will seek to recover fees, even if such recovery is contingent on that
party prevailing. By contrast, the bad faith fee seeker typically will not
consider requesting fees until after the opponent has begun to engage in
conduct that will justify such an award. Often this behavior occurs well
into the litigation.4
0 6
In Wright v. Jackson, 407 the Fourth Circuit expressed concern about
minimizing piecemeal appeals involving related issues. The court dis-
tinguished between bad faith fees dependent on the lower court's assess-
ment of the merits and bad faith fees unrelated to the merits, requiring
that the former be decided before an appeal, but sanctioning severing
the latter from the merits. 40 8 Despite its concern about piecemeal ap-
peals, the court illogically also stated that a district court could defer
consideration of bad faith fees dependent on the merits until after resolu-
tion of the appeal of the merits, thereby assuring dual appeals if the
parties exercise their right to appeal.
The Wright court's distinction based on the relatedness of the
grounds for fees and the merits is logically defensible. It ignores, how-
ever, the advantages of consolidating all grounds, even unrelated ones,
in a unitary appeal. Perhaps more importantly, it may result in greater
uncertainty and increased litigation over the category in which a partic-
ular bad faith award belongs. Finally, a party may often assert more
than one ground as justification for a fee award.40 9 Permitting consoli-
dated consideration of such requests would seem sensible, even if the
406 A court may award bad faith fees against a party who willfully fails to comply with a
court order, Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923). This
raises the possibility that the conduct justifying a bad faith fee award would not occur until
after a final decree; separate appeals of the merits and fees would then be a matter of
necessity.
407 522 F.2d 955 (4th Cir. 1975).
408 Id at 957-58. The issue in Wright arose in the context of the appellate court's sua
sponte consideration of whether the district court had jurisdiction to award attorney's fees
after a notice of appeal of the merits had been filed. The merits appeal had already been
resolved without any explicit consideration of appellatejurisdiction. However, to the extent a
party seeks to modify or alter a final judgment, the time limitations of rule 59(e) work in
tandem with the judicial doctrine ousting the lower court of jurisdiction after a notice of
appeal is filed. See supra note 119. For the district court to modify a final judgment, a rule
59(e) motion must be made within 10 days of entry of judgment. Any notice of appeal filed
before the disposition of a timely rule 59(e) motion is of no effect, FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(4);
Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 103 S. Ct. 400 (1982) (per curiam), and there-
fore would not affect the district court's jurisdiction.
409 Eg., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.13 (1978); Obin v. District No. 9 of the Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists, 651 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1981); Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955 (4th Cir.
1975).
Because Congress legislatively overruled the Supreme Court's decision in Roadway Express
by amending 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976) to permit recovery of attorney's fees from a lawyer who
"unreasonably and vexatiously" "multiplies the proceedings," Antitrust Procedural Improve-
ments Act of 1980, § 3, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (Supp. V 1981), it is quite likely that parties will
assert both statutory and bad faith grounds to justify a fee award against counsel.
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standards for recovery of fees are not identical. 41 0 Thus, despite the dif-
ferences between bad faith fees and statutory fees,'4 1 according the same
procedural treatment to both would promote consistency and certainty
and appears the most reasonable resolution of the question.
IV
COMMON FUND ATTORNEY'S FEES
Over one hundred years ago, in Tmwtees v. Greenough,'4 2 the
Supreme Court announced the power of an equity court to reimburse a
litigant whose efforts on his own behalf had incidentally produced a
fund that benefited others. The Court has substantially expanded this
power over the last century, and it is widely relied on today in a variety
of contexts including, most notably, class actions and shareholder deriv-
ative suits. 4 13 The pervasiveness and impact of common fund attorney's
fees, heightened by modern procedural developments such as the class
action, have been both roundly condemned and vigorously
applauded.
4 14
The Supreme Court could not possibly have foreseen the impact of
its decision in Greenough to reimburse Frederick Vose for attorney's fees
and expenses incurred in successfully litigating a claim against the trust-
ees of a fund created to secure the interest and principal on certain rail-
road bonds of which Vose owned a substantial number. Vose
established that the trustees had wasted assets in the fund, and suc-
ceeded in having the trustees removed and a receiver appointed, thereby
preserving a substantial portion of the fund for the benefit of all
bondholders.
Recognizing that it would be unfair for Vose to shoulder all of the
litigation expenses, the Court approved recovery of those expenses from
the other bondholders. Because the trial court was still administering
the fund, payment from the fund represented a convenient method of
enforcing Vose's claim. The Court clearly understood that the claim for
reimbursement by Vose was asserted against his cobondholders; the
existence of the fund simply provided a readily available method of as-
serting and enforcing that claim.
4 15
410 See Obin v. District No. 9 of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 651 F.2d 574, 579 n.5 (8th
Cir. 1981).
411 See supra text accompanying notes 395-406.
412 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
413 Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntag Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REV.
849, 854-81, 915-29 (1975); Dawson, supra note 18, at 1601-12.
414 See generally, e.g., Handler, The Shi From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits-The Twenty- Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1971); Miller, supra
note 20; Simon, Class Actions-Usefid Tool or Engine of Destruction, 7 LINCOLN L. REv. 20
(1971).
415 It would not only be unjust to him, [to deny reimbursement of fees and ex-
penses beyond taxable costs,] but it would give to the other parties entitled to
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After concluding that Vose was entitled to recover from the fund,
the Court addressed the issue of determining the proper amount. By
comparison with the detailed standards for calculating attorney's fees
employed today,416 the Court's approach was quite simple. The task
was made easier still because the claim was asserted by a client who had
already incurred and paid the lawyer's fees: Vose was allowed to re-
cover his actual payments.
4 17
Unlike the issue of the appropriate procedural relationship between
statutory fees and the merits, which festered in the lower courts for a
number of years, the Court faced that question head-on in its first com-
mon fund decision.4 18 At the time of the appeal, the trial court was still
administering Vose's lawsuit, and no final decree had been entered.
Prior to the Evarts Act,4 19 appeals to the Supreme Court required a
final decision.4 20 The Court began by noting that the circuit court's
orders were intended to conclude the issue of Vose's reimbursement, but
recognized that this was not sufficient for appealability. The Court con-
tinued: "Though incidental to the cause, the inquiry was a collateral
one, having a distinct and independent character. . . . [U]nder all the
circumstances, we think that the proceeding may be regarded as so far
independent as to make the decision substantially a final decree for the
purpose of an appeal."' 42' Thus the Court established the proposition
that a plaintiffs claim for reimbursement of attorney's fees from a com-
mon fund was sufficiently independent of the merits to justify a separate
appeal.
Four years later, the Court "leaped across a gulf '422 in Central Rail-
road & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 423 and approved a request for fees made not
by the party, but by his attorneys. The suit established a lien on rail-
road property to secure repayment of bonds owned by clients of the
petitioning lawyers and by other unsecured creditors. The attorneys had
participate in the benefits of the fund an unfair advantage. He has worked
for them as well as for himself; and if he cannot be reimbursed out of the fund
itself, they ought to contribute their due proportion of the expenses which he
has fairly incurred. To make them a charge upon the fund is the most equita-
ble way of securing such contribution.
Greenough, 105 U.S. at 532.
416 See supra note 167.
417 Greenough, 105 U.S. at 537.
418 At that time, the Supreme Court had no discretion over its appellate docket, and it
was the only court of review for final decisions in the circuit courts. 1 J. MOORE, J. LuCgs,
H. FINK, D. WECKSTEIN &J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.3[2] (2d ed. 1983).
419 Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
420 The Judiciary Act of 1789 required a final decree or judgment as a prerequisite for
Supreme Court review by writ of error of a circuit court decision. Ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84.
That requirement was retained until enactment of the Evarts Act in 1891. See supra note 38.
421 Greenough, 105 U.S. at 531.
422 Dawson, supra note 18, at 1603.
423 113 U.S. 116 (1885).
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entered into a fee arrangement with their clients that allowed them to
seek additional compensation from any fund established to benefit the
other unsecured creditors. The attorneys then reduced the amount of
fees they would have otherwise charged their clients. The case was
brought as a class action on behalf of all similarly situated unsecured
creditors "who should come in and. . . contribute to the expenses of the
suit. '424 Because of the undisputed facts regarding the fee agreement,
the Court viewed the situation as essentially one in which the client had
assigned his right to seek fees to his lawyers in exchange for a reduced
fee, thus placing the attorney's fee petition squarely within the perime-
ters of Greenough.
The second leap across the gulf taken by the Pettus Court, although
largely masked because of the existence of a contingent fee arrangement
between attorney and client, was to make a determination of the appro-
priate compensation for the attorneys. Whereas in Greenough the bench-
mark for determining the amount of the award was established by the
fees that the client had actually incurred, no such standard based on a
good faith arm's length transaction existed in Pettus; the contract be-
tween attorney and client was limited to compensating the attorneys for
their services on behalf of their clients only. Thus, the task of determin-
ing "reasonable compensation," the only standard provided by the
Court for valuing the attorneys' efforts on behalf of the class, fell to the
Court. Because the attorneys' contract with their clients provided for a
fee of five percent of the amount recovered on behalf of the client,4 2 5 the
Court simply adopted that formula for the entire recovery, without ex-
plaining why the class should be bound by that arrangement,426 or why
it represented "reasonable compensation.
'42 7
The question of appealability did not arise in Pettus. The suit to
establish a lien had been brought in state court; when the attorneys peti-
tioned for fees, their petition was removed to federal court. The only
issue in the removed proceeding was recovery of attorney's fees.
428
424 Id at 119.
425 The fee agreement also provided for a small retainer that the Court ignored in setting
the amount of fees to be paid by the class. id at 127-28.
426 Such fee arrangements between client and attorney are routinely ignored today in
determining common fund fees, Dawson, supra note 18, at 1608 & n.34, largely because of the
possibility of abuse.
427 As Professor Dawson has remarked, "[r]eports of earlier cases gave few clues as to the
standards used in fixing fees in. . 'common fund' cases .... " Dawson, supra note 413, at
870.
428 An issue that did arise in the circuit court was whether the attorney's petition was
removable. The removal statute at that time, Act of Mar. 3 , 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470,
changed the prior practice of permitting removal of separate controversies and required in-
stead that the entire suit be removed to federal court. Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205, 212-
13 (1881). The defendants in Pettus moved to dismiss the removed federal action arguing that
it was not separately removable. The circuit court denied the motion on the ground that the
attorneys' petition was a distinct and separate suit in equity that could be prosecuted inde-
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The last and probably most important case in the trilogy that forms
the backdrop for the common fund exception to the American rule is
Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank. 429 Lottie Sprague had established a
trust with the defendant bank. Because the bank had use of the princi-
pal of the trust, bonds owned by the bank were segregated to secure the
trust res. The bank followed the same procedure with fourteen other
similar trusts that it administered. The defendant bank was acquired by
a second bank, which was subsequently placed in receivership. Sprague
brought suit to establish a lien on the proceeds of the sale of the bonds to
ensure recovery of the trust funds. After obtaining a favorable decree in
the district court, which was ultimately affirmed by both the court of
appeals and the Supreme Court, Sprague returned to the district court,
seeking reimbursement of the attorney's fees she had paid. She claimed
she was entitled to an award of fees because her suit had established the
rights of the other trusts to share in the proceeds of the bonds, which
were more than sufficient to satisfy all fourteen claims. Both lower
courts denied the petition. Justice Frankfurter, however, in a sweeping
opinion that has been cited to authorize bad faith fees,430 as well as a
broader power to create exceptions to the American rule in the interest
of justice, 43' upheld Sprague's right to recover counsel fees from the
other trusts. Although the suit had not established a fund within the
trial court's jurisdiction, the benefit conferred on the other trust benefi-
ciaries was sufficient to entitle Sprague to reimbursement. Perhaps un-
knowingly, Justice Frankfurter sowed the seeds for the common benefit
exception, one that is only a short analytical step from the common fund
doctrine, but which when extended to its extreme, is almost unlim-
ited.432 The question of determining the appropriate amount of fees re-
quired no scrutiny; only the issue of the power to award fees was before
the Court.
After broadly resolving the power of a court of equity to shift the
expenses of litigation, Justice Frankfurter addressed the procedural de-
tails of the case. The district court had denied the petition for fees on
pendently of the underlying state action. Pettus v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 19 F. Cas.
396 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1879) (No. 11,048).
429 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
430 See Comment, supra note 389, at 569-70.
431 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 274-75 (1975) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541, 546 (8th Cir. 1975), re'd on other grounds,
432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam); Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1029 (D.C. Cir.
1974), reo'd, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1309 (2d
Cir. 1973).
432 E.g., La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (partially relying
on common benefit exception to justify award of attorney's fees against several state agencies
in a case where plaintiffs obtained injunction precluding construction of state highway pro-
ject), afd, 488 F.2d 559 (1973); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 708-09 (M.D. Ala. 1972)
(common benefit theory used to justify award of attorney's fees against state officials who had
been enjoined from engaging in racially discriminatory practices in hiring state troopers).
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the sole ground that because a final judgment on the merits had been
entered and appealed, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the fee
petition. 433 The court of appeals affirmed, pointing out the additional
ground that the petition for fees was filed at a different term of court
than the one in which the district court had rendered its decree.434 The
issue was quite narrow: did the failure of Sprague to seek fees before
judgment on the merits foreclose an award? The answer was no:
We, therefore, hold that the issue in the instant case is sufficiently
different from that presented by the ordinary questions regarding tax-
able costs that it was impliedly covered neither by the original decree
nor by the mandates, and that neither constituted a bar to the dispo-
sal of the petition below on its merits.435
Courts have regarded the result in Sprague, that common fund fee
requests are collateral to and independent of the merits, and may prop-
erly be sought after final judgment, as resolving the procedural relation-
ship between common fund fee requests and the underlying merits.
436
Largely because of that decision, there has been substantially less confu-
sion and litigation over appealability when common fund fees are in-
volved than when statutory or bad faith fees are at issue. 437 Indeed,
433 Sprague v. Picher, 23 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Me.), afdsub noma. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l
Bank, 99 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1938), reu'd, 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
434 Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 99 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1938), rev'd, 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
Before adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial courts were only authorized
to modify judgments and decrees during the same term of court in which the judgment or
decree had been entered. Buckeye Coal & Ry. v. Hocking Valley Ry., 269 U.S. 42, 48 (1925);
Cameron v. McRoberts, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 591, 593 (1818).
435 Sprague, 307 U.S. at 169.
436 White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451 n.13 (1982);
Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., 517 F.2d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1975); Union Tank Car
Co. v. Isbrandtsen, 416 F.2d 96, 97 (2d Cir. 1969); Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 186 (1st
Cir. 1959); see Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 484-85 & n.2 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
437 See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 485-86 & n.3 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). But see Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., 517 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1975).
Another reason for the dearth of litigation is that in the typical common fund case, fees
are sought from a fund in which a large number of persons who are not parties have small
interests, and there is effectively no one representing their interests in minimizing incursions
on the fund. See, e.g., Cherner v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 221 F. Supp. 55, 61 (D. Mass. 1963).
Those cases in which there has been litigation over this question have primarily been com-
mon benefit cases where payment of the fee is sought from the defendant who is viewed as the
repository for charging each of the beneficiaries her pro rata share of the fees. In these in-
stances, the defendant very likely has an independent interest in reducing (or avoiding) such
payment. See, e.g., National Council of Community Mental Health Centers v. Mathews, 546
F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977); Angoffv. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185
(1st Cir. 1959); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 110 F.2d 174 (Ist Cir. 1940). At this point, the
common benefit exception is virtually indistinguishable, except theoretically, from statutory
fee exceptions. See infra text accompanying notes 498-509. See general Dawson, supra note
413, at 859-61.
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courts have relied on Sprague in the statutory fee context, 438 despite the
obvious difference: in a common fund case the dispute is between the
plaintiff (or more often the plaintiff's attorney) and other members of
the benefited class; in a statutory or bad faith fee case, the plaintiff and
the defendant are directly at odds over an additional monetary obliga-
tion of the defendant.4 39 Recognizing this difference, Justice Powell
properly declined the appellant's invitation in While to hold that Sprague
controlled the outcome of the issue.
440
The Sprague holding, misguided in its genesis, has become mori-
bund by the development of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
44
1
and by evolving standards and procedures for determining an appropri-
ate attorney's fee. Justice Frankfurter's opinion sweepingly, albeit un-
necessarily, discussed the authority of a court of equity to award counsel
fees, but unfortunately was deficient when it addressed the finer details
in the case. In reversing the First Circuit on those procedural details,
442
Justice Frankfurter relied on Greenough for three essential propositions.
First, a request for common fund fees is collateral to the underlying dis-
pute between plaintiff and defendant, "having a distinct and independ-
ent character." 4 3 Second, attorney's fees may be sought after judgment
is entered on the underlying dispute.4 4 Third, resolution of the claim
for fees should await a final conclusion, including appeals, of the main
controversy.44
5
On the first point, Justice Frankfurter justifiably relied on Green-
ough: a claim that attorney's fees should be paid out of a fund under the
jurisdiction of the court is distinct from the dispute between the plaintiff
and defendant that produced the fund.
446
On the second point, however, Justice Frankfurter was on less solid
ground. His reliance on Greenough as authority for the proposition that
Sprague's postjudgment request for fees was timely was simply incor-
438 See Obin v. District No. 9 of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 651 F.2d 574, 582 (8th Cir.
1981).
439 See Fase v. Seafarers Welfare & Pension Plan, 589 F.2d 112, 114 n.3 (2d Cir. 1978);
Cinerama, Inc. v. Sweet Music, S.A., 482 F.2d 66, 70 n.2 (2d Cir. 1973).
440 White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451 n.13 (1982).
441 Sprague was decided in the Supreme Court on April 24, 1939. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure became effective on September 16, 1938. 308 U.S. 645, 645-766. The district
court's decision in Sprague was made before the effective date, and therefore was governed by
the then-existing equity rules. By their terms, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
inapplicable to the Supreme Court's decision. FED. R. Civ. P. 86(a).
442 See supra text accompanying notes 433-35.
443 Sprague, 307 U.S. at 169 (quoting Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 531 (1882)).
444 Sprague, 307 U.S. at 169.
445 Id at 168.
446 Justice Frankfurter need not have relied solely on Greenough; a number of cases had
held that where a distinct dispute between parties other than those who were at odds in the
main controversy was finally concluded it could be separately appealed. See infia note 475.
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rect. The petition for fees in Greenough was made before judgment.44 7
As further justification for the propriety of postjudgment fee petitions,
Justice Frankfurter asserted that a decision on fees should await disposi-
tion of the central controversy including all appeals. Once again Justice
Frankfurter relied on Greenough,- once again his reliance was incorrect.
The merits had not been concluded or appealed in Greenough when fees
were sought and awarded.
448
Although Justice Frankfurter's dogma on the appropriate point to
determine common fund fees has been embraced by courts449 and com-
mentators, 450 it is belied by a retrospective examination of the course of
events in Sprague. By the time the district court first addressed the ques-
tion of how much Lottie Sprague could recover for litigation expenses,
two separate appeals to the Supreme Court had been prosecuted and
concluded. The second appeal, which concerned only whether fees and
expenses could be recovered, consumed over thirteen months.45 1 Yet,
plaintiff's petition for fees could have been decided just as easily (and far
more efficiently) in the district court in the same proceeding as the mer-
its, thereby eliminating an entire layer of appeals. Although it may
have been desirable for the district court to know the extent of the bene-
fit conferred before determining the appropriate fee, entry of judgment
and appellate review were hardly essential. A change in the judgment
on appeal may, no doubt, have an impact on the attorney's fee, 452 but
the burden of reconsideration and adjustment on remand hardly justi-
fies the Sprague- sanctioned alternative, which interjects an additional
447 See supra text accompanying notes 419-21.
448 "The administration of the fund for the benefit of the bondholders may continue in
the court for a long time to come, dividends being made from time to time in payment of
coupons still unsatisfied." Greenough, 105 U.S. at 531.
449 Cinerama, Inc. v. Sweet Music, S.A., 482 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1973); National Council of
Community Mental Health Centers v. Weinberger, 387 F. Supp. 991 (D.D.C. 1974), re'd on
other grounds sub noa. National Council of Community Mental Health Centers v. Mathews,
546 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977); see Union Tank Car Co. v.
Isbrandtsen, 416 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1969). Contra Fase v. Seafarers Welfare & Pension Plan, 79
F.R.D. 363 (E.D.N.Y.), af'd, 589 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1978).
450 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.77[9]
(2d ed. 1976).
451 The Supreme Court rendered its decision on the merits on March 7, 1938. Sprague v.
Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 303 U.S. 406 (1938). Justice Frankfurter's opinion sanctioning the peti-
tion for fees was handed down on April 24, 1939. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161
(1939).
452 The Court may also have been suggesting that final resolution of the merits is crucial
to determining whether or not fees will be awarded. In addition to the "better perspective"
statement, the opinion contains the enigmatic suggestion that "in any event such allowances
are appropriate only in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice." Sprague, 307
U.S. at 167. Probably intended to refer to fees awarded in all cases and not contemplated as
a limitation on cases in which a common fund is created, the latter interpretation has been
ignored in common fund cases where awards of fees are de rigueur. See also Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 390 n.13 (1970) (fees justified in common benefit case before the
scope of relief is determined).
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layer of appeals.4 53
As courts have refined the standards for awarding attorney's fees,
the precise contours of the recovery have become less significant in as-
sessing fees.45 4 The development of criteria for determining an appro-
priate fee, a number of which require scrutiny of the substantive claims
asserted in the case and the attorney's efforts in connection with those
claims, generally makes it desirable to resolve the fees issue in close prox-
imity with the merits, rather than years later as occurred in Sprague. 455
The implication of such a conclusion is that common fund fees should
be sought before judgment or within the time to alter or amend the
judgment. 45 6 This is not to suggest that there are never disputes in an
equity case that are appropriately or necessarily resolved after judg-
ment. Indeed, there are.4 57 In the vast run of common fund cases, how-
ever, consideration of attorney's fees need not be delayed.
The fact that many cases in which common fund fees are sought
result in a settlement on the merits does not alter this conclusion. Al-
though consent judgments generally are not appealable,458 thus obviat-
ing concerns about reducing unnecessary appeals, Justice Frankfurter's
ground for delaying resolution of a request for fees completely disap-
453 See Blanc v. Spartan Tool Co., 178 F.2d 104, 105 (7th Cir. 1949) ("It would no doubt
have been better procedure for the [district] court to have determined the amount it deemed
proper in the earlier proceeding so that the case could have come up to this court on the one
appeal including that from a specific award of fees instead of the general allowance of 'reason-
able fees' with the amount left for later consideration.").
The Court's decision in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), also discred-
its Sprague's fees-after-final-judgment rationale. In Afills, the Court held that the plaintiffs
had established the defendant's liability for material misstatements in a proxy solicitation.
The plaintiffs took an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976), and thus
the extent of the benefit conferred on the plaintiff class remained unknown. Nevertheless, the
Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to an award of attorney's fees based on their
establishing the defendant's securities violations. 396 U.S. at 389-97.
454 This may explain why the Court in White implicitly, albeit quite clearly, rejected the
fees-after-appeal aspect of Sprague. White, 455 U.S. at 454; see also, e.g., Obin v. District No. 9
of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 651 F.2d 574, 583 (8th Cir. 1981). But see Memphis Sheraton
Corp. v. Kirkley, 614 F.2d 131, 133 (6th Cir. 1980).
455 The district court entered a final decree establishing plaintiff's lien on the proceeds of
the bonds on June 6, 1936. Sprague v. Picher, 23 F. Supp. 59, 59 (D. Me.), a sub nom.
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 99 F.2d 583 (Ist Cir. 1938), rev'd, 307 U.S. 161 (1939). The
district court's decision to award plaintiff fees came over three years later on June 29, 1939.
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 28 F. Supp. 229 (D. Me. 1939), afdinpart and rev'd in part, 110
F.2d 174 (Ist Cir. 1940). Further proceedings in both the court of appeals and the district
court were necessary to award plaintiff attorney's fees incurred in the proceedings that estab-
lished her right to fees. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 110 F.2d 174 (Ist Cir. 1940).
456 Because I would also tie resolution of the question of statutory fees to the merits, this
conclusion would mean that where plaintiff seeks recovery of fees on both a statutory and
common fund basis, the same procedural constraints would be applicable. Cf Fase v. Seafar-
ers Welfare & Pension Plan, 79 F.R.D. 363 (E.D.N.Y.) (denying fees on both statutory and
common benefit bases), afad, 589 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1978); Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403
(C.D. Cal. 1980) (awarding fees alternatively on statutory and common benefit bases).
457 See, e.g., In re Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 129 U.S. 206 (1889).
458 See supra note 145.
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pears: a consent judgment once and for all fixes the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties with respect to the underlying claim. Thus, no
reason to delay remains; given the requirement of notice to class mem-
bers or shareholders of the settlement in either a class action or a share-
holder derivative suit,4 59 deciding attorney's fees at the same time the
court performs its obligatory review and approval of the settlement
460
would provide a convenient unitary proceeding in which to resolve the
fairness of the settlement and the appropriate attorney's fees award.
46 1
Even after the Sprague justification for seeking and awarding com-
mon fund fees after judgment and appeal is rejected, the question of
coupling vel non the merits and fees for purposes of appeal still remains.
Sprague sanctioned separate appeals of the merits and fees as a matter of
necessity, not because distinct appeals were inherently desirable. Once
Justice Frankfurter sanctioned fee requests after judgment on the merits
and appeal, no choice remained save dual appeals. The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, in their infancy when Sprague was decided, provide
guidance in answering this remaining question.
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with its lib-
eral provisions for joinder of claims and parties wrought a fundamental
change in the scope of a dispute involving multiple parties or claims. In
its initial formulation, rule 54(b) permitted, but did not require, entry of
judgment upon the final adjudication of any single claim and any com-
pulsory counterclaims to the original claim.462 This gave the district
courts flexibility to partition off distinct disputes for separate appeal.
463
Although the rule was well conceived, confusion developed over when
the district court had made a rule 54(b) disposition. The resultant un-
certainty led to unnecessary protective appeals and lost opportunities for
459 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e), 23.1.
460 Id
461 Where the parties settle, the court should be able to determine most of the attorney's
fees issues at the same time it passes on the adequacy of the settlement. Remaining adminis-
trative work may necessitate a supplementary award. See, e.g., In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig.,
416 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. Pa. 1976), rev'don other grounds, 560 F.2d 1138 (3d Cir. 1977).
462 FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b), 308 U.S. 732 (1939). As initially promulgated, the rule
provided:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court
at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim
and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the
subject matter of the claim, may enter a judgment disposing of such claim.
The judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed
of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims. In case a separate
judgment is so entered, the court by order may stay its enforcement until the
entering of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such con-
ditions as are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose
favor the judgment is entered.
463 See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) advisory committee notes to 1946 amendments of Federal




The rule was amended in 1948 to avoid this uncertainty. No dispo-
sition of less than all claims would be final and appealable unless the
trial court explicitly found that "there is no just reason for delay" and
directed entry of judgment on the concluded claim or claims.4 65 This
explicit direction would, like the formalities required for entry of judg-
ment,466 make it evident to all parties that the period in which to appeal
had commenced.4 67 Rule 54(b) was again amended in 1961 to make
clear that it not only permitted separate appeals where there were multi-
ple claims but also where there were multiple parties.468 In its current
form, rule 54(b) has changed fundamentally the appealability of deci-
sions involving less than all claims or parties that existed when Greenough,
Pettus, and Sprague were decided.
Before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted, joinder
of multiple claims and parties at law was substantially limited. The
"static" conformity specified in the Process Act of 1789469 limited the
federal courts to joinder of claims that were governed by the same
464 J. MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CODE 512-15 (1949).
465 After amendment in 1946, the rule provided:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, the court may direct
the entry of a final judgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims
only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and
upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such
determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however
designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims shall not terminate the
action as to any of the claims, and the order or other form of decision is sub-
ject to revision at any time before the entry ofjudgment adjudicating all the
claims.
466 See supra note 89.
467 As with entry of final judgment, this signifies the district court's belief that the prereq-
uisites for an appeal have occurred. Obviously, when the appellate court determines the trial
judge was wrong, no appellate jurisdiction will lie. Eg., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424
U.S. 737 (1976); Cinerama, Inc. v. Sweet Music, S.A., 482 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1973).
468 Rule 54(b) currently provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direc-
tion for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which ad-
judicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all
the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties,
and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties.
469 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94; see Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 1, 14-15 (1825). The Act adopted state practice as it existed in September 1789. The
Conformity Act of June 1, 1872, 17 Stat. 196, ended the principle of static conformity and
provided for conformance to then-existing state practice. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 663-76 (2d ed. 1973).
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writ.470 Joinder of plaintiffs was permitted only where they were assert-
ing a joint right.4 71 In equity the joinder situation was somewhat more
liberal, 472 but still more restrictive than under the federal rules. More-
over, legal and equitable claims could not be joined.
4 73
Despite the restrictive joinder provisions, the courts occasionally
confronted questions of appealability when less than all claims among
less than all parties were resolved. Occasionally this problem arose as a
matter of necessity, where a largely unanticipated matter was asserted
after entry of an apparently final judgment or decree.474 More often the
question arose before entry of judgment and concerned the appealabil-
ity of a final resolution of a distinct claim between less than all parties.
Throughout the latter portion of the nineteenth century and the pre-
Federal Rules era of the twentieth, these distinct adjudications were sep-
arately appealable. 475 In discussing this exception, which permitted ap-
peal before final resolution of the case, one commentator in the early
part of the twentieth century wrote:
Where a person, incidentally interested in some branch of a case,
has been allowed to intervene for the purpose of protecting his interest
470 B. SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING 201-03 (3d ed. 1923); Blume, A Rational Theor,
forJoinder of Causes of Action andDefenxes, andfor the Use of Counterclaims, 26 MICH. L. REv. 1, 4-7
(1927); Sunderland,Joinder ofActions, 18 MICH. L. REv. 571, 575-82 (1920).
471 Ryder v. Jefferson Hotel Co., 121 S.C. 72, 113 S.E. 474 (1922); C. CLARK, CODE
PLEADING 241-49 (1928); J. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES 161-69 (4th ed. 1904).
472 Equity Rules 26, 30, 226 U.S. 649, 655-57 (1912); see Blume,supra note 470, at 10-17;
Moore & Clark, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1319-20 (1935).
473 Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 111 (1891). The clean-up doctrine permitted a court in
equity to consider legal claims arising in a case otherwise within the equity court's jurisdic-
tion. See generaly Levin, Equitable Clean-up and theJury: A Suggested Orientation, 100 U. PA. L.
REV. 920 (1951).
474 Eg., In re Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 129 U.S. 206 (1889). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) now governs postjudgment motions. A final decision on such a motion is
appealable. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2871
(1973).
475 United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 414 (1926) (condem-
nation compensation award appealable despite existence of another land owner's unresolved
claim); Williams v. Morgan, 111 U.S. 684, 699 (1883) (order setting compensation to be paid
trustees appealable despite ongoing proceedings); Withenbury v. United States, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 819 (1866) (dismissal of claim in consolidated admiralty libel case held separately ap-
pealable); see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 442 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
Some courts permitted an appeal following the resolution of an independent claim de-
spite the existence of unresolved claims between the same parties. Other courts, however,
would not permit a separate appeal in such circumstances. Compare Historical Publishing Co.
v. Jones Bros. Publishing Co., 231 F. 784 (3d Cir. 1916) (in suit for infringement of two
copyrights, decree as to one is appealable) and Scriven v. North, 134 F. 366 (4th Cir. 1904) (in
suit for patent and trademark infringement and two unfair competition claims, decree as to
three of the four causes of action is appealable) and Klever v. Seawall, 65 F. 373 (6th Cir.
1894) (in suit involving three causes of action, decree as to one is appealable) with Sheppy v.
Stevens, 200 F. 946 (2d Cir. 1912) (decision sustaining demurrer to one cause of action not
appealable where another cause of action remained unresolved).
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and a decretal order entered, which finally disposes of his right or
claim, such order is final for purposes of an appeal and may be re-
viewed before the actual termination of the litigation in the main
case.
The ground upon which the courts place their decisions, holding
orders of this sort to be appealable, is that the intervening proceedings
constitute a separate controversy, arising incidentally in the main
cause, but presenting an independent and distinct issue to be deter-
mined between the parties to it. When the court makes a decretal
order finally disposing of that controversy, as between all the parties
to be affected by it, it is a final decree from which an appeal will
lie.
4 7 6
In this respect, the result in a case like Greenough, sanctioning sepa-
rate appeals of the central controversy between plaintiff and defendant
and the issue of award of common fund fees, is consistent with the pre-
Federal Rules conception of finality: the dispute over attorney's fees be-
tween the plaintiff's attorney and the beneficiaries of the fund is distinct
from the dispute between plaintiff and defendant, and a resolution of
either constituted an appealable decision of the rights and obligations of
the parties to that distinct dispute.
Rule 54(b), however, although substantially expanding the number
of potentially appealable decisions, also imposed a restriction on the ap-
pealability of decisions such as those discussed above.47 7 Although
before adoption of rule 54(b) final decisions of less than all claims or as
to less than all parties were appealable immediately as of right, after
adoption of the rule they were appealable only upon an express determi-
nation by the district court to "dispatch" the separate matter for appel-
late review.478 Absent a certification under rule 54(b), appeal is deferred
476 F. LOVELAND, THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 150 (1911)
(footnote omitted). Although the quoted passage refers to distinct disputes engendered be-
cause of intervention, the principle is not so limited. Thus, Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S.
527 (1881) was cited in the omitted footnote as an example of this type of exception to the
final decision requirement. See Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 370-71 (1920); R. MARKER,
FEDERAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 37-38 (1935); Boskey, supra note 38, at
1011.
When the claim related to a party jointly charged or jointly asserting a claim with an-
other person still a party to the action, the joint aspect of the claim prevented separate ap-
peals. Hohorst v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 148 U.S. 262 (1893).
477 The validity of the "positive" aspect of the rule, permitting appeal of formerly nonfi-
nal decisions, was a highly controversial matter in the courts of appeals until the Supreme
Court resolved the issue in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956). In contrast,
the "negative" aspect of the amended rule was generally accepted on the theory that it was
merely an extension of the trial court's intention as to whether any decision was "final." See
Note, Federal Procedure-Federal Rule 54(b) and the Final Judgment Rule, 28 N.Y.U. L. REv. 203,
208-15 (1953); Note, Separate Review of Claims in Multiple Claims Suits: Appellate Jurisdiction Under
Amended Federal Rule 54(b), 62 YALE L.J. 263, 265-72 (1953).
478 A possible exception to this rule is that a refusal to permit intervention as of right is
appealable without a rule 54(b) determination. See Huckeby v. Frozen Foods Express, 555
F.2d 542, 549 (5th Cir. 1977). A less than completely satisfactory explanation for this excep-
19841
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until resolution of all claims. Thus, although a dismissal of the merits of
an intervenor's claim was final and appealable before adoption of the
Federal Rules, such a decision would not be final under rule 54(b), un-
less the district court made the express determination that the rule
requires.
4 79
An objection to the foregoing analysis might proceed on the basis
that rule 54(b) is inapplicable to common fund fee requests. 48 0 Professor
Moore has argued vigorously that rule 54(b) is inapplicable to decisions
that qualify for appeal under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v.
BeneficialIndustrial Loan Corp. 481 That argument is reasonable enough: if
delaying appellate review would render the appeal ineffective in pre-
serving the appellant's rights, there is little reason to require that the
district court also give its sanction to an appeal by making the rule 54(b)
certification that there is "no just reason for delay. '48 2 However, a few
courts have carried this argument one step further to conclude that the
collateral order doctrine sanctions separate appeals of the merits and
common fund fee requests, thereby rendering rule 54(b) inapplicable.
483
Under this view, Greenough was merely a precursor of the "collateral
order" doctrine of Cohen. Although such a view is plausible,4 84 it ignores
tion is that such a refusal does not resolve a distinct dispute, but simply declines to hear it.
Note, Federal Rule 54(b): The Multiple Claims Requirenent, 43 VA. L. REv. 229, 247 n. 110
(1957).
479 See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 512 (1950); Republic of
China v. American Express Co., 190 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1951). But qf. Pabellon v. Grace Line,
191 F.2d 169, 176 n. la (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., concurring) (suggestng that mandamus or collat-
eral order doctrine may sanction appeal of order denying leave to intervene as of right), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 893 (1951).
480 Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., 517 F.2d 555, 560-61 (7th Cir. 1975); cf Fase
v. Seafarers Welfare & Pension Plan, 79 F.R.D. 363, 366 n.6 (E.D.N.Y.) (judgment treated as
final on appeal, even though judgment was silent as to claim for common benefit and statu-
tory attorney's fees and made no rule 54(b) determination), afd, 589 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1978).
481 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.04[3.-
5], 54.31 (2d ed. 1983).
482 See, e.g., Redding & Co. v. Russwine Constr. Corp., 417 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
One might take issue with Professor Moore even on this point. If district court review of
appeals based on the collateral order doctrine screened out more improper appeals than the
number of proper appeals that it incorrectly refused to certify, the additional effort by the
district court might well be worthwhile. In making this assessment, one would also have to
consider the relative costs of preventing a proper appeal as opposed to permitting an im-
proper appeal. The availability of the "relief valve" of mandamus might minimize the in-
stances where a district court's refusal to certify pursuant to rule 54(b) frustrates a legitimate
appeal. See Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 624 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
925 (1972); 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976).
483 Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., 517 F.2d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 1975); see Angoff
v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 186 (1st Cir. 1959); cf. Lowe v. Pate Stevedoring Co. 595 F.2d 256,
257 (5th Cir. 1979) (attorney's fee award collateral order and separately appealable despite
pending petition seeking job reinstatement). But see West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314
F. Supp. 710, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), af'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871
(1971).
484 It is difficult to find in the Greenough opinion any notion of the necessity for immediate
review to preserve the rights of the appealing party. The Court did note that the challenged
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a significant difference between collateral orders and common fund fee
requests. The collateral order doctrine permits an appeal, before judg-
ment, of a subsidiary dispute that arises in a case involving a single bi-
lateral claim between plaintiff and defendant. The collateral matter
does not involve a claim for relief, but rather concerns a procedural as-
pect involved in adjudication of the claim.48 5 The significance of the
collateral rights and obligations at stake and the likelihood that delayed
appellate review would be ineffective in preserving the rights asserted
justify interlocutory appeal.
48 6
By contrast, a common fund fee petition involves a claim either by
the plaintiff for partial reimbursement of attorney's fees from his coben-
eficiaries or, more frequently,487 a claim by the attorneys against non-
client beneficiaries for compensation for producing the fund that will
ultimately benefit them. Although the precise legal and equitable bases
upon which these claims arise are less than clear,488 they do involve
claims for monetary relief. In an analogous area, claims by a defendant
for contribution or indemnity from a third party defendant, even when
limited to the expenses of litigation489 or asserted as cross-claims be-
tween two defendants, are distinct claims subject to rule 54(b) and not
appealable under the collateral order doctrine established by the Court
in Cohen.
Moreover, in most cases the collateral order doctrine would not
sanction separate appeals of a final determination of common fund fees
in the absence of a final determination of the remainder of the case.
Even more clearly, the collateral order doctrine would not sanction an
orders provided for immediate payment to Vose, but Vose was a substantial bondholder who
had advanced the costs of litigation to that point. There was no suggestion and little reason
to believe that delaying appeal until the lower court had completed administration of the
fund might have resulted in an inability to recoup the funds paid to Vose if the award was
reversed on appeal. Rather, the Court's opinion, although oblique, suggests that the distinct
nature of the claim, coupled with the unfairness to the parties of delaying review for a sub-
stantial period of time, led the Court to sanction a separate appeal. But see F. LOVELAND,
supra note 476, at 154 (appeal in such situations justified because once money is paid, it is
beyond court's jurisdiction). Those are the same concerns that led to the enactment of Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). See supra note 463; see also Sears, Roebuck &Co. v. Mack-
ey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956).
485 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2658.4 (1983); see Swift & Co. v. Compania Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950); Roberts v. United
States District Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950). But cf. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982)
(appeal of denial of absolute immunity defense).
486 See supra text accompanying notes 347-51.
487 See Dawson, supra note 18, at 1614 (estimating that lawyers, rather than clients, seek
common fund fees in 98% of cases); Dawson, supra note 413, at 851-52.
488 The derivation of the common fund and common benefit exceptions from the law of
restitution and unjust enrichment has been extensively discussed by Professor John Dawson.
See Dawson,supra note 18; Dawson, supra note 413. Others have analogized such fees to "mar-
itime salvage." In re Osofsky, 50 F.2d 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The
"Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. REV. 658 (1956).
489 Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 642 F.2d 614 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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appeal of the merits while the fees remain to be decided, which is the
typical chronology in which the issues are resolved.4  The necessity of
immediate appeal, a crucial factor in Cohen, simply is not present in
common fund attorney's fee cases.
49'
Thus, rejecting the mandatory separate appeal aspect of Sprague
while recognizing the flexibility afforded by rule 54(b) would reduce the
number of appellate considerations of the same case and overlapping
issues. It would also provide the district court with room to maneuver in
the complex and various cases in which common fund fees are sought.
4 9 2
A recent Supreme Court common fund case, Boeing Co. v. Van
Gemert,493 illustrates this point. After the trial court determined the ex-
tent of Boeing's liability to the class, it declared that each individual
recovery would bear a proportionate share of any fees awarded to the
class's lawyer from the fund. Boeing appealed only the last aspect of the
judgment, on the ground that class members who did not claim their
share of the fund would have received no benefit. Boeing argued that
490 Although Sprague provides support for separate appeals in this situation, its rationale
is unrelated to the reasoning behind the collateral order doctrine. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 461-62.
491 Unusual circumstances might justify an appeal of a common fund fee award under
the collateral order doctrine. One might even argue that whether such an interlocutory ap-
peal is governed by rule 54(b) or Cohen is unimportant, as long as an appeal is permitted in
the proper situation. Under this view, the provisions permitting appeal under these two doc-
trines would be largely coextensive, with rule 54(b) requiring the additional condition of
approval by the district court.
Aside from the doctrinal questions of whether Cohen applies to "claims for relief" and
whether rule 54(b) applies to less than a claim for relief, see Hooks v. Washington Sheraton
Corp., 642 F.2d 614 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Redding & Co. v. Russwine Constr. Corp., 417 F.2d 721
(D.C. Cir. 1969), it does appear that the provisions of rule 54(b) are more flexible and poten-
tially more encompassing than Cohen. Compare Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446
U.S. 1, 10 (1980) (district court has discretion to grant rule 54(b) requests in interest of sound
judicial administration; court of appeals should give such decision "substantial deference")
with Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) ("To come within the 'small
class' of decisions excepted from the final-judgment rule by Cohen, the order must conclusively
determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the
merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."). But
see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (sanctioning Cohen appeal of claim of absolute
immunity without addressing whether it was collateral to merits or effectively unreviewable if
delayed until final judgment). In any case, it is difficult to conceive of a Cohen sanctioned
appeal of a decision on the merits while the attorney's fee issue remains in the trial court. Yet
rule 54(b) would clearly afford discretion to enter judgment in such a situation. See Curtiss-
Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1 (1980); Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corp.,
642 F.2d 614 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
492 See The Supreme Court, 1955 Tenn, 70 HARV. L. REv. 83, 144 (1956).
In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983), presents a stunning exam-
ple of this complexity. The district court required two years and a 190 page opinion to sort
through the petitions of 41 law firms and state attorneys general for over $20 million in attor-
ney's fees. Where the fee proceedings take on such a massive character, permitting a defend-
ant appellate review of an unfavorable judgment before resolution of the fee request, which
might cloud financial statements, business opportunities and the like, would seem essential.
493 444 U.S. 472 (1980).
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the court, therefore, should not charge fees against the allocable share of
the nonclaiming class members. Because Boeing claimed that it was
entitled to any unclaimed portion of the fund, it objected to the pro rata
assessment, which would reduce the amount of the unclaimed funds.
Regardless of the outcome of Boeing's appeal, other potential appeals
remained. The amount of fees awarded as well as the issue of Boeing's
ownership of the unclaimed funds still might engender an appeal. Re-
quiring final resolution of all these matters might well have advanced
the ultimate conclusion of the case and reduced the number of appellate
considerations of related matters. At the same time, rule 54(b) would
afford the district court discretion to render a final decision on Boeing's




COMMON BENEFIT ATTORNEY'S FEES
A logical outgrowth of the common fund doctrine, the common
benefit exception authorizes a court to reimburse fees despite the ab-
sence of a monetary fund against which to assess fees. The theoretical
underpinnings of the common fund exception justify its extension to
those situations where no money or property is brought within the juris-
diction of the court: those who benefit from the litigation in some rea-
sonably direct way495 should contribute to the costs of producing those
benefits. In the absence of a discrete fund or asset against which to as-
sess fees, courts have substituted the defendant as a proxy where there is
494 In addition to the "multiple party" provision of rule 54(b), a common fund fee re-
quest arguably might constitute a "claim for relief" within the meaning of that rule. See infia
text accompanying note 512.
Logically, seeking recovery from an entity other than the defendant suggests that a sepa-
rate claim for relief is being asserted. Yet a common fund fee request is not a classical cause
of action; the claim for fees is dependent not only on the transaction or occurrence that forms
the basis for the plaintiff's claim, but also on the successful litigation and consequent estab-
lishment of a fund. There is little precedent on the question of whether a common fund fee
request can be asserted in a separate action against the beneficiaries. See Pettus v. Georgia
R.R. & Banking Co., 19 F. Cas. 396 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1879) (No. 11,048) (petition for common
fund fees treated as separate suit for removal purposes), rev'd on other grounds, 113 U.S. 116
(1885); cf. Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., 517 F.2d 555, 560-61 (7th Cir. 1975) (com-
mon benefit fee petition does not constitute a separate "cause of action" for rule 54(b) pur-
poses). The tendency toward expanding the scope of a cause of action for res judicata
purposes in the interest of efficiency suggests that the common fund fee request should be
asserted in the same proceeding in which the fund is established. See infla note 512.
495 The "reasonably direct way" qualification is intended to address the question raised
by Professor Dawson: should a lawyer who establishes a legal principle that through stare
decisis enables another person to recover against an unrelated party on an unrelated claim
many years later be entitled to assert a claim for attorney's fees against the plaintiff in the
second case? See Dawson, supra note 413, at 917-18. The obvious answer is no, although the
gradations of degree from the hypothetical to a Sprague-type situation are substantial. Ulti-
mately, a point must be selected to decide which claims should be recognized. See, e.g., Dorf-
man v. First Boston Corp., 70 F.R.D. 366, 369-73 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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some basis for passing the fees along to those ultimately benefiting.496
Sprague v. Ticonic National Ban "4 97 illustrates the-easy transition from
common fund to common benefit theory. 498 Although no specific fund
had been established against which the other trust beneficiaries could
assert claims, the outcome of the suit entitled those bondholders,
through stare decisis at least, 499 to recovery from the proceeds of the
bonds under the control of the defendants. Despite the absence of a fund
within the court's jurisdiction, 50 0 the plaintiff sought counsel fees from
the defendant receiver,50 1 who presumably would then deduct the pro
rata share of each beneficiary for the fees from each beneficiary's claim.
In this scenario, the defendant acts merely as a conduit to channel fees
from the beneficiaries to the plaintiff50 2 and thus should be indifferent
about an award of fees.
50 3
Where no monetary benefits are produced or where the connection
496 For a discussion of what constitutes a "benefit" sufficient to invoke the common bene-
fit-attorney's fee machinery, see Dawson, supra note 413, at 863-70.
497 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
498 Although difficult to divine from the Court's opinion, Central R.R. & Banking Co. v.
Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885), contained elements of a common benefit theory. The attorneys
were proceeding against the defendants to establish a lien on property that remained after
satisfying the claims of the underlying suit. See Pettus v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 19
Fed. Cas. 396 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1879) (No. 11,048). In this respect, the situation in Pettus very
much resembles that in Sprague.
499 Professor Dawson has contended that because of the express trust established on be-
half of all of the beneficiaries, it would have been a violation of the defendant's fiduciary
obligation to treat them differently. Dawson, supra note 413, at 917 n.285.
500 Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 28 F. Supp. 229, 230 (D. Me. 1939), rev'd in part and
af'd in part, 110 F.2d 174 (Ist Cir. 1940).
501 Sprague v. Picher, 23 F. Supp. 59 (D. Me.), af'd sub nom. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l
Bank, 99 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1938), rev'd, 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
Justice Frankfurter characterized the source from which the fees were sought by the
plaintiff as "the proceeds of the bonds." Sprague, 307 U.S. at 163.
502 See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 393 (1970) (beneficiaries "could be
forced to contribute to the costs of the suit by an order reimbursing the plaintiff from the
defendant's assets out of which their recoveries later would have to come").
Remarkably, this escaped the district court in Sprague on remand. The proceeds of the
sale of the bonds were in excess of the 14 trust beneficiaries' claims and thus the excess was
subject to the unsecured creditors' claims. The district court, rather than imposing the fees
pro rata on each trust beneficiary, directed that the fees be reimbursed from the excess,
thereby imposing plaintiff's attorney's fees on the unsecured creditors, who, if anything, had
been detrimentally affected by the suit. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 28 F. Supp. 229, 231
(D. Me. 1939), reo'd in part and afd in part, 110 F.2d 174 (lst Cir. 1940). The court of appeals
affirmed this aspect of the decision based on the "trivial disadvantage" to the unsecured cred-
itors and some ambiguous language in the Supreme Court's opinion about the "interest of the
common creditors where the funds of the bank are not sufficient to pay them in full."
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 110 F.2d 174, 176-77 (1st Cir. 1940) (quoting Sprague v.
Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939)). This language was probably intended to
address whether equity would warrant an award of attorney's fees rather than their allocation
once the award had been made.
503 Other motivations beyond a concern with the financial bottom line may affect the
defendant's response to a common benefit fee request. In Sprague, for example, the defendant
may have had obligations to protect the interests of the other trust beneficiaries, see supra note
1984] A TTORNEYS FEES
between the defendant's control over the assets and the beneficiary's
claim to them is less direct, the defendant is less able to function as a
conduit. Thus, in Mills, the benefit produced, detecting and identifying
a violation of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,504
was a sufficient advantage to the stockholders of the acquired corpora-
tion to justify payment of fees by the defendant, the merged corpora-
tion.505 But surely the stockholders of the acquiring corporation did not
benefit from the suit, yet they were also required to absorb their pro rata
share of the fee award.50 6 The general deterrent value of such share-
holder derivative suits may also benefit stockholders of other corpora-
tions,50 7 yet they are not required to share in the expenses of litigation.
The crucial point is that when the conduit function of the defend-
ant becomes less than perfect, 508 as it has in many common benefit
cases, 509 the attorney's fees issue becomes a controversy between the
plaintiff (or counsel) and the defendant. This situation more closely re-
sembles the statutory fee model: additional monetary liability is as-
serted against the defendant. The applicability of rule 54(b) becomes
more doubtful because the fee question in this situation is less separate
and distinct from the main controversy.
Nevertheless, there remain valid grounds for retaining the discre-
tion afforded by rule 54(b) in common benefit cases. Because of the
uncertain point at which common fund requests turn the corner and
become common benefit requests, 510 uniformity in procedural treatment
of the two will reduce confusion and attendant litigation. The language
of rule 54(b) requires multiple parties, a requirement that is satisfied
when the attorney rather than the plaintiff makes the fee request.5 11
499, as well as the unsecured creditors of the bank, who ultimately bore the brunt of Lottie
Sprague's attorney's fees. See supra note 502.
504 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
505 An alternative explanation for charging fees to a defendant corporation in a share-
holders' derivative suit is that the plaintiff is merely doing what the corporation should be
doing. If the corporation had fulfilled its obligation, it would have borne the costs of suit.
This alternative better justifies charging fees to the corporation, especially where, as in Mills,
the lawsuit benefited only a portion of the stockholders. See Dawson, supra note 413, at 865-
70; Comment, The Allocation of Attorn's Fees A2er Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. CHI.
L. REv. 316, 333 (1971).
506 See Fase v. Seafarers Welfare & Pension Plan, 589 F.2d 112, 116 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978);
Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 191-92 (lst Cir. 1959).
507 See The Supreme Court, 1969 Tem, 84 HARV. L. Rev. 1, 215-18 (1970).
508 Even when the defendant can identify and isolate assets against which to charge an
award of fees, there may be instances where the defendant is not indifferent to the allocation
of monetary benefits between the plaintiff and beneficiaries of the litigation. In that situa-
tion, the defendant may vigorously contest the fee claim. See, e.g., National Council of Com-
munity Mental Health Centers v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 954 (1977).
509 See supra note 432.
510 See Dawson,supra note 18, at 1615-20.
511 A skeptic might assert that the attorney is not a party and therefore the rule 54(b)
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Whether a claim for fees from a defendant based on the common
benefit rationale is a distinct "claim for relief" within the terms of rule
54(b) is a rather metaphysical matter.512 In a theoretical sense the com-
mon benefit claim differs from the statutory fee claim; a statutory claim
arises because of the defendant's liability for some invasion of plaintiff's
substantive right, the justification for common benefit fees results from
the benefit conferred on a class. That distinction is a slender reed for
concluding that common benefit fees constitute a claim for relief even
though statutory fees do not.
Ultimately, the complexity and diversity of cases in which a com-
mon benefit fee request might be made provide the most persuasive
ground for leaving discretion in the trial court to enter separate, appeal-
requirement that "multiple parties are involved" is not met. In a formalistic sense there is
some truth to this assertion. The attorney's name does not appear as a party in the pleadings.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Once an attorney makes a request for an award of attorney's fees,
however, she surely has the sort of interest in the proceeding that is congruent with that of a
party. A number of cases permitting attorneys to intervene and appeal recognize this eco-
nomic reality. Eg., Lipscomb v. Wise, 643 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1981).
512 The meaning of the term "claim for relief" contained in rule 54(b) has engendered
substantial controversy and confusion. A number of theories have been proposed. The trans-
action test focuses on whether the claims arise from distinct factual transactions or occur-
rences, RePass v. Vreeland, 357 F.2d 801, 805 (3d Cir. 1966). The separate legal claim theory
on the other hand gives primacy to the asserted substantive legal claim. School Dist. No. 5 v.
Lundgren, 259 F.2d 101, 104 (9th Cir. 1958); Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 209 F.2d 802, 807 (D.C.
Cir. 1954). For a discussion of these theories, see C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
CODE PLEADING 127-48 (2d ed. 1947). Adoption of one of the theories does not resolve all
questions because there is disagreement as to the correct interpretation of them. See, e.g.,
Note, Federal Procedure-Federal Rule 54(b) and the Final Judgment Rule, 28 N.Y.U. L. REv. 203,
210 n.47 (1953); Note, Separate Review of Claims in Multiple Claiu Suits: Appellate Jurisdiction
Under Amended Federal Rule 51(b), 62 YALE LJ. 263, 265 (1953).
Before the 1948 amendment to rule 54(b) that deleted the "arising out of the transaction
or occurrence" language, the Supreme Court sanctioned a transaction test in Reaves v.
Beardall, 316 U.S. 283, 285 (1942). After the amendment, however, the Court, in permitting
rule 54(b) certification of two claims that had a factual overlap with two unresolved claims,
rejected the transaction theory and appeared to move toward the separate legal claim theory.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956). Nevertheless, the lower courts have
been grudging in their acceptance of the implications of Mack, which would permit far
broader use of rule 54(b). See, e.g., McIntyre v. First Nat'l Bank, 585 F.2d 190, 192 (6th Cir.
1978); Wheeler v. American Home Prods. Corp., 582 F.2d 891, 896 (5th Cir. 1977); Arnold v.
Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 66 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
One commentator has suggested that "claim for relief" should be treated as equivalent to
"cause of action" for resjudicata purposes. 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2657 (2d ed 1983). Thus, if claims that could have been sepa-
rately asserted are voluntarily joined together in one suit, the option of separate judgments
and appeals should be afforded. In the attorney's fee context, this would make rule 54(b)
available only if the fee petition could be asserted in a separate lawsuit, a result that is unde-
sirable because of its inefficiency. See supra text accompanying notes 449-71; see also Van
Home v. Treadwell, 164 Cal. 620, 130 P. 5 (1913); Leslie v. Carter, 268 Mo. 420, 187 S.W.
1196 (1916). Contra Ritter v. Ritter, 308 Ill. App. 337, 32 N.E.2d 185 (1941); see supra note
428; cf Varnes v. Local 91, 674 F.2d 1365 (11 th Cir. 1982) (bad faith fee request constitutes
"new or additional claim for relief" for purposes of service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 5(a)).
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able judgments on the merits and with regard to attorney's fees. The
need for a determination under rule 54(b) of "no just reason for delay"
requires the trial judge to consider whether separate judgments are de-
sirable. With appellate review of that discretion available, sufficient
flexibility would exist to sever claims in the unusual case, but ordinarily
resolution of all matters before entry of judgment and appeal would
occur.
CONCLUSION
In decisions a hundred years apart, the Supreme Court classified
attorney's fees as a remote orphan divorced from the nuclear family of
relief for appealability purposes. With the increasing importance of at-
torney's fees to parties asserting federal statutory and constitutional
claims, and the concomitant burden placed on the courts to resolve dis-
puted claims over entitlement to fees, it is time to reexamine whether
the "collateral and independent" status of attorney's fees for procedural
purposes can peacefully coexist with efficient judicial administration
and still ensure fairness to the parties.
For the reasons identified, particularly in the statutory fee arena, I
believe the collateral and independent approach is an anachronism.
Time and empirical study may prove me wrong; prompt resolution of
fee requests and consolidation where both the merits and fees are ap-
pealed may turn out to be an adequate alternative.
In any case, providing clear and certain rules to govern the mul-
tifaceted procedural problems raised by the relationship among the mer-
its, attorney's fees, and appeals is of paramount importance. The White
decision is a step, albeit small and halting, in that direction. As the
federal courts travel further down this highway, I modestly offer the
thoughts presented in this article as a signpost, or perhaps a guardrail,
for their guidance.
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